

THE RISE AND FALL
of the
ROHILLA POWER in HINDUSTAN.
(1707-1774 A.D.).

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London, 1936.

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Abstract of Thesis.

The Rise and Fall of the Rohilla power in Hindustan.

I. Origin and character of the Rohillas.

2. Circumstances which favoured the rise of the Rohilla power in Hindustan:

- (I) Condition of the Empire
- (2) Situation in Rohilkhand.

3. Daud Khan Rohilla and the beginning of the Rohilla state. (1707-26)

4. Ali Muhammad Khan Rohilla and the establishment of the Rohilla state. (1726-48)

5. Rohilla struggle for existence (1748-52).

- Attack by the newly appointed Nazim of Rohilkhand.
- Attack by the Nawab of Farrukhabad.
- Expedition led by the Wazir.

6. Establishment of a separate Rohilla state under Najib Khan and the role of the Rohillas in the politics of Hindustan. (1754-70)

- Najib Khan given Jagir beyond the Ganges and is taken in the Imperial service.
- Invasion of Ahmad Shah Abdali (1757), and the appointment of Najib Khan as Mir Bakhshi.
- Invasion of the Marathas and the expulsion of Najib Khan from Delhi.
- Invasion of Ahmad Shah Abdali (1760-61) and the defeat of the Marathas at Panipat.
- Establishment of Najib Khan as the Dictator of Delhi.

7. Attitude of the Rohillas towards the Maratha invasion of Hindustan. (1770-73)

8. Relation between the Rohillas and the government of the East India Company in Bengal. (1765-74).

9. Internal affairs of the Rohilkhand State. (1748-74).

10. Rohilla war and the Treaty of Laldang. (1774).

II. Administration and the military tactics of the Rohillas.

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DAZ

The above gives an approximate idea of the formation of the Nevada and the first great outbreak is 1796.





A P P E N D I X

A S E L E C T B I B L I O G R A P H Y.

MANUSCRIPTS:

(Arranged according to alphabetical order).

A - PERSIAN.

(1) Ain -i-Alam Shahi (India Office Ms..)

It is a history of Emperor Shah Alam by Ghulam Ali Khan, son of Raushan-ud-daula Bhikari Khan Rustamjang, in two volumes, and was written in 1793 A.D. The first volume begins with the deposition of Ahmad Shal (1754) and goes up to 1778, and the second volume covers the period 1772-1791 A.D. The work gives very little about the Rohillas and refers to them very briefly in connection with the Emperor.

(2) Bayan-i-Waqai (India Office Ms..).

This work, which is divided into two parts, namely, the biography of Nadir Shah and the history of the Mughal Emperors, up to 1793 A.D., was written by Abdul Karim Kashmiri, who had come to India in Nadir Shah's train. The author had travelled a lot and hence his account of the Abdali invasions and of Oudh and Rohilkhand are very accurate in details.

(3) Gulistan-i-Rahmat (India Office Ms..)

It is a detailed history of the Rohillas from their advent into Rohilkhand to 1792 A.D., when the work was written. The author, Muhammad Mustajab Khan, who was the son of Hafiz Rhamat Khan, had tried to suppress everything that seemed to throw discredit on his father and has even invented things to eulogise him. Thus, without mentioning the part played by Dundas Khan as the assistant of Ali Muhammad Khan, he asserts that Hafiz was nominated by Ali Muhammad Khan as his successor and even invents the story that Hafiz was given the title of Nawab by the Emperor, when he was at Delhi to support Safdar Jang against his rival, Intizam, for the Wizarat (vide p. 85). The work, nevertheless, because of the enormous details it gives about different events which corroborate with other authorities is one of the main source for our purpose.

(4) Gul-i-Rahmat (A true copy of the Allahabad University Ms.)

This work which was written in 1834 by Sadat Yar Khan, the grandson of Hafiz Rahmat Khan, is written in the same spirit as the Gulistan-i-Rahmat. In fact, it seems to be merely an expanded recension of the other work, for, without giving any new facts, it makes minor alterations. Thus it gives the exact sum paid by Daud Khan to Shah Alam Khan.

(5) Hadiqat-ul-Aqalim (Printed by N.K. Press, Lucknow.).

It is primarily a topographical account of the world as Murtaza Hussain Khan Bilgrami, the author, understood it to be, but it gives an extremely valuable account of the activities of the Rohillas during the time of Ali Muhammad Khan and their subsequent relations with the Bangash Nawabs of Farrukhabad. The author who was in the service of both the Oudh Nawabs, Sadat Khan and Safdar Jang, and the Bangash Nawab, Admad Khan Bangash, has recorded some important facts about the Rohillas, which the regular Rohilla historians do not mention, although he wrote the work in 1781 A.D. Thus the details about the appointments of officials in charge of separate departments by Ali Muhammad Khan in 1742 is best given by him.

(6) Imad-us-Saadat (Printed by N.K. Press, Lucknow.).

It is a regular history of the Nawabs of Oudh from Sadat Khan to Sadat Ali Khan, the fifth ruler of the dynasty, and was written in 1808 A.D. The author, Mir Ghulam Ali, was a Court writer and has tried to shield the Oudh Nawabs from as much blame as he could. Thus for the relation between Oudh and Rohilkhand during the time of Shuja-ud-daula it is very misleading, but for the early history of the Rohillas, it gives some details which are not to be found in any other authority. Thus the early occupation of Daud Khan in Katehr is given by him first. Further, it supports the Hadiqat-ul-Aqalim in the details which the latter gives about the officials appointed by Ali Muhammad Khan.

(7) Khazana-i-Amara (Printed at Cawnpore).

It is a voluminous work on all the personalities who had lived during the time of the author, Ghulam Ali Azad, written in 1763 A.D. The work gives the account of the Rohillas when speaking about Safdar Jang, and although rather brief, is very accurate for dates.

(8) *Khulasat-ul-Ansab* (India Office Ms.).

This work was written by Hafiz Rahmat Khan himself, to give the geneology of the Afghan tribes settled in Rohilkhand, because they were growing up in sad ignorance of their pedigree and relationship, and was completed in 1771 A.D. It also give the details about the ancestors of Hafiz Rahmat Khan.

(9) *Masir-ul-Umara* (Bibliotheca Indica publication - 3 vols.)

It is a biographical dictionary of the Mughal peerage and hence devotes about two pages on Ali Muhammad Khan. The author Shah Nawaz Khan, Samsam-ud-daula, who was an important officer of the Nizam of Haidradad, began the work on the basis of contemporary Persian manuscripts in 1768, and completed it in 1780. The brief account given by him about the Rohilla chief is very useful.

(10) *Nuruddin* - (British Museum Ms.).

Since there is another work entitled *Tarikh-i-Nawab Najib-ud-daula*, and since this work which was written by Sayyid Nuruddin Hasan Khan Bahadur Fakhri, has no title, I have put it under the heading of the author's name. The author was the Munshi of Imad-ul-Mulk, the rival of Najib Khan, and ~~was~~ was an eye witness of most of the events narrated. Hence the detail given by him about this celebrated Rohilla chief is very impartial and accurate.

(11) *Siyar-ul-Mutakhkharin* (Printed by N.K.Press, Lucknow). 3 vols.

It is a comprehensive history of India from the earliest times to 1780 A.D., the year of its completion, and was written by Sayyid Ghulam Husain Khan, son of Sayyid Hedayat Ali Khan who was the Nazim of Bareilly before Ali Muhammad Khan, and who took active part in the civil war at Delhi against his patron, Safdar Jang. Hence the author, being able to obtain first hand information regarding Ali Muhammad Khan and the subsequent affairs of Oudh and Delhi, his account of Ahmad Shah's reign is extremely valuable. The translation of this work by Mustafa is very defective, because he frequently omits the dates given in the Persian text.

(12) *Tarikh-i-Ahmad Shahi* (British Museum Ms.).

It is a history of the Emperor, Ahmad Shah (1748-54) and is dated 1851 A.D. The author does not give his name, nor does he give reference to himself in the course of the history. But from the circumstantial character of his narrative it seems that he lived in Delhi and witnessed the events recorded. His account is most valuable for the period for he was no Courtier and passes severe judgment on the Emperor and his ministers, specially Safdar Jang and Imad-ul-Mulk.

(13) *Tarikh-i-Alamgir-i-Sani* (British Museum Ms.).

This is a minute and evidently a contemporary record in which the transactions of the reign of Alamgir II (1754-60) are stated with great chronological precision and almost from day to day throughout the whole period. The author's name is not given, nor is there any indirect reference to him in the work but because of the accurate details given of most of the events, it seems almost certain that he was a resident of Delhi. There is no mention either of the time when the work was written.

(14) *Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh* (India Office Ms.).

It is the best existing account of the Rohilla history and was written in 1776 by Shiv Prasad, who was in the service of Faizulla Khan, to whom the work is dedicated. The author, however, is rather partial to Faizulla Khan's family and besides asserting that Ali Muhammad Khan was the son of Daud Khan and that the latter was the son of Shah Alam Khan, says "Sadulla Khan and Faizulla Khan were given the Maratha possessions in the lower Doab by Ahmad Shah Abdali in 1761, who in their turn gave them to Enayat Khan, Dundi Khan and Shuja-ud-daula, (vide p. 155). But the work is full of details which are also supported to a large extent by *Tawarikh-i-Afaghana* and *Qissai Ahwal-i-Rohilla* - details which the *Gulistan-i-Rahmat* either suppresses or tries to misinterpret, namely, the appointment of a regency of all the Rohilla chiefs to direct the conduct of affairs in 1748 and the high-handed action of Hafiz in having the possessions of the principal Rohilla chiefs divided on their death, among their sons, instead of letting the eldest son get possession of the whole, as was usual among the Rohillas.

(15) *Tarikh-i-Farrukhabad* (British Museum Ms.)

It is a history of the Bangash Nawabs of Farrukhabad, written by Sayyid Muhammad Waliulla in 1828 A.D. when he was eighty years old. The author also gives in the course of his narrative copious details on contemporary events and biographical notices of all the principal actors who appeared on the scene from the reign of Muhammad Shah to his own time.

(16) *Tarikh-i-Hindi* (British Museum Ms.).

It is a general history of India brought down to 1741 A.D. Rustam Ali, the author, had served in the army of Baji Rao and had finally entered the service of the State of Bhopal. His work, which was completed in 1742, is useful for our purpose only in connection with Daud Khan's part for Sabir Shah, a pretender to the royal title. (1726).

(17). *Tarikh-i-Jahan Kushai* (India Office Ms.).

It is a history of Nadir Shah from his rise to his death (1747) by Muhammad Mehdi Astrabadi. The author was attached to Nadir Shah's service and hence was the eye witness of the things recorded in his work.

(18) *Tarikh-i-Khan Jahani-wa Makhzan-ul-Afghani* (India Office Ms.)

It is a fuller redaction of Khwaja Niamatulla's History of the Afghans (*Makhzan-i-Afghani*) which was completed on the 1st February 1613 and is dedicated to Khanjahan Lodi in whose service the author was at that time. The author does not give his name, but the subject covered in his work is the origin of the Afghans and their activities including that of the Lodi and Sur dynasty in India.

(19) *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari* (British Museum Ms.).

It is a general history of the Mughal Empire and comes down to 1779 A.D. From the time of Muhammad Shah onwards, it is arranged chronologically. The author, Muhammad Ali Khan Ansari, being in the service of Muhammad Raza Khan Muzaffar Jang, the Naib-Nazim of Bengal, when he wrote the work in 1800 A.D. named it after his patron. The work seems to have been based on *Siyay-ul-Mutakhkharin* for the Rohilla affairs particularly, for it gives nothing new.

(20) **Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukhsiyar wa Jalus-i-Muhammad Shah.**
(British Museum Ms.)

It is a detailed history of the reign of Muhammad Shah up to 1739 A.D. written in 1783 A.D. Muhammad Bakhsh (pen name Ashub) intended to bring it to the time of composition but failed to do so, due perhaps to his death. He had served Munir-ud-daula, the governor of the Panjab, Intizam-ud-daula, the wazir, and finally Imad-ul-Mulk, the wazir, and hence was an eye witness of the events he has recorded.

(21) **Tawarikh-i-Afaghana.** (British Museum Ms.).

It is a regular history of the Rohillas from the beginning to 1805 A.D. written by a zealous Muslim who seems to be a member of the family of Azmatulla Khan, the Nazim of Maradabad, about whom he speaks in detail. This work which is dated 1834 A.D., is the best account available on the Rohillas for their early activities and helps us to find out the mistakes of both the Gulistan-i-Rahmat and the Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh for the later history of the Rohillas (1748 onwards). Thus it informs us about the early settlement of the Rohillas in Rohilkhand before Daud Khan's arrival in India. Besides Rohilla affairs, this work also gives the correct dates of the events happening at Delhi although it describes them very briefly.

B - URDU.

(1) **Akhbar-i-Hasan** (British Museum Ms.).

It is a general history of the Rohilkhand State from the beginning to 1788 A.D., and was written by Hasan Raza Khan, the great-grandson of Hafiz Rahmat Khan. The author tries to eulogise both his renowned ancestor and Faizulla Khan, the Nawab of Rampur. Thus he tries to maintain that Hafiz was the nominated successor of Ali Muhammad Khan to the Nawabship and at the same time says Ali Muhammad Khan was the son of Daud Khan and that Shah Alam Khan was murdered by thieves and not at the instigation of Daud Khan. Again, his version of some of the events is a compromise between Gulistan-i-Rahmat and the Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh. Thus mentioning the division of Dundi's territories among his three sons as is given by Gulistan-i-Rahmat, he goes on to give more details about the matter, thereby supporting the assertions of the Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh.

(2) Hayat-i-Afghani (Printed Lahore)...

It is a detailed history of the Afghans from the earliest times down to the middle of the nineteenth century and was completed in 1867 A.D. by Muhammad Hayat Khan. The greater part of the work is based on Persian manuscripts but the author is very critical and does not take everything from them as truth. The sketch of the characteristics of the different Afghan tribes given in the work is particularly valuable because they are given from the author's personal experience.

(3) Qissai Ahwal-i-Rohilla (British Museum Ms.).

It is a history of the Rohillas written by Rustam Ali Subahdar in 1775 A.D. and gives a very good account of the Chiefs of Rohilkhand, excluding however, some of the details of their internal affairs after 1748. The writing of the manuscript is very bad and the events narrated are treated very briefly. But it helps to find out the truth where two contradictory accounts on a subject have been given by the Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh and the Gulistan-i-Rahmat. Thus it supports the Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh in the assertion that the Rohilla chiefs excluded the elder brothers of Sadulla from the Nawabship and usurped all the power, and again supports the Gulistan-i-Rahmat by saying that Ali Muhammad Khan was a Jat boy.

(4) Tarikh-i-Nawab Najib-ud-daula (India Office Ms.)

It is a detailed history of Najib Khan Rohilla and also gives a brief account of Daud Khan and Ali Muhammad Khan. It was written in 1895 A.D. by Durga Prasad, a resident of Najibgur and contains the information handed down to him by his family. It has many errors but when used with other authorities, is quite useful.

C - FRENCH.

Wendel: F.X. - (Orme collection 216).

It is a paper in the form of a letter from Father Wendel to Mr. Orme, on the latter's request informing him of the details about the Rohillas. Father Wendel, who used to live at Agra, says in the paper that the information communicated is the result of careful and patient enquiry from the people. The paper is entitled "Memoires de l'origine, l'etablissement et l'etat present des Pattans dans Industan" and Mr. Orme notes at the end that he read it in June 1772 A.D. The paper is extremely valuable for the details about the Rohilla army and other things during his time.

D - DUTCH.

Valentijn - Great Mogols. (Suratte 1726).

It is written in the form of travels, in four volumes by a Dutchman named Valentijn who had visited Bengal on his way back home from the Dutch East Indies. It is the first printed work to inform us that there was a section of the Mughal army under Behadar Shah, called Rohillas in 1707 A.D. Only the fourth volume which gives the above information is useful for our purpose.

E - ENGLISH.

(unpublished).

(1) Hastings papers (British Museum Mss.).

The British Museum contains two hundred and sixty four volumes of the Official and Private Correspondence of Warren Hastings with some additional correspondence of his family after his death. These papers also include the famous Benares diary left by Hastings, although some pages from it are missing. The letters, particularly those written before Hastings took up office, help us to understand his policy as a Governor, and later as a Governor-General, whereas his diary mentioned above is the only detailed account existing of the negotiations with Shuja-ud-daula at Benares.

(2) Home Miscellaneous Series.

These are the collections in the India Office of most of the papers and pamphlets which reached London from India or were prepared in London. The papers on the Rohilla affairs, however, namely, Nos. 105, 107 and 212 contain only the extracts of some of the letters sent by the Government of Bengal to the Court of Directors.

(3) Hosen, W. (Orme collection. 4.).

This is a small paper written on the origin of the Rohillas and the Pathans. Although based on the traditions prevalent at the time (1770-72) it contains very useful information.

(4) Letters - President and Committee, Government of Fort William.

These are the collections of letters sent either by the Secret Committee or the Select Committee to the Court of Directors at London, and contain summaries of the affairs

of Hindustan and the part played in it by the Company's Government at Fort William. But they are the only source for the affairs of Shuja-ud-daula with the Rohillas when the Select Committee does not record the facts mentioned in them. Thus it is from this source that we are definitely informed that Shuja-ud-daula concluded the Treaty of 1772 with the Rohillas mainly to instal Zabeta Khan in his previous possessions which included part of the Doab.

(5) Secret Committee and Select Committee Proceedings.

The Bengal Government was entrusted to the Governor and a Council of nine members and the business connected with the relations of the Government with Foreign States was transacted by a Select Committee consisting of the Governor and at least two members of the Council. (the number varied at different times). It was the practice for a long series of years of both the bodies which were called Secret Committee and Select Committee respectively to enter Minutes of all the proceedings at every meeting and, as Sir James Stephen says, "they form one of the most interesting, authentic and curious collections in the world". The Select Committee Proceedings up to October 1774 when, on the institution of the Supreme Council by the Regulating Act, it was discontinued, is the only detailed and authentic source not only for the relations of the Company and Shuja-ud-daula with the Rohillas, but also of the Maratha proceedings in Hindustan between 1770 and 1773, which all the native historians describe in a page. The Secret Committee Proceedings during the same period contains except one or two papers of Intelligence or letters from Shuja-ud-daula very little about the condition of affairs in Hindustan, although, from November 1774 when the Council took over charge of the affairs of Hindustan from the Select Committee, it is full of details.

E - ENGLISH.

(published).

- (1) Forrest, G.W. - Selections from the Letters, Despatches, and other State Papers preserved in the foreign Department of the Government of India 1772-85 (Calcutta 1890. 3 vols.). These three volumes contain the proceedings of the Secret Committee only and not of the Select Committee which was abolished in October 1774. Hence they are very incomplete for the

purpose Mr. Forrest intended them to be, namely "History of our Indian Empire from 1772-1785" based on original materials. A detailed introduction is also given and is quite useful.

(2) Gleig, G.R. - Memoirs of the Life of the Right Hon. Warren Hastings. 3 vols.

It is a good classification of the collection of a part of the private correspondence of Warren Hastings preserved in the British Museum, according to topics. Mr. Gleig's observations are also sometimes useful.

(3) Parliamentary Papers (India Office collection).

(a) Collection 9a entitled The Bengal Narrative. It is a printed book presented to the House by the Directors of the East India Company on 26th March 1781 in pursuance to their order. It contains correspondence regarding the differences of opinion in the Supreme Council on political affairs but everything in it is given in The Select and the Secret Committee Proceedings.

(b) Collection 359 - It gives the details of the charges made by Burke and the defence by Hastings in 1786.

(c) Collection 360 - It contains the Minutes of the Evidence taken before a Committee of the House of Commons, it being a Committee of the whole House for the charges brought against Hastings (1786).

(4) Report of the Committee of Secrecy - Vd.V. 1782.

In 1781 a "Committee of Secrecy" was appointed by the House of Commons 'to enquire into the causes of the War in the Carnat but it was authorised to enquire into 'the general state of political connections and interests in India' and to call for all papers that he desired to see. The Fifth Report submitted by this Committee contains an account of the relations of the Bengal Government with the Emperor, the Nawab Wazir, the Marathas and the Rohillas. It also has numerous appendices which fill more than 800 pages of a folio volume and, although they give most of the things from the Select Committee and the Secret Committee Proceedings, they also contain one or two letters of Shuja-ud-daula to the President which is not given in the above series kept in the India Office.

TRANSLATIONS FROM PERSIAN MANUSCRIPTS:

- (1) Calendar of Persian Correspondence, published in 4 vols. by the Imperial Record Department, Calcutta.

It is a true translation of the collection of letters which passed between some of the Company's servants and Indian rulers and Notables between 1759 and 1775 A.D.

- (2) Elliot- C. The Life of Hafiz-ul-Mulk, Hafiz Rahmat Khan London 1831.

It is an abridged translation of the Gulistan-i-Rahmat, and is quite accurate. But it omits some of the smaller details given in the Persian work.

- (3) Hamilton, C. An Historical Relation of the Origin, Progress and Final Dissolution of the Rohilla Afghans in the Northern Provinces of Hindustan. 1782.

The author bases this work on the Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, but introduces many things in it which do not exist in the original text. Thus mistaking Daud Khan Rohilla for Daud Khan Panj, (see Beale's Oriental Biographical Dictionary) he says Daud Khan was given a jagir in Rohilkhand by the Imperial Government for his services against the Marathas. He also misinterprets many things in the text, a detail of which will be found in the body of the thesis.

- (4) Irvine, W. Abdali and the Indian Wazir, Imad-ul-Mulk (1556 printed in the Indian Antiquary, 1907.

It is a translation of the work by Ghulam Hasan Khan, pen name Samin, who lived most of his life in the Panjab, and was an eye witness of the events recorded.

- (5) Scot - Memoirs of Eradat Khan, London 1786.

It is a translation of the work by Eradat Khan, a nobleman of Hindustan which besides containing interesting anecdotes of the two successors of Aurangzeb, namely, Bahadur Shah and Jahandar Shah, also gives the causes which precipitated the Decline of the Mughal Empire.

(6) Sarkar - Zabta Khan in Indian Historical Quarterly 1935. It is a translation of the work by Beharilal, Ki munshi of Zabta Khan.

TRACTS: (India Office Collection).

- (1) Papers on Rohilla War (43 H.15).

- (2) Vol.121 - Observations made on Tour from Bengal to Persia by Franklin, W. London, 1790.

- (3) Vol.218 - Parliamentary Debates on the Rohilla War, June 1 and 2nd, London, 1786.

PRINTED BOOKS:

- (1) Alexander, F. - Muradabad Settlement Report 1861.
- (2) Beale, W. - Oriental Biographical Dictionary. London 1894.
- (3) Burke, E. - Speech at the Impeachment of Warren Hastings, with an elaborate Index, 2 vols. Calcutta 1909.
- (4) Court, M.H. - Stateistical Report of the district of Budaon, 1855.
- (5) Dorn - History of the Afghans.
- (6) Davies, C.C. - The Problem of the North-west Frontier, Cambridge 1932.
- (7) Dames, L. - Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. Afghanistan.
- (8) District Gazetteers - United Provinces, India.
- (9) Duff, G - History of the Marathas, 2 vols. Bombay 1878.
- (10) Dodwell, H.H. - Cambridge History of India, vol.V.
- (11) Elliot & Dowson - History of India as told by its own Historians, 8 vols.
- (12) Elphinstone, M. - Account of the Kingdom of Kabul.
- (13) Forster, G. - A Journey from Bengal to England. 2 vols. London 1808.
- (14) Francklin, W. - Shah Aulum - Allahbad 1915 edition quoted. (First printed in 1798).
- (15) Forrest, G.W. - The Administration of Warren Hastings 1772- Calcutta 1892.
- (16) Grierson, G.A. - Linguistic Survey of India, 1899.

- (17) Hastings, G.W. - A Vindication of Warren Hastings. 1909.
- (18) Irvine W. - Later Mughals, 2 vols. Calcutta 1922.
- (19) do. - The Bangash Nawabs of Farrukhabad in J.A.S.B. 1878 and 1879.
- (20) Moens - Bareilly Settlement Report 1874.
- (21) Mills - The History of British India. 9 vols. London 1840-8
- (22) N.W.P. Gazetteers by Atkinson.
- (23) Prasad, B. - Daud Khan Rohilla in the Journal of Indian History, Madras, January 1929.
- (24) Prasad, B. - Ali Muhammad Khan Rohilla, in Allahbad University Studies, 1929.
- (25) Ravety, H.G. - Pushtu Dictionary.
- (26) do. Notes on Afghanistan. 1838.
- (27) do. The Independent Afghan or Patahn tribes, in The Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review, vol.VII, 1894.
- (28) do. Some Remarks on the Origin of the Afghan People and Dialect, and on the connection of the Pushtu language with the Zend and Pehlavi and the Hebrew, in J.A.S.B. vol.XXIII 1854.
- (29) do. An account of the Mountainous District forming the Western Boundary of the Lower Derajat, commonly called Roh, with notices of the tribes inhabiting it, in J.A.S.B.vol.XXVI, 1857.
- (30) Sarkar, J. - History of Aurangzeb, 5 vols.
- (31) do. - Fall of the Mughal Empire, 2 vols.1932,1934.

- (32) Srivastava, A.L. - The First Two Nawabs of Oudh. 1933.
 - (33) Strachey, J. - Hastings and the Rohilla War. 1892.
 - (34) Whiteway - The Rohilla Afghans, in Calcutta Review, LXI,
1875.
 - (35) Yule - Glossary of Anglo-Indian words.
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CHAPTER I.

Origin and Character of the Rohillas.

The term Rohilla¹ merely means "mountaineer" and comes from the word "Roh"², which is applied to an extensive tract, stretching from and including Swat and Panjkora, down to Siwalik in one direction and from Hasan-Abdal to Kandahar in the other. It refers to the mountain tracts as distinct from the plains of the Derajat further east³. The inhabitants of these regions are generally known as Afghans, although in India they are also called Pathans and Rohillas. The name Afghan which is given to them by the Persians, is not used by the people, who call themselves Pushtana or Pashtana. This seems to have been derived from their language which is called Pushta or Pashta or in the northern dialect Pukhtu or Pakhtu⁴. At the same time the Afghans generally use their tribal names to denote their families and dynasties.

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1. Yule. Colonel - Glossary of Anglo-Indian words 1903, pp 766-67.
Rohilla - "The word appears to be Pushtu, rohella or rohela,
adj. from rohu, "mountain", thus signifying "mountaineer of Afghanistan".
Longworth Dames - Encyclopaedia of Islam s.v. Afghanistan.
Raverty H.G. - Pushtu Dictionary - Rohela.
 2. Tawarikh-i-Afghana f.51b.
Dorn-History of the Afghans - Annotation, part 1, p.64.
Raverty - J.A.S.B. vol.26, 1857. p.179.
 3. Raverty - Asiatic Quarterly Review, vol. 7, 1884, p.313.
 4. Grierson G.A. - Linguistic Survey of India, vol.1889, p.71.

The exact origin of the Afghans is still uncertain and a great diversity of opinions exists. They have been traced to Copts, Georgians, Armenians, Turks, Mongols, etc., besides the claim of the Afghans themselves to Hebraic descent.¹ The majority of these theories are based on too slender a ground. As for the rest, they are given by "writers living in a pre-scientific age, before the examination of anthropometric data revolutionised the study of ethnological problems" and hence may be "dismissed as fanciful".²

The Afghans are first mentioned by the Muslim historians as inhabiting the Sulaiman mountains and about the year 760 A.D. they fought with the Raja of Lahore, who ultimately ceded to them a portion of Lamghan, on condition of their guarding the frontier against any invading army. They then erected a fort in the mountains off Peshawar, which they called "Khaibar" and took possession of the country of Roh.³

During the ascendancy of the Samanids, the Afghans, prevented them from doing any injury to the territory of Lahore and that is why the incursions of the Samanids into India, from first to last, were made by way of Sindh and Bhatiya.⁴

1. Raverty - J.A.S.B. vol.23. 1854 p.554.

2. Davies C.C. - The Problem of the North-Western Frontier.p.42.

3. Grierson - Linguistic Survey of India p.71-72.
Hayat-i-Afghani, p.112-114.

4. Grierson - Linguistic Survey of India, p.71-72.

But when Alaptagin rose to power, the Afghans found themselves unable to withstand his general Subuktagin, who frequently attacked Peshawar and Multan. The Afghan, Shaikh Hamid was about this time formally invested by Raja Jaipal, with the supreme command on the frontier. But Shaikh Hamid finding it difficult to cope with the growing power of Subuktagin, transferred himself to his side and was continued by him in the enjoyment of his authority.¹

After this the Afghans continued to be an obscure mountain race and we hear of them as adventurers and rebels only. Throughout the Ghazanavide and the Ghorid period, they were constantly employed as mercenaries and they followed the Sultans of Delhi into India in the same capacity.²

But the collapse of the Delhi monarchy after Timur's invasion of India, gave the Afghans an opportunity to play an important role in India. The leaders of these bands of adventurers began to be given responsible posts. In 1405 A.D. Daulat Khan Lodi was faujdar of the Doab and many other Lodis at this time, are alluded to as holding important posts. Daulat Khan rose to be one of the most important persons in the Empire and held Delhi for some time against Khizr Khan. By some he is

1. Hayat-i-Afghani - p.113.

2. Hayat-i-Afghani - pp.113-114.

3. Longworth Dames.- Encyclopaedia of Islam. s.v.Afghanistan.

classed as one of the kings but he never took the title of Sultan. He surrendered to Khizr Khan in 1416 A.D. and died in confinement soon after.¹

Under the succeeding Sultans of Delhi, another Lodi, Sultan Shah, alias Islam Khan rose to power and his nephew Bahlol Lodi, first became Governor of the Panjab and in 1451 dethroned the last of the feeble Sayyid Kings and became Sultan of Delhi.²

Immediately after becoming the ~~sovereign~~ of the Delhi Kingdom, Bahlol Lodi, issued proclamations to his countrymen and kinsmen, offering them service and free grants of land in Hindustan. A large number of Afghan tribes answered this call, many of whom migrated en masse to Hindustan and settling down in Northern India lost all connection with their kinsmen across the Indus.³

Bahlol Lodi, was succeeded by his son Sikandar Lodi (1489-1517), who was followed by Ibrahim Lodi, but the Lodi rule at first vigorous, failed to revive the moribund Sultanate of Delhi which fell before the Timurid invader Babur in 1526 A.D.⁴

But the Afghans who were then numerous and powerful in India after a short retreat towards Behar, succeeded in driving out the Timurids and founded another Afghan dynasty under the leadership of Sher Shah Sur. A second influx of Afghans into Hindustan,

1. Longworth Dames - Encyclopaedia of Islam s.v. Afghanistan.

2. Hayat-i-Afghani, pp. 288-89; Tarikh-i-Khanjahani f. 75a-80a.

3. Raverty - Notes on Afghanistan etc. London 1888, p. 346.

4. Hayat-i-Afghani, pp. 289-90; Tarikh-i-Khan Jahani, f. 74b-75a.

on a larger scale, again followed the establishment of the Sur power which attained its zenith under Sher Shah.¹ But after the death of Sher Shah (24th May 1548) his successors were utterly incompetent and hence the Empire again fell into decay. The result was that the Timurids again dispossessed the Surs at Delhi (5th November 1556) and the Emperor Akbar established the Mughal dynasty in India.

For some time, the Afghans in India, attempted to establish themselves in Bengal and Orissa but they were overthrown and compelled to acknowledge the supremacy of the Mughals. And in a short time these powerful Afghan tribes, lost their distinctive organisation and were absorbed into the mass of the Muslim population.²

It was the descendants of these Afghans who thus settled into India and intermarried with the Muslims of India, who came to be called Pathans.³ The origin of the use of the word Pathan, has been variously given but the most probable explanation of Pathan is that it is "merely a Hindi corruption of Pushtun".⁴

1. Hayat-i-Afghani, pp 290-91; Tarikh-i-Faiz Baksh f.9b. Tarikh-i-Khanjahani, f.75a-81b.

2. Longworth Dames - Encyclopaedia of Islam s.v. Afghanistan; Grierson - Linguistic Survey of India, p.72.

3. Raverty - Asiatic Quarterly Review, vol.7, 1894 p.312-13.

4. Hayat-i-Afghani, p.108,
 Pathan - (1) It has been derived from Patna where the first Afghans who made India their homes are said to have settled from the Hindi words, "pat" and "an" meaning "to come and utterly destroy" a not un-apt description of a normal Afghan.
 (2) Descendants of Bitan, son of Kais Abdur Rashid,

The Afghans who swarmed into India under the Lodis and the Surs were in the position of rulers and hence could not possibly have suffered themselves to be called by a name different from their own. Besides these Afghans right down to 1770 A.D. were very proud of being called Pathans.

The Pathans, however, were not deprived of all power and position during the strong rule of the great Mughals. The wars of the Mughal Emperors gave them ample employment and because of their having no local ties, they were also given posts of trust and responsibility.

In the middle of the seventeenth century, a Pathan, named Bahadur Khan Daudzai, who was a fraudar of Kalpi and Qanauj, while on service beyond the Indus, brought with him a large number of Afghans from Roh, to colonise Shahjahanpur which had been given to his brother Diler Khan as jagir. These Afghans

became known as Pathans in India.

(3) The most probable explanation of Pathan is that it is merely a Hindi corruption of Pushtun.
Raverty - J.A.S.B. vol.23. 1854, p.561.

Abdur Rashid from home the Afghans claim descent, during his visit to the prophet Muhammad became conspicuous for his intrepid bravery in the numberless struggles of that period, was given the surname of "batan" or "pathan" which in Arabic means the mast of a vessel without which it cannot sail.

belonged to fifty two different tribes and each of them established their separate mahalla (quarters)¹. After this there was constant communication between Shahjahanpur and Roh, and large number of Afghans gradually came down to the Gangetic plains, where they were given employment either by the provincial governors or the local Zamindars.²

These newcomers were now given the name of Rohillas in the sense of "savage" by the Pathans in India, and the Mughals in order to make a distinction between these rough and uncouth people and the more civilised Pathans, at once adopted this name³. Thus in 1707 A.D. there was a body of troupes in Bahadur Shah's army called Rohillas.⁴ And the new settlers on the other hand seem to have accepted the name at this time, for there is an ode in the Pushtu language, meaning, "I am a simple mountaineer compelled to live in Hindustan, that is an honest man among knaves".⁵

During the confusion caused in the Empire by the death of Aurangzeb and the ensuing war of Succession, a large number of Afghan adventurers came down to India from Roh, and while some

~~1. Valentijn. Travels. vol. 4. p. 277.~~

1. Dist. Gazetteer U.P. Shahjahanpur p. 136.

2. Tawarikh-i-Afaghana, f. 51b., 52b,

3. Wendel F.X. Orme Mss. No. 216, pp 8 and 11.

4. Valentijn.- Travels, vol. 4 (Suratte) 1726 A.D. p. 277.

5. Trotter J.M. in Yule's Glossary of Anglo-Indian words, pp. 766-6

of them found employment in the army of Bahadur Shah,¹ the rest wandered about the Gangetic plains in search of employment. Taking advantage of this Daud Khan Rohilla one of the new arrivals collecting a few followers under him, began the life of a Highway Robber in Katehr, and in a short time became the leader of a band of two hundred men. Then on the death of the Bahadur Shah, when the Rajput Zamindars in Katehr, rose in revolt Daud Khan got employment under Mudar Saha of Mudhkar, in the pargana of Bars~~ir~~, and was given a small jagir.² At the same

time another Rohilla named Muhammad Khan, whose father had settled at Mau in the preceding century, collecting a large number of ^{the} newcomers under him, was hiring himself out to the different zamindars in Bundelkhand, and by 1713 had about four thousand followers under him.³

Muhammad Khan on the arrival of Farrukh-siyar near Bundelkha on his way against the Emperor Jahandar Shah, joined him with his army and fought for him in the battle at Agra (12th January 1713) and on the accession of Farrukh-siyar to the throne was given possession of the town of Farrukhabad, with twelve villages in perpetuity (Altanga).⁴ Muhammad Khan now took his family name of

1. Valentijn - Travels. vol.4.p.277.

2. Vide - p.35

3. Srivastava A.L. First two Nawabs of Oudh, p.142.
Irvine - Later Mughals, vol.1, p.217.

4. Srivastava - First two etc. page 142.

Bangash⁵ and gradually laid the foundation of the Bangash Kingdom of Farrukhabad.

Daud Khan Rohilla on the other hand, who was joined by about 500 Afghans from his native village of Toru Shahmatpur, remained in Madar Saha's service only for some time and then entered the service of the Raja of Kumaon (1721). He had only been five years with the Raja when, he was put to death for deserting his master in the battlefield against Azmatullah Khan, the deputy governor of Muradabad. But his followers managed to escape his fate and making his adopted son Ali Muhammad Khan Rohilla their leader, they entered the service of Azmatullah Khan (1726).²

Ali Muhammad Khan Rohilla under the patronage of Azmatullah Khan, who remained in office till 1736 A.D. , considerably increased his possessions.³ And in 1738 when he rendered a signal service to the imperial cause by his bravery in the expedition against the Sayyids of Barha, he was given a mansab of five thousand, besides a substantial grant of lands. Soon after this came the persecution of Nadir Shah in Afghanistan, which led to the migration of a large number of Afghans into Hindustan. Ali Muhammad Khan encouraged most of them to enter his service and

1. Tarikh-i-Farrukhabad, f.9b-10a.

Bangash although the name of a hill was also the family name of Muhammad Khan Bangash.

2. Vide, p.44

3. Vide, p. 45-48

finally became so strong that in 1741 he was able to defeat Harnand, the deputy governor of Muradabad, who had been sent to chastise him. He was now made the deputy governor of Muradabad by the wazir. But he annexed the neighbouring lands and stopped the remittance of revenue to the Imperial Exchequer. For this reason the Emperor marched against him and he was taken as a prisoner to Delhi (1745). But within a year he was appointed governor of Sirhind and after two years he was again transferred to Muradabad. Ali Muhammad Khan once more annexed the neighbouring territories and asserted his independence, but the confusion in the central government caused by the death of the Emperor Muhammad Shah, saved him from any further attack. He lived to enjoy only six months more of his exalted position, but when he died (Sept. 1748) the Rohilla State in Rohilkhand was firmly established and lasted for the next twenty six years playing a dominating role in the politics of Hindustan.

It was during the time of Ali Muhammad Khan that the term Rohilla was restricted to the Afghans settled in the Rohilkhand State. The reason for this was as follows: The newly arrived Afghans who had been called Rohillas had put up with the name very reluctantly and were constantly desirous of being called Pathans.¹ Thus when Muhammad Khan Bangash established the State of Farrukhabad, a large number of the Pathans in India

1. Hosea, William - Orme Mss. No.4, pp 107-10.

"Rohillah...." always wishes to gain the appellation of Patan."

rallied to his standard and because of constant intermarriages, all the Afghans in the State of Farrukhabad became known as Pathans. The case was, however, quite different with the State of Rohilkhand. Daud Khan Rohilla was originally a slave and nothing certain was known of his parentage and family.¹ Hence in the absence of any distinguishing eponym, like Muhammad Khan Bangash had, he was obliged to call himself by the current name Rohilla. And after him, his successor Ali, Muhammad Khan Rohilla being only an adopted son and an Indian by extraction,² naturally called himself a Rohilla also, for otherwise he could not ^{have} assume the leadership of the Rohillas. The followers of Ali Muhammad Khan, on the other hand, most of whom joined him in 1739, naturally took their leader's name.³ Thus when Ali Muhammad Khan became master of the Sarkar of Murādābad and Bareilly, his possessions came to be known as Rohilkhand or Land of the Rohillas.⁴

The term Rohilla thus, at this time, meant the Afghan followers of Ali Muhammad Khan Rohilla whom, the Pathans of Farrukhabad particularly, regarded as the son of a slave and with whose family they refused to have any matrimonial relations. Soon after, however, because of intermarriages between the family of Ali Muhammad Khan and the principal chiefs of Rohilkhand, the Pathans refused to have any matrimonial connection with the Chief of Rohilkhand.⁵ Hence the term Rohilla now came to be understood

1. Vide - p. 37

2. Vide - p. 42-44

3. Siyar-ul-Mutakhkharin p. 854.

4. Forster G. - Journey - London 1880, p. 120.

5. Hosea - Orme Mss. No. 4. p. 107-18.

' A Pathan would not give his daughter in marriage to a Rohillah.'

in the sense of a class of Afghans who had slave blood in them.¹ Thus even when the family of Ali Muhammad Khan was superseded in the control of the State by the principal chiefs of Rohilkhand, the Afghans under the rule of these chiefs continued to be called "Rohillas". After the overthrow of the Rohilla power in 1774 and the dispersion of the greater part of the Rohilla population the term Rohilla and Pathan gradually became practically synonymous.²

Thus Rohilla was never a racial term. It represented a heterogeneous body consisting of the various tribes of Afghanistan, although the Baraich and the Yusufzais were more numerous and enjoyed a preponderating influence.³ The most important of the Baraich chiefs were Hafiz Ra'hmah Khan and Dundi Khan and the notable Yusufzai chiefs were Najib Khan and Mulla Sardar Khan.

Although the Rohillas belonged to different tribes their character differed more according to the place from which they came. Thus the Baraich and even those Yusufzais who came from the mountainous regions were remarkably sober and free from vices,

1. Wendel - Orme Mss. 216, p. 11.

Rohillas were looked upon as slaves (d'esclaves).

2. Strachey, J. - Hastings and the Rohilla War. p. 6.

When he wrote in 1892 he found it to be so.

3. Khulasat - Ul-Ansab, folio 10b.

The people from Toru Shahmatpur who joined Daud Khan were Baraich and Mandar tribes.

Hayat-i-Afghani, p. 192.

is

Mandar tribe of the Yusufzais ~~xxx~~/settled in Rohilkhand.

but the Afghans who came from the plains, were given to excessive drinking and were notorious for debauchery.¹

There were certain characteristics common to all the Rohillas. They all followed like their fellow brethren in Afghanistan and the North western frontier provinces, a code of honour, the most sacred duties of which were ~~xxx~~ "to recognise as inviolable the person of one's guest, to exact an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth and to wipe off dishonour by the shedding of blood."² They had a natural tendency to group themselves into tribes and follow their own tribal leader.³ Thus the Rohilla army had to be organised on a tribal basis. They were "intensely democratic"⁴ and hence the Rohilla Government was first based on a Jagir system, in which the different jagirdars owing to allegiance to the Nawab were entirely responsible for the administration of their own Jagirs, and later developed into a confederacy. They were uncommonly patient under hardships and attached to their chiefs by the indissoluble bonds of national affection.⁵ Thus during the invasion of the Wazir 1751-52

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1. Hayat-i-Afghani, pp.155 and 192.
Elphinstone - Kingdom of Kabul, p.349.
 2. Davies C.C. pp.46 and 49.
 3. Davies C.C. pp.46.
 4. Gulistan-i-Rahmat f.13a-15b.
Davies - p.47.
 5. Franklin W. History of Shah-Aulum, p.58.

they went through the hardships of the exiled life in the Malaria tracts of the Tarai, without a murmur.¹ They were rather rough and uncouth in their habits,² but they could be rendered tractable by a wise and liberal government. Thus under the government of Rohilkhand, they proved to be not only good subjects but even steady and faithful allies. Right down to 1772 A.D., when the Government of Rohilkhand remained efficient, there is not a single instance of rebellion or civil war among these people; nor did they ever take to plundering either within or without their own territories. And the government of Rohilkhand during the same period remained true to their pledges of friendship with all the neighbouring States of Hindustan.

At the same time these hardy and warlike Rohillas were equally capable of husbandry.³ Those that were settled in Shah-jahanpur before the arrival of Daud Khan Rohilla, had turned agriculturists and continued to be so till 1748,⁴ after which because of the ample employment they received ~~xxx~~ⁱⁿ the army of the Rohilla government, they forsook the plough for the sword.

1. Vide p. \\-\\3

2. Wendel Orme Mss, 216, p 22.

3. Francklin, p.58.

4. Siyar-ul-Mutakhkharin, p.867.

But the Rohillas did not continue to be a purely military class. After 1761 when Najib Khan Rohilla became the dictator of Delhi, and the Rohillas were freed from the constant danger of the Marathas, the government of Rohilkhand, considerably reduced the number of their standing army. Thus while part of ~~them~~ those disbanded joined Najib Khan's service, the rest turned to the profession of trade.¹ And the deputy Nawab Hafiz Rahmat Khan began to encourage commercial enterprise and built a spacious Shahar Panah or Pattah (market place) at Pilibhit.² Finally the government of Rohilkhand abolished all the inland duties on goods passing through the country (1768). The result was that Rohilkhand became a highway of commerce³, and a large section of the Rohilla population in Rohilkhand turned traders.

1. Hayat-i-Afghani p.155.

Baraigh tribe was originally traders.

Wendel - Orme Mss 216.p.21.

Najib Khan the Strongest of the three Rohilla chiefs had an army of 25,000 men, because of Sikh menace in his possessions in the Doab. Hafiz had much less while Dundi could put in only 6,000 men in the field.

Select Committee Proceedings, Bengal. 21st June 1770.

Letter-Dundi Khan- It says there are 70,000 Rohilla adults in Rohilkhand besides that under Najib Khan.

2. Francklin, p.57. "

"Pilibhit during the Rohilla government was an emporium of commerce".

3. Wendel - Orme Mss.216,p.22.

"Goods brought in through Lahore from Kashmire and Tibet were henceforth sent through Rohilkhand, because these roads were shorter and safer."

CHAPTER II.

Circumstances which favoured the rise of the Rohilla power.

(I) Condition of the Empire.

The mighty Mughal Empire founded principally by the genius of Akbar (1556-1605), after having a glorious history for over a hundred and fifty years, had begun to decline during the reign of the last of the great Mughals, Aurangzeb (1658-1707). The extravagant expenditure during the time of Shah Jahan, (1627-1658) had led to an enhancement of the standard of assessment by one-half and during the reign of Aurangzeb, besides the continuance of this high revenue demand, many new cesses and taxes were imposed upon the agricultural and industrial classes. Coupled with this Aurangzebs' southern wars began to drain the wealth of northern India. The result was that towards the close of Aurangzebs' reign, 'the ryots gave up cultivation' and their hereditary occupation gone, they turned robbers and highwaymen.¹ Side by side with the economic impoverishment of Hindustan, there was a deterioration in the Mughal army². In the struggle between Aurangzeb ~~the~~ ^{and} Dara Shikoh (1658), with the exception of the Rajputs, the bulk of the imperial army under Dara had proved to be little better than an undisciplined mob and the flower of the fighting glass, which did exist under Aurangzeb, were soon consumed by the Emperor's wars in the Deccan. And finally Aurangzeb's treacherous attempt to seize the infant son (Ajit Singh) of Maharaja Jaswant Singh of

1. Sarkar-Aurangzeb vol.5.p.445.

2. Scot-Memoirs of Eradat Khan, p.42.

Jodhpur on his death (18th Dec.1678), made the Mughals forfeit the sympathy of the Rajputs, who had hitherto formed the bulwark of the Mughal soldiery.¹ At the same time while the Mughal army had thus got weakened, Aurangzeb's religious policy created a formidable enemy in the Marathas under Sivaji, whose aggressions began to increase daily and prove to be "an open sore which drain the life blood of the Empire and steadily reduced its size."

All these forces of disruption, however, were kept in check by the determination and personality of Aurangzeb, and hence on his death as soon as a Civil War to decide the succession ensued (1707), all the outlying parts of the Empire rose in revolt.

Bahadur Shah who emerged successful from this struggle and became the next emperor, immediately on his accession, turned to the subjugation of the rebels. His attention was first occupied in Rajputana, against Ajit Singh of Jodhpur and Jai Singh of Ambar, who had made common cause with each other.² But his campaign bore no fruit and ultimately making a compromise with Jai Singh and Ajit Singh, who were again restored to their rank in the Mughal service, Bahdur Shah marched back from Raj-putana.

1. Irvine - Later Mughals. vol.1. p.45.

2. Scot - Memoirs of Eradat Khan, p.58.
Tarikh-i-Muzaffari, f.103b.

No sooner had Bahdur Shah turned his back upon Rajputana than his attention was needed in the north. The Sikhs finding themselves ~~as~~ strong in the hilly regions of the Panjab, raised the standard of revolt under the leadership of Banda and struck at Sirhind. Its faujdar Wazir Khan was killed (22nd May 1710) and the Sikhs marched on and harrassed the country in the neighbourhood of Delhi, committing excesses. On Bahadur Shah's arrival Banda after a few reverses retreated into the hills and desultary fighting continued.¹

But before the Sikhs could be brought under subjection, Bahadur Shah died on the 27th Feb. 1712. As usual another war of succession followed his death, at the end of which Jahander Shah became Emperor (29th March 1712). But he was a debauchee and allowed himself to be guided by his favourite mistress Lalkunwar, whose highhandedness offended all the nobles of the Court.² And when the famous Sayyid brothers supported Farrukh-Siyar in his march against the Emperor, the great nobles deserted Jahandar Shah at the battle of Agra (10th Jan. 1713), with the result that he was defeated and put to death³.

1. Scot - Memoirs of Eradat Khan, pp. 58-59.
Tarikh-i-Muzaffari, p. 105a.

2. Scot - Memoirs of Eradat Khan, pp. 80-83.

3. Irvine - Later Mughals, pp. 205-9, 227, 229-236.

With the ^{Accession} ~~ereption~~ of Farrukh-Siyar to the throne, the Court of Delhi became too much engrossed in party intrigues to turn its attention to the affairs of the Empire. The Emperor throughout his reign (1713-1719) did nothing but carry on intrigue to bring about the overthrow from power of the Sayyid brothers, Abdulla Khan, the Wazir and Husain Ali Khan, the Mir Bakhsh. And when he was finally deposed and put to death by the Sayyids (28th April 1719) the next two Emperors, Rafi-ud-darajat and Rafi-ud-doula, each of whom had a short reign of about four months were mere puppets in the hands of the wazir and Mir Bakhsh.

Finally Muhammad Shah, whom the Sayyids had put on the throne (28th Sept. 1719) succeeded in releasing himself from the galling bondage of his benefactors and the Emperor of Delhi again regained his former prestige (Nov. 1720)¹. But Muhammad Shah who ruled up to 1748 had neither the will nor the capacity to revive the Empire to its former glory. On the contrary he began to "countenance and even initiate conspiracies among his personal favourites against the wazir"². The result was the growth of two parties at Court deadly opposed to each other. Between 1721-1739 A.D. the wazir, Qamruddin, who was the leader of the Turani party had to face a constant opposition from the Hindustani party led by Samsam-ud-daula Khan Dauran. And after the death of Khan Dauran

1. Irvine, Later Mughals, vol. 1. pp 67-68, 85-93, 102.

2. Sarkar - Fall of the Mughal Empire. vol. 1. p. 14.

in 1739, till his own death in 1748, Qamruddin, was constantly busy counteracting the intrigues of the Irani party led first by Amir Khan and then by Safdar Jang¹.

(II) Situation in Rohilkhand.

Situated on the left bank of the Ganges and stretching to the first range of the northern hills called the Kumaon mountains, where it suddenly merges into the malarial tracts, called Tarai, the usual haunt of fierce tigers, Rohilkhand had been for centuries in the hands of turbulent Rajput tribes called Katehrias when the Muslim Sultans of Delhi turned their attention to the conquest of this part². The exact origin of the Katehrias is

1. Irvine - Later Mughals. vol.1. pp 272-275.

The establishment of the Mughal dynasty had been followed by an exodus into India of a large number of adventurers from beyond Afghanistan. Of these emigrants those whose house was in Turan, north of the Oxus, were known as Turanis, while those who came from Iran or south of Oxus, were called Iranis. The Turanis, because they were sunnis, as opposed to the Iranis who were Shas and because they came from the old ~~xxxx~~ home of the Mughals, were favoured by the Indian Emperors, and hence were more numerous. The Hindustani party was made up of Muhammadans born in India, many of them descended in the second or third generation from foreign emigrants.

2. This tract now comprises the districts of Bijnor, Budaon, Bareilly, Muradabad and Shahjahan-pur, and the territory of the Nawab of Rampur.

uncertain. Moens, in his Bareilly Settlement Report (1874), gives a detailed account of the various traditions and seems to hold that they were a remnant of the Surajban̄sis of Ayudhia, who were driven out of that country when the Aryan invasion was pushed back by the aboriginal races ¹. The end of the twelfth century had been fixed for the probable commencement of the inroads of the Katehria Rajputs into Rohilkhand and it was not till the end of the 16th Century that the old inhabitants were properly subdued.².

The usual supposition that Katehr was the previous name of the whole tract of Rohilkhand and that the name Katehr is derived from the Katehria Rajputs, seems to be entirely erroneous. The word Katehr is a corruption of the Hindi word 'Kather' or hard, and was applied originally to a small tract of land, now known as Mulk Katehr, because it has a harder soil than the adjoining countries and is more difficult to work⁴. This was the first place which the Rajput invaders conquered in Rohilkhand and making this place their headquarters, they gradually brought therest of the country under their subjection. This state thus came to be called Kingdom of Katehr and the people began to call them Katehrya

1. Moens - Bareilly Settlement Report. 1874, pp. 21-23;
N.W.P. Gaz. Maradabad pp. 142-43.

2. N.W.P. Gaz. Shahjahan pur, p. 141.
The aboriginal races of the place were the Ahirs, Bhimhar, Bihars or Bhils, etc.

3. Irvine - Later Mughals, vol. 2. p. 117.

4. Whiteway - Cal. Review 1888, vol. LXI, 1875, pp. 1292.
Forster - Journey 1808, vol. I, pp. 131-32.
Dist. Gaz. U.P. Shahjahan-pur, pp. 131-32.

Rajputs¹. But during the time of the Sultans of Delhi, when the Katehria Rajputs were dispossessed of their territories west of the river Ramganga, the word Katehr came to be applied to the whole of the country of Rohilkhand, east of the Ramganga, that to the west being called Budaon, Sambhal and Amroha, each of which had a garrison and a governor of its own.²

The Katehria Rajputs after a long reign over the whole of Rohilkhand were attacked by the Muslims under Qutubuddin Aibak in 1196 A.D. (592 A.H.)³, and failing to withstand this huge army, they retreated into the almost impenetrable forests, in the north and north east corner of Rohilkhand. The government of Delhi therefore finding it difficult to bring the Rajput Rajas under direct subjection, preferred to leave them in farm their possessions on the east of the Ramganga, and appointed a Muslim governor with his headquarters at Budaon, in charge of the whole of Rohilkhand.⁴

1. Whiteway, Cal. Review. vol. LXI, p. 201.
N.W.P. Gaz. Shahjahan pur. p. 141.

2. Moens - Bareilly Set. Report. pp. 23-24, 17.
N.W.P. Gaz. Muraābad, pp. 142-143.

3. Court M.H. - Statistical Report of the District of Budaon, p. 2.

4. District Gazetteer, U.P. Bijnour, p. 161.

But the geographical situation of Rohilkhand favoured rebellion for at least eight months in the year¹, because of the broad waters of the Ganges no invading army could cross over to Rohilkhand and during the remaining short period when the river was fordable, there were impenetrable forests in the north and north east part of the country, where the local power could safely take refuge². Besides the Katehria Rajputs were an exceedingly turbulent folk³. Hence defiance of the royal authority became an established practice with them.

In 1248 A.D. Sultan Nasiruddin, finding it difficult for the governor at Budaon, to control the large tract of land under him, because of the constant rebellion of the Katehria Rajputs, appointed another governor at Sambhal⁴, but the result was the same. Hence in 1253-54 A.D. he sent a large force across the Ramganga, to pillage the possessions of the Rajputs, so that "the inhabitants might not forget for the rest of their lives"⁵. At the same time another governor was left at Amroha. But the Rajputs were still unsubdued and continued to give trouble to

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1. Secret Com.Proceedings.19 Dec.1774. Answers to the question of the Committee by Leslie, Hanney & Champion, show that the Ganges is fordable in some parts for at least three months in a year.
 2. Vide, p. III, 186
Jungles where the Rohillas during the Wazir's expedition 1751-52 and the Maratha invasion in 1772 took refuge.
 3. Dist.Gaz. U.P. Rampur. p.79.
 4. Dist.Gaz.U.P. Bijnour p.162.
 5. Elliot & Dowson - History of India.vol.II,p.353.

~~give trouble to~~ the Governor of Budaon. In 1266 A.D. Ghiasuddin Balbon marched up to chastise them, but succeeded only in ravaging their territories¹. In 1290 A.D. Jalaluddin Khilji sent an expedition as far as the Tarai², but the result was not any better for during the reign of Firoz Tughlak, the governor of Budaon was slain by the Rajputs (1379). Another expedition was sent by Firoz and the enemy territory ravaged, but the Katehrias were safe in the forests, and in 1494 Sikandar Lodi had to march against them in person.³

Finally during the time of the Mughal Emperors at Delhi the Katehrias submitted to the authority of the Delhi government. Humayum, after conquering the fort of Bareilly, garrisoned it with his own men although the charge of the collection of revenue from these Rajput Zamindars, was still left with the governor of Budaon.⁴

In the time of Akbar we learn from Ain-i-Akbari, that Rohilkhand was a part of the Subah of Delhi and was divided into two Sarkars, sambhal and Budaon, each in charge of a governor⁵.

1. Elliot & Dawson, History of India, vol.III, pp.105-6.

2. Elliot & Dowson, History of India. vol.III, pp.537-39.

3. Dist.Gaz.U.P. Rampur, pp.79-80.

4. Dist.Gaz.U.P. Rampur, pp.79-80.

5. Dist.Gaz.U.P. Bareilly, p.152.

The Sakar of Budaon consisted of thirteen Mahals, and roughly corresponded to the modern provinces of Bareilly, Shahjahanpur, and eastern part of Budaon and Rampur, and the Sarkar of Sambhal which consisted of forty seven Mahals, covered the rest.¹

In the time of Shah Jahan, however, the seat of the government of Budaon was transferred to Bareilly. At the same time Sambhal was made the seat of a faujdar, while Bareilly was put under a Nazim, directly under the faujdar of Sambhal who was henceforth a grandee of the Empire.²

But the seat of the Faujdari of Sambhal, was soon transferred to Muradabad by the faujdar Rustam Khan Dakhani, who built this city and named it after the name of the prince Murad Baksh (1625 A.D.)³. He died in 1658, and was succeeded by Muhammad Qasin Ali, Mir Atish, who held the charge till his death in 1661 A.D.⁴. The next faujdar whose name is mentioned is Raja Makrand Rai and he was succeeded by Amin-ud-Daula in 1685 A.D.⁵.

But towards the end of the reign of Aurangzeb, all the chief nobles of the Empire, being constantly required for the wars in the south, the faujdari of Muradabad, had to be left in the hands of ^a Nazim and accordingly Azmatulla Khan, a Shaikh-Zada

1. Alexander F. Muradabad Set.Rep.1861 pp.10-11,44.

2. Dist.Gaz.U.P.Bareilly. p.153.
Moens - Bareilly Settlement Report. p.28.

3. Tawarikh-i-Afaghana f.52a.
Dist.Gaz.U.P. Bi-jnaur. p.172.

4. Dist.Gaz. U.P. Muradabad, p.153.

5. Ibid. p.153.

of Lucknow, was appointed to the post¹. The Nazim of Bareilly at this time was Muhammad Rafi Khan².

At the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, all the Katehria Rajputs again rose in^{re}volt and Muhammad Rafi Khan's power was confined to the fort of Bareilly. Azmatulla Khan, however, marched up to his assistance and brought the rebels under subjection.³

But on the death of Bahadur Shah, the next Emperor Jahandar Shah, transferred Azmatulla Khan to the faujdari of Kanauj, in the lower Doab, and sent Muhammad Amin Khan as the faujdar of Muradabad (1713)⁴. But before Amin Khan had had the time to settle himself at Muradabad, Jahandar Shah was overthrown and the new Emperor, Farrukh Siyer, recalled the faujdar of Muradabad to march against the Sikhs who were harassing the Doab⁵.

On Muhammad Amin Khan's return, there being no faujdar at Muradabad, the Rajput Zamindars of Katehr again rose in revolt and withheld the tribute due to the royal treasury. And the Nazim of Bareilly who never had sufficient men under him, was obliged to keep himself within the fort.

The Central Government did nothing to suppress the rebels for the next nine years. In 1716 Nizam-ul-Mulk was sent as the

1. Tawarikh-i-Afaghana f.52b.

2. Dist.Gaz. U.P. Bareilly, p.154.

Muhammad Rafi Khan had been there since 1679.

3. Tararikh-i-Afaghana f.53a.

4. Tawarikh-i-Afaghana f.53a. Dist.Gaz.U.P. Muradabad p.153.

5. Dist.Gaz.U.P.Muradabad p.153.

faujdar of Muradabad by Farrukh Siyer¹, but when he had just restored order to the Sarkar of Maradabad and was free to turn his attention to Katehr, he was recalled in 1718² to make room for a Court favourite of Farrukh Siyer named Rukun-ud-Daula Itiqad Khan. And before Itiqad Khan had turned his attention towards his faujdari the next Emperor Rafi-ud-Darajat (1719) deprived him of his office and appointed Saif-ud-din-Khan, the younger brother of the famous Sayyid brothers to the post³. But Saif-ud-din Khan was in office only a year, for on the fall of his brothers from favour at Delhi, Emperor Muhammad Shah appointed Haider Quli Khan, the faujdar of Muradabad⁴. And Haider Quli Khan, was at Muradabad only six months when on the death of the wazir Muhammad Amin Khan, his son Qamaruddin Khan, was made faujdar of Muradabad by Muhammad Shah (1721).⁵

All this time the Rajput Zamindars of Katehr were engaged in suicidal warfare among themselves⁶. Ever ambitious to extend their limited possessions, they no sooner found themselves completely independent, than they began to fight among themselves, with characteristic pertinacity. And this interminable warfare led them to appoint Afghan adventurers then roaming

1. Elliot & Dowson - History of India. vol.7, p.460, 469.

Dist.Gaz.U.P. Muradabad p.153.

2. Irvine - Later Mughals, vol.1. pp.351-52.

3. Dist.Gaz. U.P.Muradabad, p.153.

4. Dist.Gaz.U.P. Muradabad, p.153.¹⁵³

5. Tararikh-i-Afaghana, f.54b.

6. Tararikh-i-Afaghana, f.52b.

in about/those parts in search of employment to their service. They ever went so far as to grant the leaders of these merceneries small jagir for their maintenance, and to encourage these leaders to wage wars on their own account to increase their limited possessions. Similar was the way in which Daud Khan Rohilla began his career in Katehr at this time.

In 1721, when Qanruddin Khan was appointed to the faujdari of Muradabad and his presence being wanted at Court, Azmatulla Khan was again appointed Nazim of Muradabad.¹ Azmatulla Khan on taking charge of his office marched up towards Bareilly and brought the Rajput Zammidars under subjection. But Daud Khan Rohilla had by this time left Katehr and had entered the service of the Raja of Kumaon.

In 1726 Azmatulla Khan led a successful expedition against the Raja of Kumaon, who had espoused the cause of an imposter to the royal title. The victory was, however, gained by the defection of Daud Khan Rohilla on the battlefield, for which the Rohilla was put to death by the Raja. But his followers escaped and hence Azmatulla Khan enlisted them in his service and procured for their new leader, named Ali Muhammad Khan Rohilla, a small Jagir in Katehr².

But after taking the Rohilla into his service, Azmatulla

1. Tararikh-i-Afaghana, f.54b.

2. Vide, p. 44

began to encourage him to plunder the neighbouring countries in the Sarkar of Bareilly, and finally did not report to the Court when Ali Muhammad Khan Rohilla, forcibly occupied the pergana of Manowna and Aonla. The reason for this attitude of the Nazim of Muradabad is to be traced to a departure from previous practice by Muhammad Shah, when Qamruddin Khan was made faujdar of Muradabad. Qamruddin was not given the jagir of the whole of the faujdari, as had been done since the appointment of Itaqad Khan in Jan.1719¹, but of the Sakar of Muradabad only, and the Sakar of Bareilly was left as Crownlands, although part of it was given as jagir to Nizam-ul-mulk and Amir Khan.

In 1736 Azmatulla Khan was recalled to Delhi and was succeeded by Mir Ahmad Khan². But immediately after this Ali Muhammad Khan Rohilla rendered distinctive service to the Empire in the expedition against the Sayyids of Barha (1737) and hence he became the favourite of the faujdar himself.

Mir Ahmad Khan died in 1739 and was succeeded by Fariduddin Khan, the second son of Azmatulla Khan.³ But Fariduddin was recalled in 1741 to make room for Raja Harnand⁴. And on the defeat and death of Raja Harnand by Ali Muhammad Khan Rohilla

1. Irvine - Later Mughals, vol.1. p.352.

7 Jan.1719 The Muradabad Faujdari was taken out of the crown-lands and made into a separate Suba.

2. Tararikh-i-Afaghana f.19a,f.55b.

3. IDfom - f.56b.


4. IDfom - f.56b.

the rebel was appointed Nazim of Muradabad (1741)¹. In 1745, however, Ali Muhammad Khan because of his highhanded activities was attacked and finally taken as a prisoner to Delhi by the Emperor, and Fariduddin Khan was again appointed Nazim of Muradabad. But in 1747 he was again replaced by Raja Chatar Bhoj. And finally in 1748 Ali Muhammad Khan was appointed Nazim of Muradabad. The Rohilla immediately on his return asserted his independence and taking the forceful possession of the Sarkar of Bareilly, established a Rohilla State, which lasted till 1774.

1. Vide - p.58.

CHAPTER III.**Daud Khan Rohilla and the beginning of the Rohilla State in Hindustan.**

Shaikh Shahabuddin Khan, of whose family Daud Khan was a dependant before he came to India, was an inhabitant of Pishin and Shorwak, in the Qandahar district. He was a Badalzai, one of the sub-sections of Baraich¹. On account of his sanctity he obtained the appellation of Kuta Baba, because he called himself Kuta or dog of the Almighty. Consequently his descendents were also known as Kuta Khel². In his youth he left his homeland to earn his living and went to Attock and Lungarkot, where some families of his tribe resided. He was also followed there by a large section of the Baraich tribe, such as the Chanpanzai,



Khulasah-us-Ansab f.13a, f.25a, f.26a.

2. Gulistan-i-Rahmat f.26, f.4a.
 Khulasah-us-Ansab, f.9a.

Malizai and Badalzai¹. Later in life Shaikh Shahabuddin, making the hilly country of Chach Hazara his abode, began to wander about in woods and valleys, where he passed months in prayer and meditation without paying even a chance visit to his family. He was believed by the people to be capable of working miracles and was reputed all round as a great saint².

Shaikh Shahabuddin Khan died, leaving three sons, Paikha Adam Khan and Mahmud Khan, the last of whom became the 'Sajjadashi of his father, and took the appellation of Moti Baba³. Moti Baba also followed the example of his father and passed his days in devotional exercises. He migrated from Pishin and Sharwak to Tor Shahmatpur and was held in high veneration by the Afghans of the place, who were mostly Yusufzais. The Mandar tribe of the Usifzais even entered into marriage alliances with his family⁴.

Moti Baba died leaving five sons, Azad Khan, Shahdad Khan Hakim Khan, Hasan Khan and Shah Alam Khan⁵. These five sons did not follow the profession of their father and either entered the service of the chiefs of the Mandar tribe, or took to the profession of trade.

1. Khulasat-us-Ansab, f.9b.

2. do. f.9b ~~xxx~~-10a.

3. do. f.11a.
Tarikh-i-Farrukhabad, f.37a-39a.

4. Khulasat-us-Ansab, f.10b.

5. Gulistan-i-Rahamat, f.5b.

Shah Alam Khan, under whom we find Daud Khan working, was a horse-dealer. He used to buy horses in Hindustan and sell them at enhanced prices in Afghanistan. His chief agent who brought the horses in Hindustan and took them home was Daud Khan, but it seems probable that Shah Alam Khan himself also made occasional commercial trips to India ^{although} ~~xxx~~/some writers erroneously think that he came down and settled in Katehr.¹

Daud Khan was a slave of Moti Baba and fell to the share of Shah Alam Khan in the division of his patrimony². He was handsome and intelligent. Hence Shah Alan who had no issue, brought him up as a son and gave him good education³. And when he grew up, he was given the charge of the management of the business of his master⁴. Thus he used to make frequent trips to India to buy horses.

1. Imad-us-Sadat p.40.

Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.13a-15b. Mentions Shah Alam's son Hafiz Rahmat Khan saying to Ali Muhammad Khan that he would rather follow his family profession of trade.

Tarikh-i-Faiz Baksh, f.10a, and Hadiqat-ul-Aqalia p.139, says that "Hasan Khan and Shah Alam Khan came to Katehr and lived a dependant existence there."

2. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.5b-6a.

3. Akhbar-i-Hasan, f.6a.

4. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.5b-6a.

In 1707 he was sent by Shah Alam on the usual commercial trip to the Hardwar fair¹. Daud Khan, however, on his arrival at Hardwar found that there was complete anarchy in Katehr and that a large number of newly arrived adventurers from Roh were roaming about in those parts in search of employment. This tempted him to desert his master and try his luck in Hindustan. Thus purchasing the horses, he gathered round him an equal number of adventurers and began the career of a highwayman. A rich Hindu zamindar who had come to bathe in the Ganges was his first victim. Then with the booty acquired in his first enterprise he entered the jungle at the foot of the Kumaon hills in Katehr and making his headquarters there, began to loot the neighbouring zamindars in the open country. In a short time, many more adventurers were attracted to his standard, and his fame made different Rajput chiefs of the locality who settled their private quarrels by resorting to arms, hire his services.

In this way Daud Khan passed his life till 1712 A.D. when on the death of Bahadar Shah Azmatulla Khan, the Nazim of Murad-abad was transferred to Bharatpur, and since the Nazim of Bareilly had very little force under him, the Rajput zamindars in Katehr

1. Imad-us-Saadat, p.40.

The following account of Daud's early career in India is not given by other authorities, who start with his later career under Madar Shah, the zamindar of Madhgar. Akhbar-i-Hussain, f.6a-6b gives the date.

rose in revolt¹. At this time one of the zamindars named Madar Saha, whose possessions were Madhkar and Ajaon in the pergana of Barsir, took Daud Khan, who then had about two hundred followers under him, into his service, and assigned him a small jagir at Beoli for his maintenance.²

Luckily for Daud Khan a revolution soon took place at Delhi and on the accession of Farrukh(-Siyar, the Court of Delhi being engaged in party intrigues the faujdar of Muradabad could not come up to take any action against the rebels in Katehr. This allowed Daud Khan to remain comfortably at Beoli under Madar Shah and to enrich himself gradually for his master encouraged him to plunder the territories of the neighbouring zamindars.³

Even the wars Daud Khan fought for his master brought him much wealth. Thus when he helped Madar Saha defeat the zamindar of Chowmahla, he acquired^a large booty, both by plundering the baggage of the retiring army and the villages in the enemy's territory⁴. One of the villages looted at this time by Daud Khan was Bankauli, where besides other booty, he captured a boy of

1. Tawarikh-i-Afaghana, f.53a.

2. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.6b-7a. The name of the zamindar has been given as Madar Shah by Muslim writers, but it seems wrong because 'Shah' is not a Hindu name.

Forster - Journey p.115, gives Saha, and in p.116 says that Beoli and other villages were given to Daud.

Qissai Ahwal-i-Rohilla, f.3b.

3. Tarikh-i-Nawab Najib-ud-daula, f.2b-4a.

4. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.6b.

about seven or eight years of age, whom he adopted and named Ali Muhammad Khan (1715).¹

Sometime after this his master Shah Alam Khan, hearing the story of his greatness, came down from Toru Shahmatpur to Beoli and was received by Daud Khan with great respect. Shah Alam after a short stay was sent back by Daud Khan with a present of two thousand rupees to compensate for the loss of his service². But the news carried home by Shah Alam of Daud's prosperous condition at Beoli made many of his ambitious neighbours and kinsmen start for Beoli. Thus gradually Daud Khan was joined by about five hundred Afghans from Roh³.

Thus strengthened Daud Khan remained in the service of Madar Sha who encouraged him to attack other zamindars of the locality on his own behalf and ~~thus~~ increase his possessions.⁴

1. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f. 6b.
Qissai Ahwal-i-Rohilla f.4b.
Gul-i-Rahmat, pp.11-12, gives Ali Muhammad's approx.age, which is supported by Irvine - Later Mughals, vol II. p.118, who quotes another authority which I could not get hold of.
2. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.7a-7b.
Gul-i-Rahmat, p.12, gives the definite sum of money.
3. Akhbar-i-Hasan, f.7a.
Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.6a.
4. Tarikh-i-Nawab Najib-ud-daula, f.2b-4a.

Daud Khan was thus comfortably settled with Madar Saha when in 1720¹ his master Shah Alam again paid him a visit at Beoli. Shah Alam considering Daud's present position made the demand of a rather exorbitant sum of money from his slave this time. Daud Khan finally succeeded in settling the matter by paying a large sum of money in cash and by promising to pay him in future two thousand rupees a year regularly. Shah Alam after this started for home but on his way at Delhi, he was detained by certain horse dealers, to whom Daud owed some money. At this the old man left all his goods as security with the merchants and returned to Beoli to make Daud Khan clear his debt.

On the arrival of Shah Alam, Daud Khan who had parted with nearly all his money began to make excuses. Hence Shah Alam sent the money out of his own pocket and demanded from Daud Khan the immediate payment of it. The result was that Daud Khan plotted to get rid of Shah Alam by having him killed. At this time Daud Khan had been invited by the Amil of Budaon, a representative of Muhammad Khan Bangash, Nawab of Farrukhabad, to assist him in a struggle with certain zamindars who were causing him trouble². Thus on the pretence of assisting his compatriot he immediately set out with Shah Alam in his Company. At the same time, he

1. Gulistan-i-Rahmat - f.8b-10a.

2. do. f.8b.
Akhbar-i-Hasan, f.7b.

secretly hired four assassins to enter Shah Alam's tent at night, while he was on his way to Budaon, and to assassinate the old man.

The crime was accordingly committed on the 12th October 1720 and when news reached Daud Khan he feigned sorrow at the event and issued orders to ascertain who were the culprits¹. Shah Alam's body was buried in the jungle outside Budaon, on which a mausoleum was raised afterwards by Hafiz Rahmat Khan, the son of the deceased.

This action of Daud Khan was clearly prompted by the desire to escape being reminded constantly of his late dependance although the direct cause was the constant demand of money. And as to the carrying out of the whole affair in such a secretive manner the reason is obvious. Daud Khan was forced to do so not to give offence to his followers most of whom were closely related to Shah Alam Khan.

After burying Shah Alam, Daud Khan marched on and helped the Amil of Budaon in chastising the rebellious zamindars. Then he came back to Beoli but he had not been very long there when in 1721 Azmatulla Khan, being appointed Nazim of Muradabad by Muhammad Shah, came to his faujdari with a large army².

1. Akhbari-1-Hasan, f.7b.

Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.8b, says "It happened on Friday, 9th Zilhaj." And 9th Zilhaj on a Friday about that time falls only in 1132 A.H. i.e. 1720 A.D.

2. Tawarikh-i-Afaghana, f.54b.

Daud Khan was in a precarious position for this put an end to his plundering raids. But luckily for him Debi Chand the Raja of Kumaon, who had only just succeeded to the throne (1720) offered him employment in his service¹.

Daud Khan at once availed the opportunity and left Madar Saha's service. He was made the Commander of the Raja's forces, stationed on the plains, at the foot of the hills. Thus in spite of the suppression of anarchy in Katehr by Azmatulla Khan, Daud Khan was quite safe for he was encouraged by the Raja of Kumaon to carry on depredations in the Tarai lands.²

Daud Khan was thus occupied in the service of the Raja of Kumaon, when in 1726 an imposter named Sabir Shah who professed to belong to the Royal Family raised the standard of revolt in Tarai the ~~xxx~~/lands and collecting a large army, invaded Katehr, but he was repulsed by Azmatulla Khan who marched up from Muradabad. Sabir Shah then went to Kumaon and sought help from Raja Debi Chand, promising that he would give Katehr to the Raja when he was seated on the throne of Delhi.³.

The Raja of Kumaon who was led to believe by Sabir Shah that he "was one of the greatest princes in the world", was naturally desirous of occupying the Tarai lands which had once

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1. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.10a.
 2. Tawarikh-i-Afaghana, f.55a.
 3. Tarikh-i-Hindi, f.253b-254a.

formed part of the Kingdom of Kumaon, and hence he acceded to ~~the~~ Sabir Shah's request. Daud Khan was ordered to combine with Sabir Shah and the Adhikari of Kashipur against the Imperial army¹.

Asmatulla Khan was deputed by the Imperial government to suppress the rebellion. He accordingly marched up and finding the enemy army rather formidable, secretly bribed Daud Khan to desert the Raja when the engagement had begun.²

Daud Khan who was rather desirous of gaining the Imperial favour, acted according to Azmatulla's instructions and when the two armies met at Nagina, stood aside to watch the events of the day. And on the defeat of the forces of Kumaon, Daud Khan/made ^{even} an attempt to seize the person of the Raja as a hostage for the payment of the arrears due to his troops. But the fidelity of the hillmen prevented him from achieving his object.

The Raja ~~repeated~~ to Kakardwara and pretending ignorance ~~of~~ Daud's treachery, invited him to attend to receive his arrears of pay. Daud Khan could not check the temptation of money and fell into the snare. Leaving his followers behind, he presented himself to the Raja at Kakardwara. The Raja after according him a hearty welcome in the Court, imprisoned him and then had his legs cut off and the sinews drawn out, which caused his death³. He was buried

1. N.W.P.Gaz. vol.XI, pp.581-82.

2. Akhbar-i-Hasan, f.8b. : Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.10b. only says he rebelled against the Raja.

3. Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.11a.

near Kakardwara by the officers of Debi Chand.

Thus ended the life of Daud Khan, after a stormy career of about nineteen years in India, (1707-26). He was a brave and adventurous Afghan, but utterly unscrupulous. He was a natural leader of men, who beginning life as a robber, rose to a position of an independent command of a large number of Afghan soldiers and officers. In his wars he was always successful and his fortitude, courage and military skill was amply rewarded by his employers. The great stain on his character is the murder of his master, Shah Alam Khan. But with all his defects he was a great soldier and general who paved the way for the foundation of the Rohilla power in Hindustan.

CHAPTER IV.Ali Muhammad Khan and the establishment of the Rohilla State in Hindustan.

Daud Khan left a son named Muhammad Khan besides his adopted son, Ali Muhammad Khan. Nothing further is mentioned in any of the native authorities about Muhammad Khan. According to Forster, who does not specify his source, Muhammad Khan at the time of his father's death, was an infant and remained some years in the family of Ali Muhammad Khan, after which he retired to Farrukhabad, where he was received into the Bangash family¹. He also states that Muhammad Khan was killed in 1749 A.D. while fighting in Rohilkhand, whither he had accompanied Qaim Khan Bangash².

The story of the birth and adoption of Ali Muhammad Khan forms one of the most controversial topics in the history of the Rohillas. Conflicting accounts have been handed down to us. He is variously referred to as a Rajput, Ahir or Jat, who was captured by Daud Khan in one of his early adventures and after his conversion to Islam, was adopted as a son³. Some call him the

1. Qissai Ahwal-i-Rohilla, f.5a. : Imad-us-Saadat, p.40.

2. Forster - Journey - London 1808, pp.115-116, & p.118 foot-note.

3. Idem - p.128, foot-note.

4. Tawarikh-i-Afaghana, f.55b. : Siyar-ul-Mutakhkharin p.853.
Hadiqat-ul-Aqalim. p.139. : Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.6b.

real son of Daud Khan¹. Most writers, however, believe him to have been the son of Jat of Bankauli, who was taken a prisoner when his village was looted by Daud. This view is also supported by verbal tradition which was current in the Nineteenth Century². Again there are other writers who tell us that he was the son of a Sayyid of Barha, through a Jat mother named Lachchu, that his father had died when he was still a boy and that Daud found him and his mother in a lonely desert in a helpless condition³.

Although it is rather difficult to come to a definite conclusion on this subject, the reason for such conflicting evidence, can easily be traced to the interested motives of the writers. The authors of the Gulistan-i-Rahmat, and Gul-i-Rahmat were the descendants of Hafiz Rahmat Khan and may very naturally have tried to assign an obscure origin to Ali Muhammad Khan, their object being to extol the greatness of their renowned ancestor, Hafiz Rahmat Khan. Similarly, the information in the Tarikh-i-Faiz Baksh represents the views of Faizulla Khan, the son of Ali Muhammad Khan. The reason why most of the later writers adopted the former view is to be found in the current tradition

1. Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f. 11a-12b.

Hadiqat-ul-Aqalim, p.139.

Akhbar-i-Hasan, f.9a.

2. Moens - Bareilly Set.Rep. p.30.

3. Imad-us-Saadat, pp.40-41.

Tarikh-i-Farrukhabad, f.37b.

According to these authorities his father died when he was an infant.

which supported it. But the fact that another tradition was equally current is shown by the information in the Imad~~xx~~-us-Saadat and in the Tarikh-i-Farrukhabad, and this tradition also explains why the other tradition persisted. Ali Muhammad Khan was found with a Jat mother and then he had to be circumcised. Naturally the rumour must have gone round that he was a Jat boy.¹

Ali Muhammad Khan who was handsome, intelligent and strong was only about seven years old when he came into the possession of Daud Khan. Daud took a fancy to him and adopted him as his son for he was childless at that time. He received a good training in every military exercise necessary for a young man destined to be a great leader.² In fact, it was his proficiency in military discipline, the use of arms and riding which led Daud Khan to nominate him as his successor.³ On his father's death he assumed the command of the Rohilla forces then numbering about five hundred and appealed for help to Azmatulla Khan for the sake of whom his father had sacrificed his life. The Nazim took him into his service and gave him some villages for his maintenance. Some time after this Ali Muhammad Khan took possession of the farr of Beoli which was within the Jagir of Amir Khan. But because

1. Hamilton - Rohilla Afghans, p.35. foot-note, states that it was not the practice for Muslims to adopt Hindus.

2. Qissai Ahwal-i-Rohilla, f.5a.
Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.11a.

3. Qissai Ahwal-i-Rohilla, f.5a.
Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.11a.

he remitted the dues to Amir Khan regularly, no action was taken against him. He now made Beoli his headquarters and served his master loyally.¹

At this time a constant stream of Afghan adventurers flocked to join him till it became really difficult for him to support them from his limited resources. He appealed to his patron for help. The Nazim who held Ali Muhammad Khan in high esteem, unable to make any further grants to him, gave him indirect permission to increase his income and extend his possessions. The Rohilla chief, therefore, began to raid the neighbouring villages as his father, had done before. At the same time taking advantage of the rivalry at Court between Amir Khan, his absentee landlord and the Wazir, he stopped the remittance due to him, paying however the revenue due to the Crown.²

But unfortunately for Ali Muhammad Khan his conduct was soon followed by all the other zamindars in Amir Khan's jagir in Katehr. This gave Amir Khan, a chance to have his revenge ~~against~~ on Ali Muhammad Khan against whom he could not do anything openly, the Rohilla being the servant of Azmatulla Khan, the Wazir's partisan. Under pretence of bringing the recalcitrant zamindars

1. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.11a-11b.
 Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.11b.
 Akhbar-i-Hasan, f.9a.
 Tarikh-i-Nawab Najib-ud-daula, f.2b-4a.

2. Hadigat-ul-Aqalim, p.139.
 Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.12a.
 The Nazim of Bareilly collected both the revenue due to the Crown and to the Jagirdars from the farmers in Katehr.

to subjection, Amir Khan sent a large army under a deputy named Muhammad Saleh who was a Khwaja Sarai.¹ Muhammad Saleh must have been instructed by his master to destroy the Rohilla, for no sooner had he brought all the other zamindars to subjection and collected the revenue than he demanded from Ali Muhammad Khan besides the arrears due from him, the surrender of the possessions of Beoli which he had forcibly taken in farm. Ali Muhammad Khan was prepared to pay any enhancement of revenue but as nothing short of the entire resignation of the lands would satisfy the Khwaja Sarai he applied to Azmatulla Khan for advice. His patron told him to act as he thought proper and this as some authorities suggest, was probably an indirect permission to fight Muhammad Saleh². Accordingly when the Khwaja Sarai tried to enforce his demand by sequestering the rents of some of the villages within the disputed area, the Rohilla replied by a sudden night attack on his camp. (1727 A.D.). The Eunuch's troupes at Manauna were taken completely by surprise and fled in all directions. Muhammad Saleh himself was slain in ^{the} action and a considerable amount of booty fell into the hands of Ali Muhammad Khan. The pargana of Manauna was annexed by Ali Muhammad Khan and thus increased the extent of the Rohilla's possessions. Amir Khan was helpless

1. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.11b.

Tarikh-Faiz Bakhsh, f.12a.

Amir Khan's jagir was the parganas of Manauna and Aonla.

2. Akhba-i-Hasan, f.10a.

and could take no action to punish him because of the Wazir, his friend at Court.¹ Ali Muhammad Khan seeing that the Wazir would naturally support him in any of his activities against Amir Khan now set himself to capture the Irani nobleman's remaining possessions in Katehr, namely, Aonla. This ~~xxxx~~ pargana was then in the possession of a powerful Rajput zamindar named Dujā. Hence Ali Muhammad Khan resorted to secret and underhand means and hired a chamar to assassinate Dujā. The chamar was able to carry out his commission secretly and when the relations of the dead zamindar were performing the funeral rites in the morning he assaulted the town, dispersing the relatives and followers of Dujā who fled away leaving everything behind. Establishing his rule over the town and the villages around Aonla, Ali Muhammad Khan made this town the chief seat of his power. The buildings raised soon after beautified the town and made it the premier town in Katehr. Again as the Rohilla had expected, Azmatulla Khan did not report the matter to the Court, nor could Amir Khan do anything against the wishes of the Wazir.²

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1. Gulistan-i-Rhamat, f.11b-12a.
 Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.12a.
 Qissai Ahwal-i-Rohilla, f.7a.
 Forster - Journey, p.112, foot-note, gives the date.
 Manauna is two miles west of Aonla, which is again
 seventeen miles north of Budaon. (see map).
 2. Gulistan-i-Rhamat, f.12a.
 Akhbar-i-Hasan, f.10a.

Thus established in Katehr Ali Muhammad Khan's power and prestige greatly increased. The extent of his power can easily be guessed from the fact that in 1729 his assistance was sought by Muhammad Khan Bangash, for which purpose the Nawab of Farrukhabad had sent his son Qaim Khan, to Ali Muhammad Khan's fort at Bangar.

Some time after this Ali Muhammad Khan sent a wakil to the Wazir Qamruddin Khan and secured his neighbouring parganas in farm (in the Sarkar of Muradabad). This gave him some status and ensured him protection by the highest dignitary of the Empire. He obtained some villages, on similar condition, from the other jagirdars of the neighbourhood as well.²

In 1736 Ali Muhammad Khan suffered a great loss in the person of Azmutalla Khan who, after his recall to Delhi, died there a few months after, for in him he had a constant supporter who exercised considerable influence in the Imperial Court, and but for whom he could not have succeeded. Luckily for him, however, the new Nazim Mir Ahmad Khan, confirmed him in all his possessions.³

A year after Azmutalla's recall came Ali Muhammad Khan's opportunity to show his devotion to the Wazir. Saif-ud-din Khan,

1. Irvine, J.A.S.B. Vol.47, part I. 1878 - Bangash Nawab's of Farrukhabad - p.301.
Muhammad Khan Bangash was engaged in fighting the Marathas.
2. Gulistan-i-Rhamat, f.12a-12b.
3. Tawarikh-i-Afaghana, f.55b.

the leader of the Sayyids of Barha and the brother of the famous Sayyid brothers, the ministers of Farrukh-Siyar, after their death had lived aloof from the Court at Jansath, in the pargana of Saharanpur. He had not been on cordial terms with Muhammad Shah and had in 1737 opposed the royal officer, Hashmat Khan, faujdar of Saharanpur and killed him. The Wazir could not tolerate this contumacious conduct and hence his brother, Azimulla Khan, was sent with a large army to punish the rebel and Ali Muhammad Khan was ordered to join the Imperialists with his followers. The army marched to Jansath (25 miles north of Meerut in Muzaffarnagar district) and in the battle which followed Ali Muhammad Khan's bravery was conspicuous. His party which had been opposed to the force commanded by Saif-ud-din Khan himself had proved victorious, killing Saif-ud-din. The town of Jansath was sacked and the power of the Sayyids was completely broken. ~~TX~~

The Wazir was highly impressed by the Rohilla's services and procured him the title of Nawab and the right to keep a standard and drums. He was decorated with a military rank (Mansab), the nature of which is uncertain. Some substantial rewards were also secured, for some villages of the Crownlands (halasa) were given by the Emperor and the Wazir gave him out of his own jagir the command over some districts in the Sarkar of Muradabad¹. The grant of Nawabship and a Mansab gave Ali

1. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.12b.

Tarikh-i-Muzaffari, f.192b.

The Hadigat-ul-Aqalim, p.139. and The Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh f.13x state that he was given a Mansab of 5,000 foot and 5,000 horse, but this seems to be an exaggeration for otherwise it would have been mentioned by Siyar-ul-Mutakhkharin, p.854.

Muhammad Khan a legal position in the State. He was no more an adventurer but a recognised servant of the Empire.

While Ali Muhammad Khan was thus living in all splendour and greatness, affairs in Afghanistan in 1738 helped him to increase his power still more. The rise of the national State of Persia under Nadir Shah led to an invasion of Afghanistan by the Persian to avenge the past insults they had suffered at the hands of the Afghans. The pages of the *Tarikh-i-Jahan Kushai*¹ give a vivid picture of the terrible atrocities committed by the Shah upon the unfortunate Afghans. Nadir Shah sent several ambassadors to Muhammad Shah with an earnest request that he would "prevent the fugitives of that nation (Afghans) from finding a retreat in his dominions." Discovering that the Emperor of Delhi had done nothing to prevent the Afghans escaping into India and that a large number of them had taken shelter there, Nadir Shah's fury knew no bounds². The chief cause of the Persian monarch's invasion of Hindustan was the protection which the rebellious Afghans had received there; the murder of the Persian envoy at Jalalabad was only the immediate cause of his invasion.

A large number of Afghans ~~xxxxxx~~ who had thus taken refuge in India naturally gathered round their compatriots in Rohilkand who were in a flourishing condition³. Two of the most

1. *Tarikh-i-Jahan Kushai*, f.222a-227a.

2. *Tarikh-i-Jahan Kushai*, f.225a-227a.

3. ~~xxxxxx~~ *Siyar-ul-Mutakhkharin*, p.854,
Tawarrikh-i-Afaghana, f.56a.

important recruits entertained by Ali Muhammad Khan at this time were Hafiz Rahmat Khan and Dundi Khan. Rahmat Khan was the son of Shah Alam Khan and was born at Toru Shahamatpur in 1716 A.D.¹ In his fifth year he commenced to study the Qoran under the tuition of Hafiz Muhammad Janan, and at the age of ten or twelve years he had memorised the Qoran besides many other learned works, and had thus earned the title of Hafiz². He began his career as a petty trader and visited Hindustan several times in pursuit of his calling. He had even visited Katehr once on Ali Muhammad's invitation and inspite of his host's repeated entreaties to settle down in Katehr, had returned to his native hills. His final migration synchronised with the severities of Nadir Shah in Roh. He was given twelve villages for his maintenance by Ali Muhammad Khan and a proper escort being sent, his family was brought to Aonla from Toru Shahmatpur³. He soon took a leading part in all of Ali Muhammad's schemes and succeeded him as the chief Rohilla leader. Dundi Khan was the son of Hasan Khan, brother of Shah Alam Khan and was born in 1705 A.D. He was a brave soldier and distinguishing himself in the wars of Ali Muhammad Khan rose to the position of Sipahsalar, which position he retained till his death in 1771 A.D.⁴

1. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.10b.

2. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.11a.

3. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.13a-15b.

4. Akhbar-i-Hasan, f.11a and 53a.
Qissai Ahwal-i-Rohilla, f.7b.

Nadir Shah, who ~~xxx~~ at the time of his envoy's murder, was near Kabul, marched towards Hindustan. Storming Alahabad on the 17th September 1738 and capturing Lahore on the 21st January 1739, he marched on towards Delhi. The Emperor marched out to oppose him and in the battle which followed at Karnal (23rd Feb. 1739) the Indians were totally routed. Nadir Shah who had no intention of establishing an Empire in India, left Muhammad Shah in possession of his Kingdom¹ but only after he had yielded to him the hoarded treasures of many generations. The provinces beyond the Indus were, however, annexed to the Persian Empire. Nadir Shah marched homeward on the 5th May 1739¹.

But the defeat of Muhammad Shah at the hands of the Persian monarch completely shattered the prestige of the Mughal Emperor. The centrifugal forces soon became active and distant provinces shook off the Imperial yoke. The central government had neither the resources nor the will to bring them back to allegiance. Ali Muhammad Khan also noted this weakness. He had already enlisted as many of the fugitives from Afghanistan into his service as his limited income had allowed. But during the confusion consequent upon Nadir Shah's invasion, he was able to increase the size of his army by plundering his neighbour's territories and by taking forceful possession of the Imperial lands in Katchh as far as Richha (eighteen miles north west of Pilibhit). He now assumed his independence and ~~he~~ stopped the remittance of revenue ~~from~~ to even for the lands he had originally been the Imperial Exchequer

1. Tawarikh-i-Afaghana, f. 220b.; Tarakh-i-Jahan Kushi, f. 231a-231b.

2. Irvine - Later Mughals, vol. II, pp. 345-6, 375-76.

given in farm.¹

These high handed activities of ~~kix~~ Ali Muhammad Khan dispelled the confidence of the Wazir in him. Qamruddin Khan began to see through Ali Muhammad's intensions of asserting his independence but he was at this time in a rather precarious position at Court. The Emperor convinced of the selfishness and disloyalty of the Turani nobles by their conduct during the late Persian invasion, had been won over by the Iranis under Amir Khan whom he had made the third Bakhshi and was even plotting to make Wazir in the place of Qamruddin. He had intended to ~~xxxxx~~ bring about this change as soon as Nizam-ul-mulk, the richest and the best armed nobleman in the Court, had gone away to his Jagir in the Deccan. But Amir Khan's over enthusiasm when the Nizam was not yet far from the capital, led to the failure of the plot. Under the pressure of the Nizam the Emperor had to order Amir Khan to leave the Court and retire to his Jagir of Allahbad. The Iran nobleman repaired to his Jagir in July 1740²

Relieved of the Irani intrigues, Qamruddin Khan at once turned his attention towards Ali Muhammad Khan, both to ascertain the Rohilla's real intentions and to please the Emperor. Raja Harnand was accordingly appointed Nazim of Muradabad with instructions to look narrowly into the conduct of Ali Muhammad Khan and to demand the government's share of revenues of the Afghan lands.

1. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.15b.

2. Siyar- ul-Mutakhkharin, vol.II, ^{pp} 486-517.

In the battle of Karnal the fighting was done by the Irani nobleman, Sada Khan, governor of Oudh.

To enable him to carry out these instructions he was accompanied by a considerable body of horse and a respectable train of artillery.¹

But Raja Harnand, it seems, was determined to destroy the Rohilla power and thus earn merit and reward for himself.² Reaching Muradabad he at once sent reports to the Wazir regarding the power of the Rohilla chief and represented the situation as very serious for the Empire. He followed this up with various complaints of the zamindars in the locality. At the same time he ordered Ali Muhammad Khan to present himself with an exorbitant revenue ~~as~~ as the amount due from him. Ali Muhammad Khan requested some order reduction of the demand before he could comply with the ~~request~~ of the Raja. But the Raja refused.³ The Rohilla then appealed to Muhammad Khan Bangash, Nawab of Farrukhabad to intercede on his behalf. Muhammad Khan requested both the Wazir and the Nazim to come to a reasonable settlement. But the Raja who was determined upon war would not listen to any advice. He represented the whole affair to the Wazir in such a light that an order was finally issued to him to destroy the Rohilla. The royal park of artillery and the services of Munir-ud-Daula, son of the Wazir, were also granted for this expedition. Failing in his attempt to persuade

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1. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.16a.
Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.13b.
Qissai Ahwal-i-Rohilla, f.8a.
Tawarikh-i-Afaghana, f.56b.
Siyar, III. p.854.
 2. Tawarikh-i-Afaghana, f.56b.
 3. Siyar, III, p.854.
Qissai Ahwal-i-Rohilla, f.8b.

the Wazir to come to terms with the Rohilla, Muhammad Khan Bangash advised Ali Muhammad Khan not ^{to} hold money too dear, but to settle matters with the Raja if possible. But Raja Harnand was deaf to all proposals and hence Ali Muhammad's efforts in that respect failed. Finally Muhammad Khan Bangash advised Ali Muhammad Khan to resort to force¹.

Raja Harnand receiving his master's permission at once summoned Abdul Nabi Khan, the Nazim of Bareilly, to join him and himself marched from Muradabad with his son, Moti Lal, and Diler Khan, the younger brother of the Nazim of Bareilly, who had followed him from Delhi. Ali Muhammad's force which did not exceed 12,000 men was a poor one compared to that of the Raja but deficiency in the materials of war and number of men was more than compensated by the determination of the soldiery to die for their leader and the superiority of generalship. He marched out of Aonla to meet Harnand and encamped at Dal Amla (sixteen miles west of Aonla). Harnand encamped at Aslatpur Jarai at a distance of six miles from the enemy's encampment, and waited there for the reinforcements from Delhi and Bareilly to join him. Ali Muhammad Khan carried on negotiations for peace for some time to put the Raja off his guard and finally when he heard that the Nazim of

1. Irvine, J.A.S.B. 1878. pp.334-35.

He bases this account on a series of letters which passed between Muhammad Khan Bangash and Ali Muhammad Khan Rohilla.

Bareilly would be with the Raja in another day and that Munir-ud-Daula would have crossed the Ganges, he circulated the report that he was going to present himself to the Raja in the evening. The Rohilla's device had the desired effect and when he fell on the Raja's army that very night just before the break of dawn with his valiant assistants, Hafiz Rahmat Khan, Dundi Khan, Painda Khan and others, all in command of the different wings, the enemy was caught completely by surprise.¹ When the Rohillas had already penetrated into his camp, Harnand quickly mounted an elephant and came out to fight but he was soon numbered among the slain. His son, Moti Lal, then took the command but perished in the effort and the whole of the Raja's troops took to flight except a small band under Diler Khan who died fighting bravely. The last to succumb was Abdul Nabi Khan, the Nazim of Bareilly who, with three or four thousand soldiers, had come to the scene when the day had already been lost. Ali Muhammad Khan was completely victorious and a large amount of booty fell to him, including many pieces of artillery, tents and other camp equipage (6th April 1741)². X

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1. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.16b-17a.
Tararikh-i-Afaghana, f.56b-57a.
Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.13b.
Akhbar-i-Hasan, f.11b.
 2. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.17b.
Qissai Ahwal-i-Rohilla, f.9a. - Imad-us-Saadat, pp.42-43.
Hadiqatul-Aqalim, pp.139-40.: The Akhbar-us-Sanadid in
Srivastava A.L.- First two Nawabs of Oudh, pp.107-8, gives the
date of the battle.

This victory over the Imperial Army and the acquisition of considerable treasure and artillery greatly increased Ali Muhammad's power and prestige and all the neighbouring chiefs rallied to his standard. Ali Muhammad Khan at once marched up and encamped on the bank of the Ganges opposite Munir-ud-Daula's camp who dare not now cross over and attack the rebel. He therefore applied to Delhi for advice. The Wazir also could not risk a further defeat. So, when Muhammad Khan Bangash now pleaded for the Rohilla, saying "he had not meant to fight and that the calamity was not his fault; he was still ready to submit", the Wazir availed himself of the opportunity and, to save the Imperial prestige, formally ordered his son to demand from the Rohilla satisfaction for the injury which the Imperial authority had sustained in the discomfiture of the Nazim.¹ When Ali Muhammad Khan was informed of the Wazir's attitude towards him, he at once went up and interviewed Munir-ud-Daula. Munir, being satisfied by the explanation given by the Rohilla of his conduct, pardoned him. The friendship was further cemented by a marriage alliance. Ali Muhammad's daughter was given in marriage with a considerable dowry to the Wazir's second son, Mir Sadruddin Khan.

1. Irvine, J.A.S.B. 1878, p. 335.
 Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.14a-14b.
 Tawarikh-i-Afaghana, f.57a.

The Wazir issued a rescript appointing Ali Muhammad Khan Nazim of Muradabad.¹

Immediately after his appointment, Ali Muhammad Khan sent out his collectors with large detachments to take charge of the territories now put under his control. But after securing the control of the Sarkar of Muradabad Ali Muhammad Khan grew bolder and occupied all the territories in the Sarkar of Bareilly except the town which was under the control of the Nazim of Bareilly to avoid giving affront to the Imperial authority. He even went so far as to send a large force under Painda Khan to conquer ~~Pilibhit~~ Pilibhit by driving out the zamindar of that place. Despat the zamindar of Pilibhit, was a strong chief and was the leader of the whole confederacy of the Banjarah Zamindars extending from Pilibhit to Gorakpur, at the foot of the Kumaon mountains. Painda Khan defeated Despat and occupied his lands. The other Landlords at the foot of the mountains who could hardly put up a resistance, also met the same fate.²

1. Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.14a-14b.

Siyar, III, p.855.

Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.17b.

Tawarikh-i-Afaghana, f.57a.

Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh-siyar wa jalus-i-Md.Shah, f.294a-294b.

2. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.17b.

These zamindars brought under subjection were smaller chiefs in the Sarkar of Bareilly and were all inhabitants of the land. The larger Rajput chiefs, as we shall see later on, were driven out in 1748.

Ali Muhammad Khan after this busied himself in organising his government and placing it on a sound footing. To make his administration more efficient, he divided it into separate departments and appointed one of his assistants in charge of each of them. Hafiz Rahmat Khan was made Diwan-i-Kul (chief Diwan) and was given charge of the Revenue Department with Raja Man Rai as his personal assistant. (Katiba-i-Peshkar-i-Diwan). Mulla Sardar Khan was made Bakhshi (paymaster). Fateh Khan was appointed Khan Saman (steward) and was in charge of both the household store ~~xxxxxxxx~~ and the treasury. Dundi Khan was given the post of Sipah Salar or Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and Pahda Khan was made Hirawal (running footman), an office corresponding to that of the Mughal Harkara, and was in charge of the Intelligence Department.¹

Some time in 1743 when Ali Muhammad Khan had got his administration highly organised, one, Himmat Gosain, called Duli Chand by the Rohilla historians, a State official in the service of the Raja of Kumaon, sought shelter at Aonla from the persecution of Kalyan Chand, the Raja of Kumaon and instigated Ali Muhammad Khan to lead an expedition against the Raja. Ali Muhammad Khan who had had his eye on the Tarai lands for the last two years and was also desirous of avenging the blood of his father

1. Imad-us-Saadat, p.42.
 Hadiqat-ul-Aqalim, p.140.
 Forster - Journey, p.122-23, but he wrongly makes
 Sardar Khan, Sipahsahr.

at once took advantage of the situation for he was shrewd enough to realise that the problem of a campaign in an unfamiliar mountain tract was solved for him by the presence of Duli Chand, who could point out the best route¹.

A large army was accordingly sent by Ali Muhammad Khan towards Kumaon under his Sipah-Salar, Dundi Khan, although Hafiz Rahmat Khan was also associated with him to determine the conduct of operations. The army first marched towards Rudurpur, an outpost of the Kingdom of Kumaon on the plains.² ~~Raj~~

Raja Kalyan Chand, on the other hand, treated the report of the advance of the Rohillas with a disdainful negligence³. Sib Deo Joshi had full power in the Tarai, Ramdatta Adhikari in the Kota Bhabar and Hari Ram Joshi in Almorah, the capital. The Rohillas defeated Sib Deo at Rudurpur and obliged him to take refuge in the fort of Barakheri. Then leaving a governor at Rudurpur, they pursued the Kumaonis and occupied Bijipur. The Raja alarmed at the success of the Rohillas, at length sent a force to support Sib Deo. But the Kumaonis in spite of this reinforcement, fled away from Barakheri at the very sight of the Rohilla army. Leaving the Bakhshi behind at Barakheri, because of his old age, the Rohillas marched on towards Almorah. In spite of the various efforts by the Raja to stop their progress the

1. Gulistan-Rahmat, f.17b-18a.

2. Idem, f.18a.

3. N.W.P. Gaz. vol.XI, pp.585-88.

Rohillas who were adept in the art of fighting in hilly regions, reached Almorah and invested the City. The Raja unnerved by the dauntless courage exhibited by the Rohillas during their onward march, considered flight as the better part of valour. Accordingly he left the palace under cover of night, with all his dependants and followers and set out for Garhwal¹.

The Rohillas were, therefore, master of the town which they thoroughly plundered. Flushed with iconoclastic zeal they even rejoiced in destroying the temples and idols of the Hindus. Cows were slaughtered in the streets.²

Four months after this when the rainy season was over Ali Muhammad Khan went up to Almorah, where, besides distributing gifts to the army, he awarded robes of honour to his principal officials.³ Ali Muhammad Khan had not been long at Almorah when came the news that Kalyan Chand had secured the assistance of the Raja of Garhwal and that the allied forces were marching up to recover Almorah. Ali Muhammad Khan was not perturbed by this information and advanced to meet the enemy. Falling upon the United forces at Dunagiri and Dwará, the Rohillas completely defeated them. Ali Muhammad Khan followed the fugitives and

1. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.18a-18b.

2. Idem, f.18b.

3. Idem, f.19a.

threatened to conquer Sirinagar, the capital of the Garhwal State, as well. The Raja of Garhwal, apprehensive of his own safety, sent his envoys to Ali Muhammad Khan professing submission. Negotiations for peace were begun which finally ended in the Raja promising to swear allegiance to the Rohilla Chief, and to stand security for the payment of three lakhs of rupees per annum as tribute by the Kumaon State, which was now given to a relative of Kalyan Chand. The Tarai lands, however, consisting of Kashipur and Rudurpur, were retained by Ali Muhammad Khan. The terms of the agreement were carried out and after a stay of seven months at Barakheri, the Rohilla leaving a small garrison there, returned to Aonla.¹

This successful expedition of Ali Muhammad Khan into a State where even the Mughal Emperors had never penetrated, raised him high in the estimation of the people. The first person to get alarmed was naturally Abul Mansur Khan Safdar Jang, the Subahdar of Oudh. The province of Oudh lay on the south-east of the Rohilla dominion with no permanent barrier like a river or mountain between them. On the west the river Ganges was the natural boundary of the Rohilla State; besides Delhi being so near on that side, they did not dare to cross over and extend

1. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.19b. : Akhbar-i-Hasan, f.13a-13b.
 Hadiqat-ul-Aqalim, p.140. : Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.15b.
 Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh-Siyar, f.294a.
 Bayan-i-Waqai, f.99a.

their possessions further. The presence of the mountains barred the progress of the Rohillas in the north and in the north-east and on the south lay the territory of a brother Afghan, - Qaim Khan Bangash, and from their past relation with this State it was extremely unlikely that they would advance in that direction. Safdar Jang therefore, became apprehensive lest the Rohillas in their flush of victory should invade his territories next. Nor was this fear altogether groundless. Debi Das, Deputy faujdar of Kanauj, reported to Safdar Jang that the Rohillas were carrying on depredations on the north-western frontier of his province¹. Therefore, Safdar Jang who had only lately been introduced to the Court and had been made Mir Atish, began to regard the Rohilla as a "thorn in his side" and at once began to plot his destruction.²

Early in 1745 Safdar Jang found a pretext for instigating Muhammad Shah to uproot (istisal) the Rohilla power. Some of the Afghan chiefs retainers had a dispute with the servants of Safdar Jang who had been sent by their master to ^{cut} Sal timber in the forest at the back of Katehr. This produced an affray in which several were killed on both sides and the Gumashta who commanded Safdar Jang's people, was obliged to flee, leaving behind all his effects, which according to the usual custom,

1. Letter of Safdar Jang in Srivastava.A.L. p.109.

2. Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh-Siyar, f.294b.
Bayan-i-Waqai, f.99a.

were seized as lawful spoil by the Rohillas. Safdar Jang, at this, at once went to Delhi and requested the Emperor to undertake an expedition against the Rohillas¹.

Ali Muhammad Khan had a very strong supporter at Court in the person of the Wazir, Qamruddin. But unfortunately for him, the Irani party headed by Amir Khan, dominated the Court at this time. Besides, Ali Muhammad Khan's late conduct had been so bad that it gave a good change to ~~xxx~~ his enemies to turn the Emperor against him. After Harnand's defeat, he had become proud and had not remitted the revenue due to the Emperor. The invasion of Kumaon had been undertaken without the Imperial permission — an act in itself alone sufficient to dub him a rebel. He had besides neglected to remit the vast booty he had collected during this campaign though it was both by custom and law the property of the Emperor. Further, as is mentioned in *Masir-ul-umari*, he had been using tents of a red colour, a privilege reserved for the Emperor.² Nor ~~xxx~~ were these the only considerations which made Muhammad Shah give a willing ear to the persuasions of Safdar Jang. The Irani nobleman offered to pay a considerable sum of money for the expenses of the campaign ~~xxxx~~ and the Emperor could not afford

1. *Tarrikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh*, f.16a-16b. : *Hadiqat-ul-Aqalim*, p.140. Forster, *Journey* - p.123.

2. *Siyar*, III, p.855.
Masir-ul-Umara, II, p.842.

to let the opportunity slip for the sake of the preservation of his Empire¹. While his government was weak and his Treasury empty there was a constant danger of the Rohillas in alliance with their compatriots, the Bangash Afghans, crossing the Ganges and gaining control of the capital, or at least of the whole of Oudh, and thus establish a strong Afghan dominion, a rival to Delhi.

All these considerations made Muhammad Shah agree to lead the invasion against Rohilkhand in person, without even consulting the Wazir as he was publicly known to be the protector of Ali Muhammad Khan and even related to him by marriage². A formidable army was recruited and all the influential persons in the State, including the Wazir, were ordered to accompany it. Issuing out of Delhi on the 26th February, 1745, the Emperor arrived three months after (25th May) within eight miles of the Rohilla stronghold of Bangarh.³

1. Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.16b,
Hadigat-ul-Aqalim, p.140,

They say Safdar Jang undertook to pay Rs.150,000 for the expenses of the campaign; Rs.50,000 then and there, and Rs.100,000 on the day of the march of the Emperor.

2. Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh-Siyar, f.294b.

3. Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.16b. says the Imperial Army consisted of 100,000 men, both horse and foot.
Srivastava A.L. ,p.110. He has used the account by an eye witness, Anand Ram Mukhlis.

Ali Muhammad Khan, on the other hand, had been very uneasy all the time. He had decided to leave Rohilkhand and take refuge in the Tarai lands which had lately been subdued. But Qaim Khan advised him to remain in his State and meet the royal forces with all courage and equanimity, for otherwise it would infallibly prove the loss of the country.¹ Ali Muhammad Khan, therefore, remained at Aonla until the royal army had crossed the Ganges and encamped at Sambhal. He wrote to both Qaim Khan and the Wazir that it was not his intention to offer any resistance to the Mandates of the Emperor and begged that he might be admitted to the royal presence. But owing to the opposition of Safdar Jang and his party, all the exertions of the Wazir failed to obtain for him the sought for audience. Another attempt to bring about a peaceful settlement was made after Qaim Khan had joined the Imperial Camp although it met with the same fate. The Imperial demand for a settlement was the payment of a crore and a half of rupees by the Rohilla the surrender and ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~/of all his possessions and artillery².

After this Muftis (theologians) from the Imperial Camp issued a fatwa that it was a sin for any Muslim to fight the Emperor. The immediate result of this was the desertion of

1. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.20a.

2. Prasad-B- Allahbad University Studies, vol.V. 1929. p. 177
He uses the account by Anand Ram Mukhlis.

a large number of Afghans from the Camp of Ali Muhammad Khan, who finding his ranks considerably thinned, was compelled to take refuge in Bangarh (10 miles north of Budaon), a mud fortress in the heart of a thick forest well suited for a siege¹.

The military operations of the Imperial army in the present campaign revealed the glaring defects of the Imperial government and the worthlessness of its military machine. Besides their army being utterly inefficient in the field, there was a constant quarrel among the nobles, Safdar Jang and Amir Khan on one side determined to ruin the Rohilla, and the Wazir and Qaim Khan on the other, equally determined to save the enemy and thereby stop the Irani party from getting more powerful. The energy of the court was thus frittered away in selfish wranglings and all the armed strength of the Empire failed to capture the fort of Bangarh till after Ali Muhammad Khan had vacated it.

The details of the campaign are best contained in the graphic account left by Anand Ram Mukhlis, an eye witness². On the

1. Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.17a.

2. Srivastava, pp.110-11, and Sarkar-Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol.I, pp.59-62, give a detailed account based on Anand Ram Mukhlis, but differ in the dates, which is obviously due to their particular system of calculation. Thus for 12 Zilhaj 1162 A.H., Sarkar p.380 gives 12th Nov.1749 A.D., while Srivastava p.145 gives 22 Nov.1749 A.D. and as neither of them are correct according to Dr.Ferdinand Wunstenfeld's table, which makes it 23rd Nov.1749, I have by a method of addition and subtraction given my own dates for the present events.

Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.20b. supports Anand Ram very briefly.

arrival of the Imperial Army near Bangarh (25th May 1745) the Rohillas came out of their stronghold in the afternoon and advanced towards the Imperial Camp. An attack by the Imperialists however, obliged the Rohillas to fall back to their entrenchment. Next day passed without any activity on either side but about midnight the Rohillas, issuing out of an ambush, opened fire on the Imperialists, although obliged to retire about three hours before dawn. On the 27th May Qaim Khan rode out to assault Bangarh but halted in a grove after he had proceeded three miles. He then returned to the Imperial Camp before sunset without doing anything. The day following this was spent in rest. This day Naval Rai, the deputy governor of Oudh, who had been summoned by Safdar Jang, arrived in the Imperial Camp. On the 29th May batteries were erected and the shelling of the fort commenced. This was again followed by a day of rest. On the 31st Amir Khan, Safdar Jang and other nobles again advanced their batteries two miles further towards the enemy and captured two of the four mud forts around the principal Rohilla Stronghold. At midnight following, when the nobles were resting in their tents behind the batteries, the Rohillas attempted a surprise attack but the Mughal artillery being well served, they had to retreat. There were no sallies by the Rohillas after this, for they remained on the defensive within the walls of their fort. Nor did the Imperialists do anything effective to storm the fort.

Ali Muhammad Khan was, however, apprehensive about this time lest his supplies of food should fail and the garrison be starved. So he resolved to abandon the struggle and submit to the Emperor. Accordingly, on the morning of the 3rd June, he sent a formal message of submission. The Emperor, equally apprehensive lest the approaching rainy season should cut off the food supply of the Imperial Camp, finally submitted to the Wazir's entreaties for the Rohilla at this time and negotiations for peace were begun.¹ The Wazir succeeded in persuading the Emperor to grant Ali Muhammad Khan a pardon on condition of the cession of all his possessions and his remaining a prisoner at Delhi for six months as an example to others.² Ali Muhammad Khan, handing over the charge of the fort to an Imperial Officer, marched out with his troops and first went to Qaim Khan and then to the Wazir, who brought him with his hands tied by a handkerchief to the Imperial presence. Muhammad Shah pardoned him and made him over to the custody of the Wazir.³ The Rohilla property and dominion were confiscated and the fortifications of Bangarh

1. Bayan-i-Waqai, f.99b-100a.

Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh-Siyar, f.295a.

2. Imad-us-Saadat, p.43.

It says Ali Muhammad Khan was taken prisoner to be kept for a fixed period and the period we find was six months.

Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.21a-21b, gives the period as six months.

3. Siyar, III, p.855. : Hadiqat-ul-Aqalim, p.141.

Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.20b-21a. : Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.17a.

Tawarikh-i-Afaghani, f.57b.

were dismantled. The royal camp began its return journey on the 5th June and reached Delhi on the 1st July 1745.

The entire possessions of Ali Muhammad Khan was again divided into the Sarkars of Muradabad and Bareilly. Fariduddin Khan, son of Azmatullah Khan was made ~~Kanungo~~ Nazim of Muradabad and Badar Islam Khan that of Bareilly. At the same time all the lands previously held as jagirs, were restored to their previous owners. The family and dependants of Ali Muhammad Khan went to Qaim-ganj ~~xxxxx~~ in the territory of the Nawab of Farrukhabad and stayed there.¹

No authority mentions about how Fariduddin Khan fared in maintaining law and order within his jurisdiction. It is, however, quite likely that the Rohilla land-holders submitted peacefully to his rule because of the most favourable treatment they had been accorded during his father's late administration.

The deputy governor of Bareilly, however, was faced with a different problem altogether. The Rohilla population in the territories put under his charge refused to submit to his authority and he did not have enough resources at his disposal to bring them back to subjection by force. This gave a chance to the Irani party to recommend the Emperor to appoint one of their

1. Gulistan, f.21a. : Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.17b.
Siyar, III, p.865.: Tawarikh-i-Afaghani, f.57b.
Akhbar-i-Hasan, f.14a-14b.

partisans named Hedayat Ali Khan to the post, on the ground of his being an efficient and strong man. Ghaziuddin Khan, the ~~xxxx~~ Nizam's agent at Court because of the loss to his father, of income from the seventeen Mahals he had in jagir in the Sarkar of Bareilly, also supported the proposal.¹ Thus Hedayat Ali was appointed to the post and sent up to take charge of it. But the resources at his disposal were insufficient to keep the turbulent Afghans in check. His position was further complicated by the opposition of Shaikh Qutubuddin, the grandson of Azmatulla Khan who was living in the mud fort at Chaglait (13 miles north of Muradabad). Qutubuddin wanted to put himself in power in the Sarkar of Bareilly and was perhaps encouraged in it by the idea that the Rohilla landlords would naturally support him against Hedayat Ali, the partisan of their enemy, particularly because of the friendly relations his family had had with the Rohillas in the past. Hence he came up to Bareilly and was joined by a large number of the Rohillas. .

In the face of these difficulties Hedayat Ali acted with great tact and diplomacy². Since the Rohilla landlords had by that time "taken a deep root in the soil" he thought it advisable to leave them undisturbed in their possessions. Furthermore, to be able to control the districts under his charge and to subdue

1. Siyar, III, p.865.

2. Idem, pp.865-67. The above work is written by the son of Hedayat Ali who was with his father at the time.

Qutubuddin he enlisted in his service some of the principal Rohilla chiefs. Thus he had under him Sardar Khan, Mughal Khan and Pir Ahmad, a pirzada (son of a Pir or Saint) of the Rohillas, each with about two thousand men under him. With these Rohillas Hedayat Ali marched towards Bareilly. Qutubuddin, on the other hand, was deserted by the bulk of his army who were Rohillas and not in any way disposed to fight their fellow brethren. Thus finding himself left with only a few of his old servants and friends, Qutubuddin shut himself up in a fort. Hedayat Ali came up and besieged ~~him~~ the fort but with his usual tact, preferred to offer Qutubuddin favourable terms. Qutubuddin readily agreed, and joined the service of Hedayat Ali. But the sudden favour and marks of distinction conferred on Qutubuddin by Hedayat Ali annoyed Pir Ahmad, the principal Rohilla chief, who quitted the service of the Nazim and began to create trouble in the country. Hedayat Ali marched to subdue him giving the command of the vanguard to Qutubuddin. In the battle which followed, Pir Ahmad was defeated and after this there was tranquillity in the country.

Meanwhile affairs at Delhi had moved to the advantage of Ali Muhammad Khan. The faujdari of Sirhind had become a problem for the Empire. The zamindars were refractory and had stopped all payment of the revenues to the Government.¹ A strong man with a good following was wanted to bring these rebellious

1. Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh-Siyar, f.297a.

landlords under control. The Wazir whose jagir it was, accordingly requested the Emperor to appoint Ali Muhammad Khan for the task on the expiration of the period of his imprisonment.¹ Thus when Ali Muhammad Khan had been at Delhi only for six months Muhammad Shah, realizing that the appointment of the Rohilla to the faujdari of Sirhind, was definitely to the advantage of the Empire, and at the same time quite in conformity with the previous practice of his predecessors, promised the Wazir he would comply with his request. The Wazir, knowing how feeble minded the Emperor was, at once directed Ali Muhammad Khan to summon his men from Rohilkhand. A large Rohilla force accordingly marched to Delhi and encamped in one of the parks of the capital. The Emperor, as the Wazir had apprehended, had been won over by the Irani intrigues during the interval. He began to delay issuing the necessary ~~royal~~ farman to Ali Muhammad Khan. But the number of the Rohillas in Delhi began to increase daily and they constantly clamoured for the promised promotion of Ali Muhammad Khan. Finally, at the end of five months from the expiry of the date of Ali Muhammad Khan's release, when Delhi had become filled with Rohillas, the Emperor apprehensive of the peace of the city, was obliged to give in to their demands³. Ali Muhammad Khan was given back his title and

1. Imad-us-Saadat, p.43.

2. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.21a-21b.

3. Gulistan, f.21b. : Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.17b-18a.
Tarikh-i-Muzaffari, f.232b-~~xxx~~ 233a.

the privilege of keeping kettle-drums and banners and was also awarded a Mansab, but he had to leave behind at Delhi his two eldest sons Abdulla Khan and Faizulla Khan as hostages for his future good conduct.¹

Ali Muhammad Khan marched with his followers to Sirhind and immediately on his arrival there summoned the various chiefs to present themselves and clear up the arrears of revenue due from them. These chiefs who ~~had~~ cared little for royal authority, replied in defiant tones. Ali Muhammad Khan accordingly sent a large army to subdue these zamindars. The Rohilla army led by Dundi Khan and Hafiz Rahmat Khan, first subdued Bharamal of Raipur by defeating him in the field. Nigahimal of Motpur was next subdued and forced to pay ~~Rs. 65,000~~ Rs. 65,000 as the amount of arrears due. Raigulla, the most important chief of the locality, was next attended to and a siege of only three days to his fortress sufficed to bring him to his knees. Collecting the arrears of revenue amounting to Rs. 130,000 from him the Rohilla army then retired to their headquarters. Henceforth there was perfect peace in the entire Sirhind faujdari and all the zamindars paid their dues regularly².

1. Gulistan, f. 21a-22a. : Tarikh-Faiz Bakhsh, f. 18a, 18b.
Tawarikh-i-Afaghani, f. 57b-58a.

2. Gulistan, f. 22b-25b. : Akhbar-i-Hasan, f. 15a.
Qissai Ahwal-i-Rohilla, f. 14b.

It merely states that after his appointment to Sirhind, the faujdari was well governed.

Ali Muhammad Khan had not been long settled at Sirhind when Ahmad Shah Abdali invaded Hindustan. The assassination of Nadir Shah in 1747 had paved the way for the establishment of a national Afghan Kingdom for the first time¹. Knowing very well the predatory nature of his fellow countrymen and their love of independence, the Abdalli monarch wanted to utilise the glamour of foreign conquests to silence the forces of disorder at home. The usual field for the Afghans had been made difficult for him because of the spirit of nationalism aroused by Nadir Shah in Persia. Hence his best field of activity was Hindustan - a land that had only lately been subdued by the Persian King. Occupying Peshawar without resistance Ahmad Shah Abdali assaulted Lahore and after some resistance, was able to drive away Shah Nawaz Khan, the usurper of the governorship of the Panjab (22 Jan. 1748)². After collecting large booty which fell into his hands here Abdali pushed on towards Delhi at the head of 12,000 men (20 Feb.)

Muhammad Shah meanwhile, at the first news of the advance of the Afghan king, quickly made the necessary preparations to resist the invasion and appointed a large army under his son, Prince Ahmad Shah, who was also to be accompanied by Qamruddin Khan,

1. Tawarikh-i-Afaghani, f.58a.

2. Srivastava, p.116.
Gulistan, f.26a.

Safdar Jang and other important nobles.¹ But Muhammad Shah had at the same time another problem to solve. Ali Muhammad Khan with his 20,000 followers was then posted in Sirhind, which was on Abdali's way to Delhi, and there was every chance of his going over to the side of the Afghan king, first, because Abdali was his compatriot, and secondly, because it would provide him with an opportunity of avenging his late punishment at the hands of the Emperor. It was therefore essential that Ali Muhammad Khan should be removed from Sirhind. The Emperor, therefore, decided to restore to him his previous office in Rohilkhand. A farman was accordingly despatched to Ali Muhammad Khan instructing him to proceed immediately to his new faujdari². At the same time to make sure that the Rohilla did carry out this order, his two sons who had been kept as hostages in Delhi, were sent with the army under Prince Ahmad which marched out towards Sirhind (Dec.1747).³

Before, however, the order for restoration could reach Sirhind, Ali Muhammad Khan had received a letter from Ahmad Shah Abdali inviting him to join forces ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ against the Emperor and promising him the Wizarat of Hindustan after the conquest.⁴ The offer was rather tempting and, inspite of the

1. Tarikh-i-Muzaffari, f.232b-233a. : Gulistan, f.26a.

Tawarikh-i-Afaghana, f.58a.

2. Gulistan, f.26a.

3. Tawarikh-i-Afaghana, f.58b.

4. Gulistan, f.26b. : Akhbar-i-Hasan, f.16a.

advice of most of his chiefs to accept Abduli's offer in preference to the Emperor's order, which had by that time reached Sirhind, Ali Muhammad Khan refused to risk the sure chances of a rule in his old possessions, for the uncertain prospects of a Wizarat. Hence, ~~Murad~~ marching from Sirhind with all his followers, Ali Muhammad Khan entered Rohilkhand by way of Chandi Ghat, and marched straight on to Muradabad (beginning of 1748). After settling himself in the Sarkar of ~~Muradabad~~ Muradabad¹ he took possession of his previous jagir in the Sarkar of Bareilly. Then he marched to occupy the rest of Bareilly which he had previously taken forceful possession of. As soon as the news of his advance reached Bareilly the Rohilla population in those parts left the plough and flocked to join him, while the Rohilla army then under the employment of the Nazim, besieged their master in his fort at Bareilly on the pretence of demanding their arrears of pay.² On the arrival of Ali Muhammad Khan within twenty miles of Bareilly, Hedayat Ali decided to surrender and sent Qutubuddin to the Rohilla camp with the message. After some negotiation, Hedayat Ali surrendered the fort of Bareilly and was given a safe passage out of Rohilkhand.

This sudden appearance of Ali Muhammad Khan in Rohilkhand was responsible for the rumour that his arrival there was a

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1. Gulistan, f.28a. : Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.19a, and 20b.
 2. Gulistan, f.28a.
Siyar, III, p.867-68.

rebellious flight. The circumstance of the issue of an Imperial order for his restoration to the government of Muradabad could not be believed generally and furthermore the son of the dispossessed Governor of Bareilly commuted this rumour into writing because of Ali Muhammad Khan's rebellious conduct in occupying the Sarkar of Bareilly¹. Hence the rumour became confirmed among the people and is the reason why all the later writers support it.² In any case Ali Muhammad Khan was now master of all the lands he had previously held.

During his last administration Ali Muhammad Khan had left the different zamindars and Rajas in possession of their territories but the system had not worked very well for the Rajput zamindars true to their tradition, had constantly risen in revolt, thereby keeping him busy all the time. Hence this time Ali Muhammad Khan drove out all the Rajput zamindars "across the Ganges" and took direct possession of their territories³. He then

1. Siyar, III, pp.865 and 868.

It says Ali Muhammad Khan drove out the Nazim of Katehr (Bareilly) but because during Ali Muhammad's late administration, his headquarters being at Aonla in Katehr, the faujdari of Muradabad had also been known by the name of the faujdari of Katehr, the later writers have misunderstood him.

Tarikh-i-Afaghana, f.58b, informs us that Chatar Bhog was at Muradabad and Hedayat Ali at Bareilly (Katehr).

2. Tawarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.19a. : Imad-us-Saadat, p.43.

Qissai Ahwal-i-Rohilla, f.11b: Hadiqat-ul-Aqalim, p.141.

3. Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.21a.

It also gives the following names of the Rajput zamindars:-

Narpat Singh, Lachman Singh, Mahandar Saha, Todar Singh, etc.

turned to the regulation of his administration. Reviving his old offices, he gave to each of his officers outlying lands of his dominions as jagirs and, keeping a large part round the capital (Aonla) for himself, he appointed in these parts Resaladars who were given full control of the civil administration in their own jurisdiction.¹

Meanwhile the death of Muhammed Shah (26 April 1748) had led to complete anarchy all over the realm. The Imperial Army that had been sent against Ahmad Shah Abdali, had managed to gain a partial victory over the Afghan king, as a result of which he had gone back home (25th March). But before the actual battle, their miscalculation had made the Imperialists lose their treasures and the two hostages left by Ali Muhammad Khan, which they had deposited in the fort of Sirhind². Besides, on the day of the battle (22nd March) the Wazir Qamruddin, had been killed by a canon ball. Prince Ahmad Shah who became the Emperor now, ~~X~~ promised the Wizarat to Safdar Jang.³ But the post remained vacant till 30th June 1748, because of the fear of hostility from Nizam-ul- Mulk, the Subahdar of the Deccan.⁴ During this period of suspense, Safdar Jang although he really controlled the affairs of the Empire, for the sake of expediency, kept himself

1. Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.22a~~xxx~~ and 35a.

Forster - Journey, p.129.

Hamilton, p.91, says the distribution of Jagirs etc. was done on Ali Muhammad Khan's deathbed but is not supported by Tarikh-Faiz Baksh.

Vide, p.76-81 gives the details about Jagirdars and Resaladars.

2. Faiz Bakhsh, f.20a : Gulistan, f.27a.

3. Siyar, III, p.864. : Tawarikh-i-Afaghana, f.59a-59b.

4. ~~Siyar~~ Siyar, III, pp.868-69.

on friendly terms with Ali Muhammad Khan¹.

Ali Muhammad Khan, however, was not destined to enjoy his glorious position for long. After his return from Sirhind he lost his hearing. At the same time he was seized with dropsy which gradually incapacitated him from taking any part in the business of the State. He was therefore, anxious to put affairs on such a footing as would secure the inheritance of his personal possessions to his children and the leadership of his State to his family. All his four sons then in Rohilkhand, namely, Sadulla Khan, Muhammad Yar Khan, Allah Yar Khan and Murtaza Khan, were minors and incapable of holding the ~~xxxx~~ reins of government.² The appointment of a regent during the period of his children's minority was therefore essential. But fearing that the transfer of all the powers to the hands of any one regent might end in the exclusion of his family both from the leadership and from their possessions, he decided upon a regency of a large body consisting of all his principal officials and jagirdars which included the Hindu officials and his relatives as well.³ His idea clearly was

1. Gulistan, f.28b.

2. Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.22a.

3. Idem, f.32b.

It also gives the name of the following jagirdars and officials who met in a Council to decide the question of Ali Muhammad's State on the return of his two elder sons from Qandahar:-

Hafiz Rahmat Khan, Dundi Khan, Mulla Sardar Khan, Fateh Khan, Abdul Sattar Khan, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Sayyid Masum, Qutubuddin, Shaikh Kabai, Mulla Muhammad, Muhsin, Parmal Khan, Md. Jan, Dewan Man Rai and Raja Kaunwar Singh Bakhshi.

to create a counterpoise of interests in the community which might eventually operate in favour of his heirs. Thus calling a Council of all his principal officials and jagirdars, he made his intentions known to them. The Council unanimously selected Sadulla Khan, his third son, as their future chief. Ali Muhammad Khan then appointed Hafiz Rahmat Khan who was his Dewan-i-Kul, as Naib-i-Mustaqil (permanent deputy), to Sadulla Khan¹. His duty besides the supervision that was being exercised by Ali Muhammad Khan on the Resaladars in the territories belonging to him personally, was only that of the present Prime Minister in England in all affairs involving both the general administration of the State and the conduct of foreign affairs. The power to determine the policy in these affairs was left in the hands of the Council as a whole. The various departments of the State were to be controlled by the existing officials as usual, and the guardianship of his minor sons was given to Fateh Khan, Khansaman and Bahadur Khan, a Resaladar, jointly.² But Ali Muhammad Khan made it clear to the Council that the existing arrangement was to last only till the arrival of his elder sons from exile or during the minority of Sadulla Khan.³

After this, Ali Muhammad Khan, to ensure the safety of his arrangement, discharged all the arrears due to his troops with

1. Gulistan, f.30b-31b.

Faiz Bakhsh, f.22a.

2. Faiz Bakhsh, f.22a and 28b.

3. Idem, f.22a.

scrupulous exactness. He even distributed an advance among them to the amount of Rs.2,500,000 and taking an acknowledgment from every individual by which each solemnly bound himself to stand by and adhere to the cause of his family, he lodged them in the storeroom under the care of the Khansaman¹.

In a few days Ali Muhammad Khan's condition became worse and he died on the 26th September 1748 at the age of 45 years.²

Ali Muhammad Khan was a man of medium height, robust and of fair complexion³. He had received the best military training available and the fact that he was also a born leader of men attracted people to his standard. He was ambitious and had no scruples whatever in resorting to questionable means for attaining his ends. His murder of Dujā very well illustrates this trait of his character. Yet with all his ambition, Ali Muhammad Khan was very practical. His rejection of the rather tempting proposals of the Abdalī in 1748, in preference to the humble possessions in Rohilkhand, is a clear indication of this fact. He was at the same time a clever statesman. The measures he introduced for the regulation of the administration of Rohilkhand both before and after his return from Sirhind and the arrangements that he made for the future administration of Rohilkhand - an arrangement that forms in Indian history the sole instance of any combination acting in

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1. Faiz Bakhsh, f.21b. : Akhbar-i-Hasan, f.19a.
 2. Faiz Bakhsh, f.22a. : Gulistan, f.31b.: Akhbar-i-Hasan, f.19b.
 3. Description by Anand Ram Mukhlis in Sarkar - Downfall of the Mughal Empire, I, p.62.

concert for any length of time - undoubtedly proved him to be so.

Nothing definite is known about his knowledge of reading and writing. We are, however, informed that in his youth he had learnt everything about the tenets of the Muslim religion¹, and judging from the usual custom of the Muslims and the practice of the time, it may be confidently surmised that he had received the usual education of a Muslim youth. He was also a patron of art. The palaces in Aonla were built with great care and taste and stand out as the model of the degenerate art of the 18th Century. But withal, he was a great soldier, a skilled general and a shrewd ~~xxxx~~ tactician. His various exploits are an eloquent testimony to the fact.

1. Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh-Siyar, f.293b-294a.
Qissai Ahwal-i-Rohilla, f.5a.

CHAPTER V.

The Rohilla Struggle for Existence (1748-52).

While the Imperial Army was resisting the advance of Ahmad Shah Abdali, Muhammad Shah died at Delhi (26th April 1748)¹. The news reached Prince Ahmad on the 29th April while he was at Panipat on his way back to Delhi. The Prince was enthroned on the same day and assumed the title of Ahmad Shah. The royal umbrella was held over his head by Safdar Jang, who also presented ~~him~~ his Nazam to the new Emperor. These marked attentions made Ahmad Shah promise the Wizarat to Safdar Jang.²

The coronation of Ahmad Shah took place at Delhi on the 3rd May but the Emperor apprehensive of the most powerful noble, Nizam-ul-Mulk, then in the Deccan, did not carry out his promise to Safdar Jang.³ A letter was despatched to the Nizam offering him the post, but the real object of this letter was to ascertain whether he had any objection to Safdar Jang's appointment to the office, because the Nizam had previously supported Qamruddin as Wazir, against the Irani Amir Khan and it was therefore supposed that he would again support Intizam-ud-daula, the

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1. Siyar, III, p.864.
Tarikh-i-Ahmad Shahi, f.11a-11b.
 2. Siyar, III, p.864.
 3. Tarikh-i-Ahmad Shahi, f.13b.
Siyar, III, p.865.

second son of the late~~x~~ Wazir, the first son Munir-ud-Daula, being absent in the Panjab as governor of that place. But Safdar Jang was determined not to give up without a struggle. This made him turn to Ali Muhammad Khan for help. He wrote to the Rohilla requesting him to bury in oblivion their former disputes and to aid him in securing the Wizarat promising that in the event of his being successful he would do for him infinitely more than had been done by his friend, the late Wazir.¹

Ali Muhammad Khan at once availed himself of the opportunity of establishing friendly relationship with his greatest enemy, who at the same time was very powerful. A letter was quickly despatched by him informing Safdar Jang of his willingness to support him, but because of the Nizam's reply from the Deccan in which he declined the Wizarat on account of old age and recommended Safdar Jang for the office, the occasion for armed help from Ali Muhammad Khan did not arise.²

Safdar Jang, however, found his position still insecure for he was suspicious of Nizam's sincerity and believed that Intizam who was constantly intriguing against him, might ultimately win over his relative to his cause. He therefore preferred not to hurt the feelings of his rival who regarded the Wizarat as his

1. Gulistan, f.28b-29a.

2. Idem, f.29a.

The author goes on to say that Ali Muhammad Khan sent Hafiz Rhamat Khan with a large army to Delhi but it seems to be an invention to have us understand that Hafiz, his father, received the title of Nawab, which he later assumed at this time from the Emperor.

hereditary right, by assuming the official robe till after the death of the Nizam (31st May). On the formal appointment of Safdar Jang as Wazir on the 30th June 1748, his previous position of Mir Atish was given to his son, Jalaluddin Haidar, with the title of Shuja-ud-Daula Bahadur¹. But, inspite of this promotion, Safdar Jang's position was very weak at Court. The Turanis headed by Intizam and supported by Munir, the Governor of Lahore, and Multan and Nasir Jang, the successor of Nizam in the Deccan, were plotting his downfall. At the same time, the Eunuch, Javed Khan, in alliance with Uddham Bai, the queen mother, was usurping the function of the ~~chief~~ Wazir, cleverly alienating the Emperor from Safdar Jang.²

This was the condition of the Court at Delhi when Ali Muhammad Khan died, leaving his State in the joint charge of his Sardars and Resaladars. Shaikh Qudubuddin whom the Rohillas had ~~had~~ deserted during his struggle with Hedayat Ali in 1748 and who regarded them as interlopers in his patrimony, wanted to take advantage of the situation. He requested Intizam who was the official faujdar of Muradabad to ask the Emperor to send him to that faujdari, as his deputy to take charge of it. Intizam, who knew

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1. Siyar, III, p.883. : Tarikh-i-Ahmad Shahi, f.15b.
 2. Tarikh-i-Ahmad Shahi, f.17b-18b, and Siyar III, p.886, give a detailed account of the Court intrigues.
Srivastava, p.209 - Javed Khan was originally a lowborn slave and had, by reason of his intimacy with the queen mother, risen to be assistant superintendent of the Imperial Harem and Diwan of Begum jagirs.

that the Rohillas had established a friendly relationship with Safdar Jang, readily agreed to the proposal. The Wazir who had no objection to the destruction of the Rohillas, gave the necessary patent at once. But Safdar Jang, hating as he did the Rohillas, hated the Turanis still more and hence refused to help Qutubuddin with money and material necessary for the undertaking. Nevertheless, Qutubuddin's fame as a soldier and the private purse of the Turani party, was able to muster up a fairly large force¹.

At the head of this army, Qutubuddin marched out towards Rohilkhand. The Rohillas on the other hand, hearing the news of his march, sent him several messages, offering peaceful settlement by which they were prepared to give him a portion of their lands suitable to his rank. But he was too high spirited and ambitious to accept the terms offered and preferred to stake everything on the entire possession of Rohilkhand². He marched on towards Muradabad and at Dhampur, was met by a large Rohilla army under Dundi Khan. In the engagement which followed Qutubuddin was hopelessly outnumbered and fell fighting bravely (Feb.1749).³

1. Siyar-us-Mutakhkharin, ~~III, p.873~~ III, p.873.

Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.33a. : Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.22b.

2. Siyar-us-Mutakhkharin, III, p.873.

3. Gulistan, f.33a, says it happened six months after the death of Ali Muhammad Khan, which was on the 26th Sept.1748.

But the defeat of Qutubuddin in such an easy manner by the Rohillas, frightened Safdar Jang. He was determined not to let them continue in such strength. A repetition of the invasion of Rohilkhand was ~~out~~ of the question ~~at~~ the moment, for besides dissensions at Court, the treasury was practically empty.

He accordingly devised a plan. In close proximity to the Rohillas was the equally strong State of Farrukhabad under Qaim Khan Bangash. The Bangash, being the compatriots of the Rohillas, had always been on friendly terms with them and had even served them from inevitable ruin in 1745. Hence his idea was to play one against the other and weaken both powers¹.

Difficulty ~~as~~ this plan, outwardly seems to have been, because of the most intimate connection that had so long subsisted between the Rohillas and the Bangash Nawab, it certainly was well carried out. His opportunity came after July 1749, when he obtained a temporary respite from the Turani intrigues. Ahmad Shah was successfully persuaded to appoint Qaim Khan to the government of Rohilk~~hand~~ and call upon him to recover it from the Rohillas. The royal favours, together with a flattering letter from the Wazir, was sent to Qaim Khan².

The Bangash Nawab, on receipt of the farman, called a Council of the principal Sardars and laid the matter before them.

1. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.33b.

2. Siyar, III, p.874.

Bayan-i-Waqai, f.141b.

Irvine, Bangash Nawab's of Farrukhabad, J.A.S.B. vol.47, part I, p.376.

One party headed by Muhammad Khan Afridi, the Bakhshi, voted for war against the Rohillas, while another under Shujaat Khan Gilzai was opposed to it. Qaim Khan himself was rather reluctant to fight his fellow Afghans. But the Bakhshi, being his favourite officer, it was finally decided that Muazzan Khan, the brother of the Afridi chief, was to be sent to the Rohilla Sardars to demand the peaceful surrender of their territory, in return for suitable jagirs for the three sons of Ali Muhammad Khan. Muazzan Khan accordingly started for Aonla, with three robes of investiture (khilats) and a number of Bangash flags.¹

Meanwhile, Safdar Jang's messenger had already presented the three sons of Ali Muhammad Khan with robes of investiture and brought the Wazir's special instructions that the farman had been given to Qaim Khan by the Emperor, against his will, that he was prepared to support the Rohillas with an armed force against Qaim Khan, and that Navel Rai, the deputy-governor of Oudh had already been instructed to march up to their assistance.²

Qaim Khan's envoy, therefore, had to return to Farrukhabad the day after his arrival at Aonla without carrying out his commission. The Rohillas encouraged by the Wazir went so far as to plant the Bangash flags brought by the envoy upside down³. This insult,

1. Irvine, J.A.S.B. vol.47, 1878, pp.376-77, Imad-us-Sadat, p.44.

2. Ba'yan-i-Waqai, f.141b-142a.

Irvine - Bangash of Farrukhabad, J.A.S.B. 1878, part I, p.377.

3. Imad-us-Sadat, p.44.

combined with another, the return of the Khilats, was enough for the war party in Farrukhabad, to win over Qaim Khan to an immediate invasion of Rohilkhand.

At the head of 50,000 troops and a good park of artillery, supplemented by contingents of the friendly Raja of Chachudi, Rura and Shivarajpur, Qaim Khan marched out of Farrukhabad on the 13th November 1749 and crossing the Ganges at Qadirganj (40 miles north-west of Farrukhabad) he encamped near the village of Dauri Rasulpur (4 miles south-east of Budaon), on the 22nd Nov. facing a Rohilla army of 25,000 men who had already entrenched themselves there. A friendly message sent by the Rohillas, through three holy Sayyids, was rejected by the Bangash Nawab and on the morning of the 23rd Nov. 1749, Qaim Khan advanced to attack the Rohillas.¹

In the face of the obvious superiority of the opposing forces both in number and in ammunition, the Rohillas displayed marvellous presence of mind. Behind the Rohilla army lay a ravine, long, wide and deep. The steep ^{crests} ~~sides~~ of the ravine was covered with thick tall crops of Bajra (spiked millet). On both sides of the ravine the Rohillas concealed 8,000 men, 3,000 on one side and

1. Khazanai Ameri, p.79, says 12 Zi^l Hajj 1161, but it is evidently one year out.

Srivastava, p.145, gives the date from Waqai Shah Alam-i-Sani, called the Delhi Chronicle and authorities, as 12 Zi^l Hajj 1162 A.H. but he reckons it wrongly as 22nd Nov. Irvine, J.A.S.B. 1878, part I, p.377-79 - good detail, but the date inaccurate due to wrong calculation.

5,000 on the other, with their matchlocks loaded and resting on the ground.¹

The battle started after the exchange of artillery with an attack from the Bangash side which the Rohillas faced very gallantly and were even having the better of it, when Qaim Khan himself headed a charge. The Rohillas gave way, taking refuge in the ravine behind the battle field, hotly pursued by Qaim Khan and his division. The fugitives from the field rushing along the ravine, were on foot and the ground being familiar to them, had no difficulty in clambering up the ravine again. The exultant pursuer had penetrated nearly half way through the ravine, when suddenly they were greeted with a shower of musket balls from the dense bushes above. The leaders, who were on elephants, were too conspicuous targets to escape death and Qaim Khan was one of them. The result was a complete confusion among the ~~many~~ army, and taking advantage of this, the Rohillas who had climbed up, with those on the banks of the ravine, charged down sword in hand. The result was butchery and only a few could escape. The other divisions of the invading army took to their heels, at the news of this disaster, to their vanguard. The Rohilla army was

1. Irvine - Bangash Nawabs of Farrukhabad, J.A.S.B. 1878, part I, Bayan-i-Waqai, f.142a-142b. p.380-82.
 Siyar, III, p.874.
 Hadiqat-ul-Aqalim, p.141.
 Imad-us-Saadat, p.44-45.
 Tarikh-i-Ahmad Shahi, f.22b-23a. They all
 The Tarikh-i-Muzafferi, f.240b-241b gives the account of the battle.

ordered not to pursue the retiring forces¹ and with drums beating a triumphant march, they returned to Aonla, their capital.

Parties of Rohillas were then sent out and they annexed the Bangash dominions on the left or eastern bank of the Ganges, except the three parganas of Amritpur, Khakatmau and Pararnagar, which were gallantly defended by a Bangash Chela².

Meanwhile at Farrukhabad, Iman Khan, the eleventh son of Muhammad Khan Bangash, had been made the Nawab, by Bibi Sahiba, his mother. As the new Nawab possessed little ability, the Bibi Sahiba, gathered all power into her own hands. She was determined upon avenging the death of Qaim Khan and was endeavouring to procure the Maratha support for the purpose, by offering a subsidy of ~~xxx~~ 20 lakhs of rupees to them³, but unfortunately for her she had a fresh trouble to attend to, from the quarter of the Wazir.

Safdar Jang, hearing the news of Qaim Khan's death, instigated the Emperor to confiscate the deceased's dominion and property in accordance with the well-known Mughal custom of escheating the property of ~~dead nobles~~ dead nobles⁴. He further

1. Imad-us-Saadat, p.45.

2. Irvine, Bangash, Nawab of Farrukhabad. J.A.S.B.1878, part I, Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.24b. p.383.
Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.43b-48a.

3. Bayan-i-Waqai, f.142b-143a. : Tarikh-i-Ahmad Shahi, f.24a. Irvine, J.A.S.B.1879, part I, p.49.

4. Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.25a. : Tarikh-i- Afighana, f.61a.

suggested that the Emperor should march in person to the vicinity of Farrukhabad to facilitate the undertaking. The Emperor marched out of Delhi on 9th Dec. 1749 to join the Wazir and his party who had started a week earlier.¹ Leaving the Emperor at Aligarh, Safdar Jang with his 40,00 Mughals, advanced to Thana Daryao Ganj (35 miles north-west of Farrukhabad) while almost simultaneously, Raja Nawab Rai, according to his direction, arrived with a large army within three miles of Khudaganj (15 miles south-east of Farrukhabad).²

Bibi Sahaba opened up negotiation for the confirmation of Iman Khan and on Safdar Jang's friendly reply that on her attendance to his camp, with Iman Khan, her request would be granted. She then went to the Wazir's camp with 30,000 soldiers (4th Jan. 1750)³. It being decided after a few days negotiation that on payment of sixty lakhs of rupees the Bangash territories would be confirmed by grant to Iman Khan, Bibi Sahiba came back to Farrukhabad to hand over the promised sum to the Wazir's agent. The Emperor now left Aligarh (19th Jan.) and returned to Delhi.⁴

The cash and goods found at Farrukhabad were estimated by the Wazir's agent at 45 lakhs only. Hence Bibi Sahiba was again

1. Tarikh-i-Ahmad Shahi, f.24a.

2. Irvine, J.A.S.B. 1879, vol.48, part I, pp.50-51.

3. Imad-us-Saadat, p.45.

Irvine J.A.S.B. 1879, vol.48, part I, pp.51-52.

4. Tarikh-i-Ahmad Shahi, f.24b.

Irvine, J.A.S.B. 1879, pp.53-55, gives a detail of the Wazir's movements in Farrukhabad.

invited to the Wazir's camp to treat with him about the remaining 15 lakhs. She agreed to disband the army she had with her, and, with her five sons and five of her favourite chelas, to remain in the Wazir's camp until the balance had been paid.

Safdar Jang now moved towards Farrukhabad and encamped at Yaqutganj (5 miles south-west of Farrukhabad). He was also joined there by Naval Rai. Halting here for some time, Safdar Jang finally threw off his mask and confiscated the Bangash dominion, except the town of Farrukhabad and twelve villages that had been granted to the Bangashes in perpetuity (Altunga) by the late Emperor, Farrukh Siyar¹. Appointing his own revenue and police officers to the annexed countries, Safdar Jang after a short time, left Naval Rai in charge of these parts and returned to Delhi, with the five Bangash Chelas. The five sons of Muhammad Khan Bangash, were according to Safdar Jang's instruction, sent in chains to the fort of Allahabad, by Naval Rai, who taking the Bibi Sahiba with him, went to Kanauj and made it his headquarters.

Bibi Sahiba, through an old servant of the Bangash family, then in the employment of Naval Rai, managed to escape from Kanauj and fled to Mau². Here she budied herself in rousing the Afghans to rebel. Her task was facilitated by an incident which took place

1. Siyar, III, p.875.
Tarikh-i-Ahmad Shahi, f.24b.

2. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.49b. : Siyar II, p.875-76.
Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.25b.

at this time, for the Afghans were roused to fury when a subordinate police official insulted an Afghan woman by slapping her with his shoe.¹ Some of the leaders of Mau, bringing Ahmad Khan from Farrukhabad, installed him as their leader (July 1750). The next thing they wanted was money, and this they secured partly from Rustan Khan Afridi, on condition of the grant of half of the Bangash territory to him on recovery and partly from a rich Kurmi of Chiloli on loan. The rest of the deficit they made good by plundering rich Hindu bankers.

Ahmad Khan marched at the head of a considerable force and capturing Farrukhabad, set off southwards to recover the rest of his father's jagir.

Naval Rai, at the news of this rising, informed the Wazir about it and summoning Baqaulla, his chief assistant in Allahbad to join him, he marched towards Farrukhabad and crossing the Kalinadi, encamped on the bank near Khudaganj (16 miles south-east of Farrukhabad). Receiving orders at this place to wait for the Wazir who was coming up with reinforcements, he entrenched himself².

Ahmad Khan on the other hand, arriving within 2 miles of Naval Rai's camp, encamped himself there.³ The two forces lay facing each other for about a week, at the end of which Ahmad Khan ~~Shah~~ receiving definite information about the Wazir's near

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1. Imad-us-Saadat, p.46.
 2. Siyar, III, p.876.
 3. Imad-us-Saadat, p.47.

approach, made a sudden night attack on the enemy (13th Aug. 1750). The fighting went on in the confusion and darkness of the night, and at the break of dawn, Naval Rai was shot dead. The enemy now fled in panic. This victory established the Bangash rule in Farrukhabad once again and his army swelled to 60,000 the very next day.¹

Safdar Jang had traversed only forty miles when he received this news. In a fit of rage, he issued orders to the commandant of the Allahbad fort and to his son at Delhi, to put the five sons and five slaves of Muhammad Khan Bangash to death.² Then, determined upon revenge, he invited the Maratha chiefs, Sindhia and Holkar, Raja Surajmal Jat and others to come to his help. Joined by Surajmal at Aligarh, he marched to Mahara (7 miles south-west of Kasganj in the Etah district) and waited there over a month for other reinforcements to join him. Reinforced by contingents from several States, except the Marattas, he marched out at the head of 70,000 horses and crossing the Kalinafi, encamped a few miles south-east of the village of Bhadari (5 miles east of Kasganj).³

Ahmad Khan Bangash on the other hand, at the approach of this huge army, found himself left with only 20,000 soldiers.

1. Siyar, III, p.876. (10 Ramzan).

Tarikh-Faiz-Bakhsh, f.26a.

Khazena-i-Amra, p.80 (10 Ramzan 1163 A.H.) 13 Aug. 1750.

2. Hadiqat-ul-Aqalin, p.173. : Imad-us-Saadat, p.45.
Faiz-Bukhsh, f.26b.

3. Siyar, III, 877.

Sending a messenger to the Afghans of Rohilkhand soliciting their aid, he marched with his army and encamped south of the Ganges, at a distance of ten miles from the Wazir's entrenchment.

Shocked at the disgrace to which ~~an~~ an Afghan^{family} had been exposed by Safdar Jang, the Rohilla Sardars unanimously agreed to support Ahmad Khan. Accordingly they sent a force of 10,000 brave Rohillas under Parmul Khan and Davr Khan¹.

Safdar Jang, hearing that the Rohillas had joined the Farrukhabad Pathans and were on their way to reinforce them, at once marched forward to meet the enemy, but he was too late. He reached the extensive plain of Ram Chatanni (6 miles west of Patiala ~~city~~) at 9 o'clock on the morning of 24th Sept. 1750, by which time the Bangashes had already been joined by the Rohillas.

Ahmad Khan detached a part of his army under Rustam Khan Afridi to meet the advancing army and hid himself with the rest of the army behind the jungle in one corner of the field. Rustam Khan Afridi, with ten thousand men under him, opened artillery fire when the enemy appeared. This was followed by a charge by the Wazir's right and left wings under Surajmal Jat and Ismail Beg Khan respectively. A hand to hand encounter finally ended in the loss of six to seven thousand men on the Afridi's side, including the chief himself. The remainder fled in extreme panic.

1. Khazana-i-Amra, pp. 81-83 (22 Shawwal, 1163 A.H.)

Gulistan-i-Bahmat, f. 52a-52b. : Tarikh-i-Ahmad Shahi, f. 26b.

Faiz-Bakhsh, f. 27a. : Irvine J.A.S.B. 1879, p. 71. gives the date of the battle as 22 Shawwal 1163 A.H. but calculates it wrongly as 13 Sept. 1750.

Tawarikh-i-Afaghani, f. 61b.

in the direction of Aliganj, hotly pursued by the Victors who were thus drawn away more than four miles from the Wazir's centre. Taking advantage of the situation, Ahmad Khan sent the ten thousand Rohillas from his hiding place to charge the Wazir's advance guard. This sudden rush led to the desertion of a number of chiefs on the Wazir's side. In spite of the stubborn resistance put up by the Wazir's left flank, the Rohillas were fast approaching his front. At their near approach, the five thousand Mughals in the Wazir's immediate front, in order to stem their tide, discharged their guns loaded with spikes. As soon as the smoke had disappeared, Ahmad Khan emerged with his army from the grove of palah trees and fell on the enemy, who were already busy fighting the Rohillas in the dark. This completed the defeat of the Wazir's force and he was himself struck in the jaw by a bullet and fell unconscious in his howdah¹.

Safdar Jang's elephant had been taken out of the battle by a faithful servant and about an hour after the battle, he recovered from his swoon, but finding himself left with only 200 men, he marched away to Marhara. The victorious army under Surajmal and Ismail Beg returned to the battlefield, only to find that the chief had been defeated and had withdrawn. They retired to the banks of Kalinadi and spending the night there, returned

1. Siyar, III, p.878.
 Imad-us-Saadat, p.49, and
 Hadiqat-ul-Aqalin, p.174,
 give the detail of the battle.

to their respective homes.

Flished with the unexpected victory, Ahmad Khan quickly made arrangements for the occupation of the Imperial territory and round Farrukhabad/of the Wazir's territory of Oudh and Allahabad. Dismissing the Rohilla army, who had played the most important part in his victory, with suitable presents, Ahmad Khan communicated to the Rohilla chiefs his intention of taking possession of the provinces of Oudh and Allahabad and requested them to assist him in the execution of his purpose. The Rohilla Sardars, accordingly, despatched Shikh Kabir and Parmal Khan with a strong body of troops and they took possession of the pargana of Shahabad and the Sarkar of Kharabad (roughly equivalent to the modern district of Hardoi, the western half of Kheri-Lakhimpur and Sitapur) without any opposition from the enemy.¹

Meanwhile numerous Chelas and half-brother of Ahmad Khan, according to his orders, had taken possession of all the country from Aligarh to Akbarpur (26 miles east of Cawnpore). Mahummad Khan, his son, marching with a large army, had occupied Lucknow without opposition and had even brought the major part of Oudh under his control, although the tyranny of his Kotwal at Lucknow had led to the rising of the people and the expulsion of the Afghans from the City. Another army under Shadi Khan

1. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.54a.

being defeated by the deputy-governor of Allahabad, Ahmad Khan had marched in person against him and the enemy having returned to the fort of Allahabad, he had laid siege to it¹. The siege had lasted for 54 days when Ahmad Khan, hearing the news of Safdar Jang's advance with the Marathas and the defeat of the Shadil Khan, his faujdar of Koi (Aligarh) and Jalesar, had to raise the siege ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ and beat a hurried retreat to his capital.² Reaching Farrukhabad in six days, he was joined by Mahmud Khan from Oudh and also by Shadil Khan.

Safdar Jang, on the other hand, on his arrival at Delhi, had found his position very delicate. Intizam-ud-daula had instigated the Emperor to forbid him the Court on the ground that according to Mughal tradition, a defeated Wazir must go into retirement. But the Wazir got over the difficulty by winning over Javad Khan, with a bribe of seventy lakhs of rupees³. His next concern was to wipe out the disgrace of his defeat. Hence he wrote repeatedly to Malhar Rao Holkar and Jayappa Sindhia to come to his assistance, offering large sums of money. On the near approach of the Marathas, he left Delhi with the Emperor's permission and was joined by the Marathas near Kishan Das tank on the 2nd March 1751. A formal agreement was then drawn up by which the Wazir

1. Irvine, J.A.S.B. 1879, pp. 76, 78-82.

Tarikh-i-Muzaffari- f.258b-259a.

2. Irvine, J.A.S.B. 1879, p.86.

3. Siyar III, p.881. : Imad, p.50 : Tarikh-Faiz Bukhsh, f.27b.

agreed to pay the Marathas, while the campaign lasted, a daily allowance of 25,000 rupees. Surajmal Jat, who had also joined him at this time, obtained the grant of fifteen thousand rupees per day¹.

The wazir then marched towards Farrukhabad (2nd week of March) and at Agra detached a light Maratha force of twenty thousand, which surprised Shadil Khan at Qadirganj (30 miles north-east of Etawah)². Then about the time when Ahmad Khan had raised the siege of Allahabad, the Wazir detached a strong Maratha contingent under Gangadhar Tantia to intercept Ahmad Khan on his way to Farrukhabad. The slow progress of the Maratha army because they as usual plundered and burnt the countryside on their way, allowed Ahmad Khan to reach Farrukhabad without trouble. The Bangash Nawab, on his arrival at his capital, preferred to make a stand at a small fort now called Fatehgarh and accordingly entrenched himself there.

This fort was situated three miles east of Farrukhabad and faced the Ganges, near the ferry of Husainpur. Across the river was the Rohilla country, the only place from which help could reach the occupants of the fort³.

The Maratha contingent, passing through Farrukhabad,

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1. Tarikh-i-Ahmad Shahi, r.28a. : Imad-us-Saadat, p.57.
Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.27b-28a.
 2. Siyar III, p.281.881
 3. Irvine, J.A.S.B. f.1279, pp.88-89.

encamped a few miles to the north-west of Fatehgarh, where they were soon joined by the main army. The wazir posted Holkar and Sindhia at Qain~~bagh~~ and himself encamped further south, at the ferry of Shinghirampur, on the right bank of the Ganges (10 miles south of Fatehgarh). But, although Ahmad Khan had thus been encircled by the enemy, on the north, west and south, he was continually in receipt of supplies from across the river. Therefore after a few days' useless artillery duel, Safdar Jang decided to cut off the enemy's access to the country north of the Ganges. Accordingly ~~kniboxe~~ boats were collected to throw a bridge over the Ganges near Singhirampur. Ahmad Khan at once took action and sent a strong contingent under his son, Mahmud Khan, across the river to stop the construction of the bridge, from the left bank of the river opposite Singhirampur. But, inspite of Mahmud Khan's endeavours to stop the construction of the bridge, the work continued steadily under cover of artillery fire and by the 27th April, it was complete.¹

Meanwhile, the Rohilla chiefs who had so enthusiastically supported Ahmad Khan in his last struggle with Safdar Jang, inspite of the repeated requests of the Bangash Nawab, had refused to join him. This sudden change of the Rohilla policy must be attributed to the awe of the huge army then under the command of the Wazir and perhaps to the promise made to them by Safdar Jang that he

1. Irvine, J.A.S.B. 1879, pp 90-91.

Srivastava, A.L. p.179, he also quotes the Marathi sources.

would spare them their territories, in return for their neutrality in his contest with the Bangash Nawab. Ahmad Khan Bangash, in utter desperation, finally sent his mother to the Rohilla chiefs to plead for him¹, but all the entreaties of Bibi Sahiba, failed to win over the experienced Rohilla chiefs. The astute old lady however, did not give up and through the influence of the ladies of Ali Muhammad Khan's house, successfully persuaded Sadulla to help Ahmad Khan Bangash.

The entire Rohilla army, except the personal contingents of Hafiz Rahmat Khan, Dundi Khan and Mulla Sardar Khan, rallied to Sadulla's standard. Fateh Khan and Bahadur Khan, the custodians of Ali Muhammad Khan's children also joined him as a moral duty². Sadulla Khan, who was accompanied by his three younger brothers, marched out of Aonla at the head of 12,000 soldiers and reached the left bank of the Ganges, opposite Fategarh, on the very day the bridge at Singhirampur had been completed³. Ahmad Khan sent him a message asking him to cross over next day with the Bangash forces under Mahmud Khan. His idea was to present a United front to the opposing forces and he was apprehensive, the bridge being complete, the wazir might make a sudden attack on the army on the left bank of the Ganges. Sadulla consulted Fateh Khan and Bahadur Khan on the matter and was convinced

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1. Faiz Bukhsh, f.28a. : Irvine J.A.S.B.1879,p.91-92. Says Sadulla was prompted to this action by his mother but Bahadur Khan gave him the idea.
 2. Faiz Bukhsh, f.28b.
 3. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.55a, gives the number of soldiers. Srivastava,A.L. p.180.

by the latter that his army, together with that of Mahmud Khan's, numbering 30,000 in all, was enough to frustrate any attack of the enemy, particularly because the existence of an army at Fatehgarh, would not allow the Wazir to lead his entire forces against them and thus allow Ahmud Khan to attack in the rear. The decision was accordingly communicated to Ahmud Khan, who agreed to it but sent a message to Sadulla to be on the defensive and in no condition to pursue the enemy after they had been defeated.¹

Early next morning Safdar Jang, little knowing that the enemy had decided not to make a junction and was on the alert for any attack from him, decided to make a surprise attack on the Rohillas to prevent them from joining the besieged. Keeping the bulk of the army in its place as a guard against any movement from Fatehgarh, he detached a strong force consisting of the Marathas, Jats and the Mughals, to cross over and attack the enemy.² The Marathas formed the vanguard of the Wazir's army and after the

1. Irvine, J.A.S.B. 1879, p.96-97. The exclamation of Bahadar Khan that if God willed they would lay before Ahmud Khan, the next morning as an offering to the chief of the Afghans, the head of the Wazir and the Maratha Sardars, certainly means that should the enemy cross over the next morning to attack the Rohillas would be done, and not that the Rohillas would cross over and attack the enemy.

Srivastava, p.180, misunderstands the above but states that the Wazir was the first to attack the next morning.

2. Irvine, J.A.S.B. 1879, pp.97-98.

Srivastava, p.180.

Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, I, p.407, misunderstanding Bahadar Khan's boastful declaration, says "Sadulla attacked the Marathas before Ahmud could cross over from the west bank and unite with him."

usual artillery duel, a hand to hand encounter followed.

Bahadur Khan, the leader of the Rohilla vanguard, was having the better of the Marathas, when they began to retreat. Bahadur's enthusiasm led him to pursue the enemy with the result that he was separated from the main body of Sadulla's army. The Marathas suddenly turned back and attacked Bahadur Khan, who at the same time was fired upon by the Jats in his rear. Thus caught between the two armies, Bahadur Khan, with ten or twelve thousand soldiers, fell after putting up a gallant fight. In spite of this great loss, Sadulla Khan and Mahmud Khan determined to stand their ground. But Fateh Khan succeeded in persuading Sadulla to give up the idea and with him and his three younger brothers, proceeded to Aonla¹. Mahmud Khan was naturally obliged to cross over and join his father at Fatefarh.

The news of this disaster, caused panic among the Afghan troops in Fategarh. Ahmud Khan tried his best to keep them in order by paying personal visits to all their batteries. But as soon as they saw the huge conflagration, about three hours after nightfall, caused by the enemy's burning Sadulla's tents and baggage, they were determined upon taking refuge in flight and Ahmud Khan had to submit to their wishes. In their attempt to

1. Faiz Bakhsh, f.29b.

Irvine, J.A.S.B. 1879, p.98. supports this by saying that Fateh Khan advised Sadulla to run away to Aonla, on being asked for advice.

escape the rearguard were attacked by the vigilant Marathas. Yet the majority, including Ahmud Khan, his son and his brothers, crossed in safety, marching rapidly via Shahjahanpur, reached Aonla.¹

A hurried consultation was held at Aonla, between Ahmud Khan, Sadulla Khan and the principal Rohilla chiefs. Hafiz Rahmat Khan, Dundi Khan and Mulla Sardar Khan, were now obliged to join hands with Ahmad Khan, for they realised that although Sadulla had joined the Bangash cause against their wishes, Safdar Jang and still less the Marathas, once they had gained the advantage, were not likely to make any fine distinctions between Sadulla's enmity and their friendly feelings. Finding themselves unable to face the huge army of the Wazir in the open, the Afghan chiefs decided upon a hurried retreat to the Kumaon hills. Accordingly, all the Rohilla chiefs and Ahmad Khan Bangash were flying northwards with their family and treasures, but they had not got beyond Muradabad, when they heard to their relief of the Wazir's departure for Lucknow. The whole party, therefore, returned to Aonla where they spent the four months of the rainy season².

Safdar Jang, meanwhile, immediately after the victory, busied himself in devastating the Bangash territories. Then

1. Irvine, J.A.S.B. 1879, p.99.

2. Tarikh-i-Faiz Bukhsh, f.29b.

Gulistan-i-Rahmat, 55b-56b, says Ahmud Khan reached Aonla four days after Sadulla Khan.

Irvine, J.A.S.B. 1879. pp.102-103.

he made arrangements for the occupation of the conquered country. This having taken more than a month, the rainy season set in. War being now impossible for the next four months, he started for Lucknow, to reduce his provinces, then in the thro^{es} of a revolution, to order, while the Marathas remained encamped at Singhirampur.

After the rains were nearly over, the Afghans found their enemy still scattered and unprepared. This made them turn their attention to the recovery of Farnukhabad. Throwing a bridge over Ramganga, they crossed over to the other side. The Marathas meanwhile, being informed of the construction of the bridge, had hastily sent an army under Khande Rao, son of Malhar Rao Holkar, to prevent the enemy from reaching the bridge at Singhirampur. While the Afghans were marching towards the bridge, keeping close to the river bank, they were intercepted by Khande Rao, at a place where the river described a semi-circle. Dundi Khan, the Sipahsalar of the Rohilla army, at once took advantage of the situation and surrounded the Marathas¹. Khande Rao, finding himself entrapped, sent a man to Ahmad Khan to arrange terms. Khande Rao, promising solemnly on behalf of the Barathas, not to take any more active part against them, although keeping up the ^{appearance} of opposition to satisfy the Wazir, Ahmad Khan and Hafiz Rahmat Khan, managed to persuade Dundi Khan, to withdraw the troops. Khande ^{Rao} Khan

1. Irvine, J.A.S.B. 1879, p.103-104.

then marched away towards Singhirampur.¹

The kindness thus shown to the Marathas by the Afghans was a clever piece of diplomacy on their part and indeed proved to be the corner stone of their ultimate salvation from certain destruction at the hands of Safdar Jang. Henceforth the Marathas, although outwardly serving the Wazir, were definitely in collaboration with the enemy. In fact, the events immediately following Kandhe Rao's release seem to be pre-arranged between the two parties.

The Afghans wished to regain possession of Farrukhabad. The Marathas, having been left in charge of the place by their employer, the Wazir, could not very well hand over the country to the Afghans openly. Hence a carefully arranged plan had to be adopted. First of all, the Wazir's bridge at Singhirampur had to be destroyed. This was done by Mulhar Rao on the approach of the enemy, presumably on the plea that his army was not strong enough to face them. This was followed by a long distance artillery duel between the two parties to ^{Keep} ~~make~~ up outward appearances. Then the Afghans giving out that they were going to Ramganga, marched to Surajpur (30 miles above Farrukhabad) in order to join the expected reinforcements under Najib Khan, a Rohilla, Jamadar, and to cross the Ganges so that they would be in a position to attack Mulhar Rao at Singhirampur. Mulhar Rao at the approach of this huge army, was perhaps supposed to abandon his

post and run away¹.

But before the Afghans could carry out their carefully arranged plans, Safdar Jang, who had been informed of the Afghan activities during the time they were crossing over the Ramganga had arrived at Singhirampur on the 28th Nov. 1751 by crossing over at Mahdi Ghat² (40 miles below Farrukhabad). Receiving this news the Rohillas and the Pathans quickly decided to march straight to Bangash³ (10 miles north of Budaon) and entrench themselves in that fort. The allied forces who had only a few months before fled towards the mountain, preferring not to meet the Wazir in the plains, were still in no condition to withstand the same army at Bangash. Nevertheless, because of the promise made by Khande Rao, they determined to do so. The commander of the Rohilla artillery was accordingly ordered to transport his guns to Bangash. But the entire Rohilla army, except the Commander and chief officers, learning the reason of this sudden change of plan, were seized with panic and fled. These simple minded soldiers obviously did not have much faith in the sincerity of the Marathas. This flight of the Rohillas which made their leader exclaim in sorrow "Without a battle we have been defeated"

1. Irvine, J.A.S.B. 1879, pp. 104-105, supplies facts but misunderstands it.

Srivastava, p. 184, also misunderstands the whole proceeding and thinks the Rohillas were seriously planning to attack Malhar Rao.

2. Irvine, 1879, p. 105, gives the date 9 Muharram 1165 A.H. but miscalculates it for 17 Nov. 1751. He seems to have followed the same table for Hijra dates as Sakar in Fall of the Mughals

3. Irvine, 1879, p. 105.

Ahmud Khan, who was encamped a mile away from the Rohilla troops when informed of this, agreed with the Rohilla ^{chiefs} ~~troops~~, that they should all proceed to the hills, after taking their families from Aonla.¹

Within twelve hours of their arrival at Aonla, the Rohillas set their houses in flames and in company with Ahmud Khan and his soldiers, started towards the Kumaon hills, keeping their families and treasures in the centre of their forces.²

Meanwhile, the Wazir had quickly thrown a bridge of boats across the Ganges at Kamraul (28 miles above Singhirampur) and despatched 25 thousand active Maratha horse, under Gangadhar Yaswant to pursue the enemy. He even urged Mulhar Rao Holkar and Jayappa Sindhia to join in the pursuit. But the Muratha leaders, in accordance with their promise to the enemy and also because of their natural desire, began to plunder the town of Rohilkhand but sent secret messages to Ahmud Khan Bangash warning him of ^{their} ~~Ali's~~ approach.³

1. Irvine, J.A.S.B. 1879, pp. 105-6.

Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f. 57b, says that an action took place on their way to Aonla, because the Marathas overtook them, but it is entirely wrong. Hisamuddin, upon whose works Irvine has based his article was an eye witness of the present Bangash affairs.

Sarkar - The Fall of the Mughal Empire. I, p. 409, and Srivastava, p. 184, follow the wrong authority.

2. Faiz Bukhsh, f. 29b. : Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f. 58a. very brief. Siyar III, p. 882. : Irvine J.A.S.B. 1879, pp. 106-7.

3. Faiz Bukhsh, f. 30a. : Srivastava, p. 186.

By these means the Marathas allowed the Afghans to march at ease through Rampur, Maradabad and Kashipur, till they reached a hilly place known as Chilkiya (22 miles north-east of Kashipur)¹ Here they encamped at a place of great strategic importance. Their camp was on a plain which was surrounded by deep impenetrable forests on three sides; a deep and extensive ditch was immediately dug by them on the fourth side which was exposed to attack. At the ~~xxx~~ edge of this they further erected an earthen wall and many towers along which they ranged their guns side by side and secured them with iron chains. Nor did they have much difficulty in securing provisions for their camp. They applied to the Raja of Kumaon, whose territory lay to the north, for help. Since the Wazir had already written to the Raja not to help them, he hesitated for some time, thereby obliging the Afghans to subsist on sugar cane. But the Raja, recollecting the former treatment he had received at the hands of the Imperial Government when attacked by the Rohillas in 1743, and realising at the same time that the Rohillas since 1743 had all along been on very friendly terms with him, preferred to throw in his lot with the Afghans.²

The Wazir, meanwhile, had encamped with his allies at a little distance to the south of the Afghan entrenchment. Irregular

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1. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.58a.
Tarikh-i-Ahmad Shahi, f.28b.
Irvine J.A.S.B. 1879, p.107.
 2. Irvine, J.A.S.B. 1879, pp.107-8.
Tarikh-i-Ahmad Shahi, f.29a.
Tarikh-i-Faiz Bukhsh, f.30b.

fighting continued for some time between the skirmishes of the opposite sides, and the besiegers toiled in vain to get an entry into the enemy's position. After this Safdar Jang erected batteries facing the side which the Afghans had fortified and began discharging his big guns every day.¹ Two months patient battering in this way failed to clear an opening for him.

About this time, came a letter to Safdar Jang from Delhi x that Ahmad Shah Abduli was on his way to the Panjab and that the Emperor as a result of this, would soon direct him to make peace with the enemy and hurry back to Delhi to meet the Abdali invasion. Safdar Jang, getting extremely anxious to strike a decisive blow before order~~ed~~^{and} to retire, summoned a Council of War of his friends/officers. The Marathas who were in treacherous collusion with the enemy, pleaded their inexperience in fighting against entrenchments.² Finally, Rajandara Giri volunteered to deliver the assault. Next morning, he sent some Mughal troops to attack the batteries on the eastern wing of the Afghan entrenchment which was under the command of Najib Khan and Sayyid^{Ahmad} Khan. His idea was to draw by this attack the majority of the troops from the batteries under Ahmad Khan Bangash and then himself deliver a sudden attack on the Bangash Nawab, with his brave Naga soldiers. But the plan had been treacherously betrayed

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1. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.58b, says four months passed in this war. Irvine, J.A.S.B.1879, pp.108-9.
Tarikh-Ahmad Shahi, f.29a.
 2. Srivastava, pp.186-87.

to the Afghans by the Marathas (Jayappa Sindhia)¹. Rajendra Giri finding Ahmad Khan's batteries remained fully manned inspite of his carefully planned stratagem preferred not to leave the attack himself and detached a strong Naga contingent to deliver the assault. After an artillery battle lasting an hour, a hand to hand fight between the two armies ensued in which the Nagas were completely outnumbered. By the time this battle was over, it was evening and hence Rajendra Giri retired to his camp.

This failure of Rajendra Giri's attempt was soon after followed by an urgent farman from the Emperor calling ~~for~~ Safdar Jang to Delhi.² The Marathas at once took advantage of this and strongly desired an early termination of the campaign on the ground that the unhealthy climate of the hills was telling heavily upon the health of their soldiers.³ Thus the Wazir had now no alternative to peace.

Ali Quli Khan was accordingly sent to sound Ahmad Khan Bangash. But the Afghans, having no faith in Safdar Jang,

1. Srivastava, p.187.

2. Tarikh-i-Ahmad Shahi, f.30b-31a.

3. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.58b, and Faiz Bukhsh, f.31, say that the Muratha chiefs were pressing Safdar Jang for an end of the Campaign on plea of unfavourable climate.

Srivastava, p.188.

Tawarikh-i-Afaghana, f.62b, says The Wazir made peace, realising that the Murathas did not want him to defeat the Afghans.

desired Muratha mediation, thinking that the latter alone could enforce the terms of the intended peace¹. The situation was at once ~~making~~ taken advantage of by the Murathas, who demanded from the Afghans a price for the services as peace-makers. The Afghans reduced to the state of homeless wanderers and suffering from the inclemency of the weather and the ravages of sickness, were obliged to yield to the Muratha demands and the price was ~~fixed~~ fixed at 50 lakhs of rupees.²

Khande Rao was sent by Holkar and Sindhia to invite the representatives of the Bangashes and the Rohillas to a conference. ~~Mohammad~~ Muhammad Khan and Hafiz Rahmat Khan accordingly came to the Wazir's camp with 200 attendants but at night their tents being surrounded by one thousand Mughals under Ali Quli Khan to protect them against the Wizar's army, the two Afghan chiefs suspected treachery and rode away to their own entrenchments, being faithfully conducted there by the Murathas.

Immediately after this came the alarming news that the Abduli had crossed the Indus and was coming to the rescue of the Indian Afghans. The Murathas now seriously alarmed at the prospect of a war with the Afghan invader, forced the Wazir to

1. Imad-us-Saadat, p.59.

2. Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.31b, gives the sum to be paid.
Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.59a, 59b, gives the details of negotiations
Imad-us-Saadat, p.59,
Srivastava, p.190.
Irvine, J.A.S.B.1879, p.121-22.

a speedy settlement with the enemy¹.

After a great deal of discussion it was finally agreed upon that Safdar Jang was to pardon Ahmad Khan Bangash, in consideration of a fine of thirty lakhs of rupees, if as security for payment of it, he surrendered half of his territory till such time as the whole sum was paid. Accordingly, Ali Quli Khan and Gangadhar were despatched to negotiate with Ahmad Khan Bangash. The Bangash Nawab, who had been in touch with the Murathas while these terms were being drawn up accepted them at once and ~~Induraut~~ Mahmud Khan and Hafiz Rahmat Khan were again sent to wait on the Wazir.²

Safdar Jang, granted them audience the next day and on the third day he set out for Lucknow, taking Mahmud Khan, Hafiz Rahmat Khan and Gangadhar with him, while the Murathas retired to quarter themselves at Kanauj. Reaching the town of Mohet (15 miles south-west of Lucknow) the Wazir gave Hafiz Rahmat Khan leave to return to his country, permitting the Rohillas to retain possession of their present territories on condition of their paying the revenue in future³.

Reaching Lucknow (Feb.1752), a treaty was signed between the Wazir and Ahmad Khan Bangash. This confirmed one half of the

1. Irvine, J.A.S.B.1879, p.120-121.

2. Irvine, J.A.S.B.1879, pp.112-113. Ali Quli Khan had come from the Emperor with the letter to make peace. Srivastava, p.189.

3. Siyar-ul-Mutakhkharin III, pp.881-82. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.60a-61b. It says Hafiz left Safdar Jang at a distance of 14 miles from Lucknow. Faiz Bukhsh, f.31b.

Bangash territory in the name of Ahmad Khan Bangash and transferred the other half ($16\frac{1}{2}$ parganas) to the Maratha allies of the Wazir, in lieu of thirty lakhs ~~of~~ rupees that was due to them for their services in the campaign, but only until the above sum had been paid off. After the clearance of the debt, the country was to revert back to the previous owner. Further, the Bangash territories west of the Ganges, which the Rohillas had taken possession of in 1749, were transferred permanently to the present owners¹.

From this it will be apparent that the Marathas and the Rohillas profited most from the campaign. The Marathas received the Bangash territories from Kol (Aligarh) in the north to Kara Jahanabad in the south-east. It is true that they were given this for a limited period only, but there was nothing to prevent their holding it indefinitely, as they actually did, till they were driven out after their defeat at Panipat (1761). At the same time they obtained fifty lakhs of rupees from the Afghans for bringing about the peace. The Marathas, taking a bond for the above sum and leaving their own agent Govind Pant Bundela, to collect the revenues of their new possessions, began their march towards the Deccan.² The Rohillas were confirmed not only

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1. Irvine J.A.S.B. 1879, p.122. : Siyar III, pp.881-82.
Tarikh-i-Ahmad Shahi, d.28b-31b. : Hadiqat-ul-Aqalīn, p 175, 674
 2. Faiz Bukhsh, f.31b : Siyar III, pp.881-82.

in their own territories, but also over the Bangash possessions on the left side of the Ganges. The local zamindars of these territories had never properly submitted to the Rohillas before and hence they at once set themselves to the task of their subjugation, which was done in a short time.¹

1. Galistan-i-Rahmut, f.61a-63a.

CHAPTER VI.

Establishment of a separate state under Najib Khan
Rohilla and ~~the~~ Role of the Rohillas in the politics of
Hindustan. (1752-69)

Safdar Jang after his departure from Rohilkhand was still busy establishing his rule in his Subas of Oudh and Allahbad, when an urgent letter of recall from the Emporor at the news of the fall of Lahore into the hands of the Abdali monarch, obliged him to repair to the Capital ¹. The Abdali problem, however, had already been settled by the Emporor, through the influence of Javed Khan, before the Wazir reached Delhi.² Hence the Wazir, on his arrival repaid Javed Khan for usurping his power by having him assassinated (7th September, 1752).³ But Safdar Jang was not satisfied with the restoration of his powers as Wazir. He wanted to play the role of a dictator and made the Emporor Ahmad Shah practically a prisoner by surrounding him with creatures of his own in all the important posts of the palace-fort.⁴ This galling bondage finally led to the Emporor's

1. Tarikhas-i Ahmad Shahi f 31a-33b
Siyar III. p 889.

2. Ahmad Shahi f 33b-34b : Siyar III, p 889.
3. Ahmad Shahi f 40a-41b: Siyar III p 890.

Imad-us-Saadat p 60; Tawarikh-i-Afaghana f 64a.

4. Ahmad Shahi f 42a-42b.

plotting with the enemies of Safdar Jang at Court, to bring about his overthrow.¹ A well planned coup d'etat was carried out on the 18th March, 1754, by which Safdar Jang was deprived of the command of the Palace.² But the Wazir thinking he could coerce his master, petitioned the Emperor for permission to let him depart from the Court to his provinces. The Emperor to his surprise took him at his word and gave him the requisite permission. But the Wazir again miscalculated the Emperor's move and quietly marched out of Delhi on the 27th March still hoping the Emperor would recall him and encamped in the vicinity of the Capital. He lingered on for weeks near Delhi, postponing his departure on the plea that there was not sufficient transport available, and at last when it was too late he discovered that his enemies were in dead earnest and resolved even to fight him.³ Realising that his foolish delay had allowed the Imperialists to collect enough troops and ammunitions to frustrate any sweeping assault on the Capital, Safdar Jang at once summoned Rajendra Criri from Oudh and Surajmal Jat to his assistance, who accordingly joined him on the 23rd April and 2nd May respectively.⁴

1. Imad-us-Saadat p 22.

The leaders of the Plot were ~~the~~ Intizam and the Queen Mother Udham Bai and they were also secretly joined by Imad-ul-Mulk the Mir Bakhshi, who was outwardly a partisan of Safdar Jang

2. Ahmad Shahi f 48a-49a: Siyar III p 891.

3. Ahmad Shahi f 49a-52b: Siyar III p 891.

4. Ahamad Shahi f 53a.

The Imperialists meanwhile appealed to the Rohillas for help offering to grant them their lands in perpetuity (Altamga) ¹. On the receipt of the Imperial letter summoning them to Delhi, the Rohilla Chiefs marched out at the head of forty thousand men.² Safdar Jang alarmed at this, immediately despatched letters to the Rohilla Chiefs informing them ^x that he had already been reinforced by Surajmal Jat and Rajendra Giri and asking them to join his side, threatening them at the same time with complete destruction, if they joined the Imperialists.³ Since Safdar Jang had twenty five thousand men under his command besides the reinforcements that had joined him under Surajmal and Rajendra Giri, it looked as if he would be successful. Hence the Rohilla Chiefs when they reached Hapur began to discuss among themselves which side they ^x should join in the forthcoming struggle.⁴

Finding the Rohillas thus wasting time in discussions, the Imperialists sent to them a deputation of Ulama (religious teachers,) to win them over by means of Masala (religious precepts). These Ulama represented to the Rohillas that

1. Nuruddin f 6b-7a.

2. Gulistan f 67b-69d

3. Nuruddin f 6b.

4. Idem f 6b; Gulistan f 68a-69a. - it gives other details but says that they marched on invitation of Safdar Jang. Qissai Ahwal-i-Rohilla f 58a.

according to Canon law, obedience to the call of the Emperor in a war against a rebel and a heretic (Safdar Jang being a Shia) was ~~incumbent~~ incumbent on every true ~~Muslim~~ Muslim,¹ The matter though very cleverly put before the rather fanatic Sunni Rohillas, failed to win over, the shrewd Rohilla Chiefs. Hafiz Rahmat Khan, the Naib-i-Mustaqil replied "we have taken oaths of allegiance to Safdar Jang also. Breach of agreement is a very bad thing." Hence it was finally decided between the two parties that the matter should be put before the Rohilla religious teachers (Akhumdan) for their decision.² But before the Council broke up one of the Rohilla Resaladar, named Najib Khan, who was present there prepared to join the Emperor's Cause without any further argument, with his one thousand followers. His lead was followed by many other Rohillas from the ranks of Hafiz Rahmat Khan, Dundi Khan and other Rohilla Chiefs so that, when he started for Delhi the next day, he had about eleven thousand men under his command.³ At the same time the Imperialist agents, knowing that the Chiefs of Rohilkhand were determined upon not joining the Emperor against Safdar Jang, did not wait for the decision of the Rohilla teachers and sent for an Imperial order from Delhi, commanding the Rohillas to remain neutral and confirming them in their ~~possessions~~ possessions. On the receipt

1. Nuruddin f 7a-7b.

The Ulama said "if you are a Muslim agree to this, otherwise there will be reason to doubt your faith."

2. Nuruddin f 7a-7b; Gulistan f 68b-69a.

3. Nuruddin f 7b-8b; Gulistan f 69a.

of the ~~farman~~ farman the Rohilla Chiefs, readily obeyed it and marched back to their own possessions.¹

Najib Khan was one of those Afghans whom the tyranny of Nadir Shah had compelled to ~~migrate~~ migrate to India (1739). He was a Yusufzai of the Umer Khel section and belonged to the village of Man Rai -- a place about fifty miles distant from Peshawar across the river Abasin.² On his arrival at Aonla, he was taken into the service of Ali Muhammad Khan Rohilla as a footman, but because of his bravery was soon promoted to the cavalry department. He rendered such distinguished services as a cavalryman that within a year of his arrival at Aonla, he became a Jamadar.³ He continued as a small Jamadar till ~~1232~~ 1752 A.D. when ^{the} invasion of Rohilkhand by Safdar Jang and his allies, gave him an opportunity to display his merit. While the Rohillas were besieged at Chilkya, one entrenchment on behalf of Sadulla Khan was placed in charge of Najib Khan with five hundred men under him. During this time Najib Khan rendered valuable services, by frequently quitting his own trench on his own initiative to bring timely succour to the different points where the enemy attacked in strength.

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1. Gulistan f 69a.
 2. Nuruddin f 5a; Faiz Bakhsh f 30b.
Tarikh-i-Nawab Najib-ud-daula. f 2b.
 3. Nuruddin f 5a.
Faiz Bakhsh f 31a.

And when peace was finally concluded with Safdar Jang his services were rewarded and he was promoted to the position of a Jamadar with one thousand men under his command.¹

Soon after his promotion, his wife died leaving a son named Zabeḡa Khan. Dundi Khan, the Sipahsalar of the Rohilla army who had been greatly impressed by this daring warrior, at once had him attached to his family by giving him his daughter in marriage to him. But this marriage alliance raised Najib Khan's position as well, for his father-in-law made him a grant out of his own Jagir, of some Mahals on the banks of the Ganges, such as Nagina, Sherkot, Bijnour, as amli jaidad for the support of the troops then under him and he was no more a Jamadar receiving a salary but a Resaladar ruling over his own territories.²

Najib Khan established a firm administration in ~~xxx~~ his own possessions and settled down there for some time. But a life of complete inactivity ill-suited him, he crossed the Ganges two or three times before 1754 and took possession of the Mahals of the Emperor appertaining to Saharanpur, although on each of these occasions he was obliged to evacuate them due to letters and requests from the Emperor to Sadulla Khan, the Nawab of Rohilkhand.³

1. Faiz Bakhsh f 31a.

Nuruddin f 5a-5b.

2. Idem f 5b.

Faiz Bakhsh f 31a.

Gulistan f 69a.

vide p. 280. for amli jaidad

3. Nuruddin f 5b-6a.

Reaching Delhi on the 4th June, 1754 at the head of about fifteen thousand men, Najib Khan played the most decisive part on the 5th June in frustrating the assault of Safdar Jang on the city.¹ After this the war lasted for about four months but only two great battles were fought. The second assault of the enemy on Delhi came on the 14th June but they were once more defeated and forced to retire.² At this time when the result of the contest was obvious, Najib Khan was joined by a large number of Rohillas from Rohilkhand.³ The last desperate attempt was made by Safdar Jang at Faridabad where he had retreated on the 29th September but he was again defeated.⁴ Luckily for him, however, the Campaign was suddenly brought to an end by the Imperialists.

1. Ahmad Shahi f 56a-57a.

It gives the number of the Rohillas under Najib as fifteen thousand, which shows he was joined by many more on his way.

Siyar III p 892; Nuruddin f 9a-11b.

Tarikh-i-Muzaffari f 266a-267b.

2. Siyar III p 892.

Ahmad Shahi f 57a.

Rajendra Giri was killed in this action, and hence Safdar Jang started retreating.

3. Nuruddin f 11b

It says Najib was joined by about 8,000 men.

4. Ahmad Shahi f 75b-77b.

Nuruddin f 12a.

Imad-ul-mulk, the Mir Bakhshi, during the course of the struggle, had gathered together a large army under his command and hence the Emperor and his Wazir Intizam-ud-daula concluded peace, in order to save Safdar Jang from destruction and, if necessary, to use him as a check on the increasing power of the Bakhshi.¹

This action of the Emperor, however, brought no money to the empty Imperial Treasury. Najib Khan at once took advantage of the situation. The Bakhshi being directly responsible for the payment of the ~~xxx~~ arrears due to the army, he had a sharp dispute with Imad-ul-Mulk over the matter at the camp of Ballamgarh and won his direction the Rohillas surrounded Imad's tent thereby keeping him in confinement for two days.² The Emperor being informed of this, through the Bakhshi's agent was obliged to make a settlement and Najib Khan was given a Jagir consisting of his previous possessions in Rohilkhand and Saharanbur, the adjoining lands in the Doab. The Emperor also gave Najib Khan the title of Najib-ud-Daula and a panj-hazari (5,000) Mansab.³

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1. Siyar III p. 893 : Ahmad Shahi f 81b -85a.
 2. Nuruddin f 12a-12b and Qissai Ahwal-i-Rohilla f 37a-40a, say Najib-Khan was given the title and Mansab on his arrival at Delhi, but it seems unlikely.
Ahmad Shahi f 87a : Gulistan f 69a.
 3. Nuruddin f 8b and 12b: Ahmad Shahi f 88a.
Tawarikh-i-afaghana f 64b.

Najib Khan after this started for his Jagir (end of Nov.) plundering on his way.¹ Taking charge of his possessions he ruled in those parts quite independant of the Rohilkhand state. Nor did the Chiefs of Rohilkhand take any exception to the separate establishment of a state under Najib Khan, part of whose territories included Rohilkhand. On the contrary they regarded it as an accession of power to themselves, particularly as a check to the future aggressions of the Empire of Delhi.

The foreign policy of the Rohilkhand state from now onwards was the maintenance of the Status quo, in so far as the neighbouring states were concerned. Thus we shall see that in future whenever there was a threat of destruction either to the state of Najib Khan, the state of Farrukhabad, or the state of Oudh, the state of Rohilkhand, always came to their assistance. And as to the affairs of the Empire of Delhi the Rohilkhand State was not in the least concerned, even if the Marathas secured control of it. Thus, when they were forced to join the standard of Ahmadshah Abdali against the Marathas, their main concern was a peaceful settlement with the Marathas and the Afghan King and not the expulsion of the Marathas from Hindustan.

1. Tarikh-i-Ahmad shahi f 88a-88b.

Najib on the contrary was desirous of increasing his power and hence there was a sharp difference of policy between the Rohilkhand state and Najib Khan in future. Najib wanted to take advantage of the Abdali invasions, to get the control of Delhi by driving out the Marathas from Hindustan. But it was the affairs at Delhi which gave Najib Khan a chance to meddle in the politics of Hindustan. Imad-ul-mulk had forcibly secured the Wizarat from the Emperor with the help of the Marathas (3rd June, 1754) and then deposed Ahmad Shah on the same day enthroning Muhammad Aziz-ud-daula in his place, under the title of Alamgir II.¹ The new Wazir was after this occupied for the next seven months, settling the fabulous subsidy he had heedlessly promised to the Marathas when, hiring their arms to place him on the Wizarat.² The Marathas finally went back to the Deccan satisfied with the grant of some Mahals in the middle Doab. They also settled on their way at Garh Mukh~~h~~eshwar (on the bank of the Ganges) the money due from the Rohilkhand state since 1748 in lieu of the bond for fifty lakhs given to them.³

Imad after the departure of the Marathas turned his attention to his Badakshi troops who had all the time been creating disturbances in Delhi for the arrears of their pay. He sent them to subdue a rebel named Qutub Shah, in the Sirhind district.

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1. Ahmad Shahi f 135a -136a
 2. Tarikh-i-Alamgir II f 16b-21a.
 3. Faiz Bakhsh f 35b
Alamgir II f 36a-39b.

But the Badakshis were defeated by Qutub near Karnal (12th March, 1755).¹ This making it necessary for Imad to punish the rebel, he wrote to Najib Khan and Bahadur Khan Baluch to come to his assistance.² Najib Khan at once answered the Wazir's call and joined him outside Delhi, where he was encamped with the Emperor. The Wazir was joined by Bahadur Khan Baluch also. The combined army marched forward (14th April, 1755) but near Sonapat, news was brought that the rebel had been defeated by Adina Beg. Confirming Adina Beg in his new acquisition Imad moved on and reaching Panipat (20th April) summoned the defeated Badakshi Captains to muster their troops and receive payment according to the actual number of the men under arms. As a result of this on the 3rd May, a small body out of the Badakshis assembled at Panipat, handled the Wazir very severely. Thoroughly incensed, Imad, consummated a wholesale massacre of all the Badakshis on the same day, with the contingents of Najib Khan and Bahadur Khan. By thus forcibly disbanding his own army, Imad, from this time onwards was obliged to keep the contingents of Najib Khan and Bahadur Khan permanently in his employ.³

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1. Tarikh-i-alamgir II f 42b
Sarkar-Fall of the Mughal Empire II p. 34.
"The newly recruited (during the war between Ahmad Shah and Safdar Jang) body of central Asian mercenaries, called Badakshis, were 12,000 strong."
 2. Alamgir II f 43b-44b.

Bahadur Khan Baluch was given a Jagir in the Doab, at the same time as Najib Khan (Ahmad Shahi f. 88a.)

3. Alamgir II f. 48b-51a.

After this Najib Khan followed Imad to Delhi and on Imad's order he set out on a campaign against Surajmal Jat (29th June) to recover the lands of the Doab he had forcibly seized, although when Najib had only reached Dasna (26th July) peace was concluded between Imad and Surajmal through Nagarmal, the Diwan of the Crownlands.¹ He then followed Imad on his expedition to the Panjab (Dec. 1755 - June 1756). Having the Abdali agents driven out of Lahore by Adina Beg and leaving Sayyid Jamaluddin with 10,000 horsemen as his real deputy there, Imad turned back from Machiawara on the Satlaj (1st May) and reached Delhi at the end of June, 1756.² After this Imad, in order to break the tie of friendship between Shuja-ud-daula and Ahmad Khan Bangash, sent the latter an Imperial letter ~~xxxxxx~~ patent, which transferred to him the former's possession of Allahbad³. At this Shuja-ud-daula marched up with his army to the frontier of his state and Ahmad Khan Bangash being apprehensive of the safety of his own possessions sought the help of the Chiefs of Rohilkhand, who accordingly marched up with their army to Fatehgarh. Shuja apprehending an attack by Ahmad Khan and his allies sought the help of Surajmal Jat. When things were in this state an envoy from Ahmad Shah Abdali reached the capital to demand satisfaction for Imad's attack on the Punjab (October, 1756). Hence on the Wazir's request matters

1. Alamgir-i-Sani f. 54b-58b.

2. Idem f. 64a-66b.

3. Idem f. 79b.

were compromised between Shuja-ud-daula and Ahmad Khan Bangash ~~xxxxxxxx~~ through Najib Khan who got Ahmad ^{Khan} Bangash to publicly disavow all claims to the Allahbad province. (Nov. 1756.)¹.

Imad after this thought of opposing the invader in the same way as had been done in 1748 and accordingly asked Najib Khan to march up with him. But Najib Khan was not prepared to meet the enemy single handed and hence evaded the compliance off the order by demanding the arrears of pay due to his army, before he could do so.² The Rohilla, however, was prepared to serve his master if he could secure the assistance of some other power. Thus, to help ~~himself~~ Imad win over Surajmal Jat to his cause Najib, with the Wazir, envoy, interviewed the Jat Rajah at Tilpat, but nothing was accomplished owing to the Jat's insistence on a campaign against the Marathas before marching to resist the Afghan invader, and because of Imad's refusal to sacrifice the Marathas³. The Wazir still hopeful of Maratha help wrote several letters to them but in vain for they also demanded the payment of money in advance for the undertaking.⁴

Ahmad Shah Abdali, meanwhile enterering Lahore on the 20th December and crossing the Sutlej on the 10th January, 1767 1757, was marching towards Delhi. When Ahmad Shah Abdali

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1. Alamgir-i-Sani f. 83a.
 2. Idem f. 81b.
 3. Idem f. 82b-84a.
 4. Idem f. 85b-86a.

reached Narela (16th Jan.) Najib Khan, who had been posted outside the north gate of the capital at Wazirabad, went over on his own to the Abdali camp. Receiving the order of the Shah to reinforce his vanguard Jahan Khan at Luni, he came back to Wazirabad and on the 17th January, crossed over to Luni (on the bank of the Jumna.) ¹

Imad surrendered himself to Ahmad Shah Abdali in his camp at Badli (19th January) and he was henceforth carried as a captive in the Shah's train. The Emperor paid a visit to the Afghan King at Wazirabad, (26th January), when the Empire ~~Empire~~ was again bestowed on him. Occupying the Delhi fort on the 28th January, Abdali stayed there till the 22nd Feb., when he marched out to realise tribute from the Jat Raja. At Khizirabad, Abdali was joined by Najib Khan and Jahan ~~Khan~~ Khan. Then the combined forces continued their march. From a place six miles south of Ballabgarh, the Shah detached a vanguard of twenty thousand men under Najib Khan and Jahan Khan.² The vanguard was opposed by ten thousand Jat peasantry under Jawahar Singh, the son of Surajmal, outside the village of Chaumaha (28th February.) Defeating the Jats after a battle lasting nine hours the vanguard entered Mathura (1st March) and after plundering the town moved on.³

1. Alamgir-i-Sani f. 91a-93a.

2. Idem f. 93b-103b.

3. Idem f. 106a and 109b
Nuruddin f. 15b.

Ahmad Shah Abdali on the other hand, bombarding Babalgarh (3rd March) followed the van and reaching Mathura \times on the 15th March, encamped at Mahavan (six miles south-east of the city).¹ Here Abdali made up his plan. Deciding upon Agra as his base of operations against the Jats shut up in the forts of Dig and Kumbher, ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ he called back the vanguard and sent them to Agra. At the same time to punish Shuja-ud-daula, the only ruler of Hindustan who had not sent his Nazar to the Shah, a small force under ~~XXXXX~~ Jang Baz Khan, with two Sahibzadas (Royal Princes) and Imad-ud-Mulk was sent towards Farrukhabad with orders to march towards Oudh and Bengal, after it had been reinforced by the troops of Ahmad Khan Bangash and Sadulla Khan Rohilla.² But while this party was on its way and Najib Khan and Jahan Khan after capturing Agra (21st March) were still busy collecting money there, a cholera epidemic broke out at Mahavan. The Shah at once decided upon retiring to Afghanistan, and the vanguard being sent for, joined him on the 24th March. Leaving Mahavan on the 28th March, Ahmad Shah Abdali halted in the northern suburbs of Delhi for three days (31st March-2nd April), to

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1. Alamgir-i-Sani f. 103b - 105a and 109a.
Irvine-Indian Antiquary 1907 p. 58-59 and 61.
 2. Alamgir-i-Sani f. 106b and 109a
Irvine-Indian Antiquary pp 64-65.

bid farewell to the Emperor. Instructing Alamgir II to give the Wizarat to Imad-ul-Mulk and the Bakhshiship to Najib Khan, his supreme agent in India, the Afghan King marched away towards Afghanistan.¹

The Emperor after Abdali's departure, placed all the districts round the capital under Najib Khan, authorizing him to appoint his own collectors. The Rohilla at once took advantage of the situation and strengthened his position at Delhi by transferring to the capital a strong force from his own possessions. He also forcibly occupied the Maratha possessions in the middle Doab.²

Meanwhile, the party sent against Shuja-ud-daula with Imad-ul-Mulk, after being joined by Ahmad Khan Bangash (4th April) conquered the Maratha possessions in the lower Doab and after this were joined by the Chiefs of Rohilkhand who had marched up to the bank of the Ganges opposite Qadirganj (end of May). But the Chiefs of the Rohilkhand state, who had sent their Nazar to Ahmad Shah Abdali when he was at Delhi and had also marched to join the Sahibzadas sent with Imad according to Abdali's direction, had done, not to give offence to the Afghan King.³ But, if possible, they were not prepared to join in the destruction of the state of Oudh.

1. Alamgir-i-sani f. 109a and 115b.

Nuruddin f. 15b.

2. Alamgir-i-sani f. 120b

Nuruddin f. 15b.

33 Gulistan f. 72a and 72b.

Hence, they began to make excuses, after sending their puppet Nawab Sadulla Khan to Shuja's camp, on the plea that the Nawab had done so against their wishes. This made Imad-ul-Mulk and the Sahibzadas, agree to come to a peaceful settlement with Shuja-ud-daula on condition of the payment of a tribute and armed help for an expedition to Bengal. The negotiations for peace dragged on till the 17th June when, on the news of the arrival of a Maratha army at Kasganj, only two marches from Farrukhabad, the party suddenly broke up and the Sahibzadas returned to Delhi.¹

The Marathas occupied their outposts in the Doab without a blow, for the collectors of the Sahibzadas in the lower Doab fled away in panic, and Najib's agents withdrew quietly on his instructions from the middle Doab.²

At this time Imad-ul-Mulk, the Wazir, knowing that the control of Delhi had already passed into the hands of Najib Khan, at once sent his agent to the Marathas to win them over to his cause. He was helped in this by Ahmad Khan Bangash to whom he promised the post of Mir Bakhshi in the place of

1. Alamgir-i-sani f. 122b-123b and 127b.
Irvine - Indian Antiquary, 1907. pp. 68-69.
Gulistan f. 73a-74b, says that Shuja agreed to pay five lakhs to the Sahibzadas.
Faiz Bakhsh f. 44a-45a, says that Sadulla paid the five lakhs for Shuj to Sahibzadas.

2. Alamgir-i-sani f. 124b-125b and 128a-130a.

Najib and the Emperor whom Najib had alienated by appropriating the revenues of the Crownlands for himself and by his overbearing conduct.¹

The Marathas under Raghunath Rao and Mulhar Rao Holkar, were won over and being joined by Imad and Ahmad Khan Bangash near Delhi, attacked the capital on the 11th August, although they succeeded in plundering the old Delhi only.² The same day Najib Khan as a revenge had Imad's house in Delhi plundered and his zenana violated. The Marathas after a few days of futile attacks, carried the Rohilla trenches outside the ~~X~~ Kashmire Gate on the 25th August. But Najib from inside the fort still held out. Another attempt on Delhi was made on the 30th August and this also failing Mulhar Rao, with whom Najib had for some time been in correspondence and who had been constantly trying to bring about a settlement, finally succeeded in saving Najib Khan. On the promise of paying an indemnity of 5 la khs and of going back to his jagir < relinquishing his post of Mir Bakhshi to Ahmad Khan Bangash, Najib Khan was allowed to march out of Delhi safely (6th Sept)³.

1. Nuruddin f. 16a

2. Alamgir-i-sani f. 130a-135b.

Nuruddin f. 16a-17a

They also give the following detail about ~~xxxxxx~~ the seige.

Najib Khan avoided paying any money indemnity and going back to his possessions lived in open defiance of the Delhi Government and kept constantly writing to Ahmad Shah Abdali to come and expel the Marathas from Delhi.¹ Raghunath Rao and Mulhar Holkar, entering the Doab (22nd Oct.) ravaged Najib's possessions there and, leaving the Wazir's agents there marched towards the Panjab.² Conquering Lahore from the Abdali's agents (20th April, 1758) and leaving Adina Beg as their Governor there, the Marathas marched back to the Deccan, without entering the Doab. Najib Khan during the absence of the Marathas in the Panjab, drove out the Wazir's agents and took possession of his territories in the upper Doab. He also gave asylum to Prince Ali Gauhar (later on Shah Alam), who due to the hostility of Imad had been forced to run away from Delhi (August) and wrote to the Chiefs of Rohilkhand to come up with Shuja-ud-daula and join him in releasing the Emperor from the tyrannical domination of Imad.³ But the Chiefs of Rohilkhand were not prepared for a contest with the Marathas and hence gave him an evasive reply. This made Ali Gauhar leave Najib Khan and go to Shuj in Oudh in order to enlist his help.

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1. Nuruddin f. 19b.
 2. ~~xxx~~ Alamgir-i-sani f. 147a-151b.
 3. Idem f. 164a-165b.

Nuruddin f. 19b-21b.

Najib Khan, however, was not left in peace in his own possessions for long. Raghunath Rao's campaign in Hindustan had done nothing towards relieving the Peshwa's burden of debt. Hence Balaji Baji Rao, ordered ~~xxxx~~ Dattaji Sindhia and Jankoji Sindhia, then in Rajputana, on another expedition to Hindustan. The Peshwa's instruction to them ~~xxxxx~~ were to crush Najib Khan and take direct charge of the Panjab which was then in a state of confusion after Adina Beg's death (13th October). Imad-ul-Mulk was to be replaced as Wazir by Shuja provided the latter paid 50 lakhs in cash and ceded Allahbad. Failing this they were to invade Bengal with~~x~~ X the Emperor and the Wazir, to realise a tribute and attack Allahbad, but if Shuja agreed to cede Allahbad and Benares X and to pay a heavy Nazar, he was to be made ~~xxxxxx~~ Mir Bakhshi. If the Wazir refused to leave Delhi, then they were to persuade Shuja-ud-daula to join hands with them in an expedition to Behar and Bengal, by promising him half of the tribute to be realised and by taking from him only Benares and Allahbad but no money contribution.¹

Unfortunately for the Marathas Dattaji was a mere soldier and he had neither the temperament nor the intellect to carry out the task entrusted to him diplomatically. Reaching south-west of Delhi (26th December, 1758) he sent an ultimatum to the

1. Sarkar-Fall of the Mughal Empire II pp. 231-232. He gives ~~xxxx~~ a true translation of the letter of the Peshwa dated 23rd February, 1759.

Wazir demanding an immediate payment of the tribute due from him, if he wanted to save the capital from plunder. Then while the Wazir entrenched himself in the city and opened negotiations he went to Barari Ghat (4th Jan.) and detached a large force to plunder Najib's possessions in the Doab. Disappointed by Shuja-ud-daula's refusal to accept the Wizarat on the proposed terms, he came to a settlement with the Wazir about the tribute and marched towards the Panjab (1st Feb.)¹. Taking direct control of the Government of Lahore and leaving Sabaji Sindhia as his Governor there, he marched towards Delhi in May 1759. Reaching Samli he opened up negotiations with the Wazir with the object of persuading him to accompany with his army in the expedition to Behar and Bengal. But the Wazir began to make various excuses. Hence he decided to frighten the Wazir to comply with his request and marching to Baghpat, got Najib to visit him there by promising to spare him his possessions if he agreed to accompany him in the Bengal expedition and then sent an ultimatum to Imad-ul-Mulk (1st June) calling upon him to resign his post and to hand over the administration to him, threatening war in case of refusal. Dattaji's move had the desired effect and Imad at once agreed to accompany him to Behar and Bengal.²

1. Alamgir-i-sani f. 192a-198b.

Sarkar- Fall of the Mughal Empire II pp. 197-202.
 2. Idem p. 203, gives the details but seems to have misunderstood Dattaji's ultimatum to Imad.

Dattaji, after this turned his attention to bring about Najib Khan's ruin and coming back to Samli with the Rohilla, ^A plotted to imprison him during a friendly interview. The plot miscarried, because Najib's officers forced their way into Dattaji's tent along with their Chief, and Dattaji terminated the inter-view very quickly. Najib Khan a shrewd observer at once guessed Dattaji's evil intentions and returning to his camp marched away to Saharanpur. ¹ Dattaji now decided upon open war, and marching to the homes of the Barha Sayyids (near Muzaffarnagar), to be joined by these hereditary enemies of the Rohillas, demanded cession of certain parganas in Saharanpur from Najib Khan, and on Najib's refusal to alienate any of his possessions, although willing to pay a fixed tribute, Dattaji opened the war by sending detachments to occupy Najib's outposts in the Doab. Najib Khan ordered his agents to withdraw and entrenched himself at Sakartai, a sunken piece of land on the right bank of the ^X Ganges, about 16 miles east of the city of Muzaffarnagar (end of June). At the same time he wrote letters to the Chiefs of Bahilkhand and to Shuja-ud-daula asking for their [✓] assistance against the Marathas. ²

1. Nuruddin f. 22a-22b.

Tawarikh-i-Afaghana f. 66b, says Dattaji after settling affairs with Imad turned to destroy Najib.

2. Alangir-i-sani f. 209a-209b. : Nuruddin f. 22b-23a. Sarkar- Fall of the Mughal Empire II, p. 205.

The entire eastern flank of Sakartai for many miles above and below was protected by the broad waters of the Ganges and its network of channels parted by sandy islands, while a bend in the Salani (a feeder of the Ganges) formed an effective natural cover on the northern side. At the same time the north-west, ~~and~~ south and south-east was covered with innumerable tortuous ravines, sloping down to the river, the loose sandy bed and sides of which, not only rendered the terrain impossible for cavalry but also afforded the infantry with an excellent opportunity to prepare an ambush. Thus the only side from which an enemy could assault the place was the west and part of the south-west, along which stretched the edge of the upland, running north to south parallel to the river.¹ Najib fortified this side by forming entrenchments and redoubts and mounting guns and posting his sharpshooters at carefully selected points. To ensure a regular supply of provisions, Najib threw a bridge of boats over the Ganges south-east of his entrenchments.² The rainy season having set in, it was not even possible for the enemy to cross the river and carry the fortified bridgehead on the left bank, for

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1. N. W. P. Gaz. III pp. 444-446 and 641-642.
Sarkar- Fall of the Mughal Empire II p. 206.
 2. Nuruddin f. 22b.

~~for~~ at least three months.

Dattaji followed Najib to Sakartal in a few days and encamping two miles west of it besieged the place. After days of fruitless skirmishes between the two parties, an engagement finally took place on the 15th September in which the Marathas suffered heavy losses.¹ After this the siege lingered on without any serious attempt from the Maratha side ~~X~~ till 20th October when the river being fordable, Dattaji detached 10,000 horse under Govind Ballal, which crossing the Ganges a little below Hardwar (22 miles north of Sakartal) captured Sakalgarh, and then marched to attack Najibgur, where ~~X~~ the family and belongings of Najib Khan and his followers had been lodged. But when Govind Ballal, had only reached Jalalabad (8 miles west of Najibgur), the fort of Najibgur ~~X~~ had been reinforced by a large army under the Chiefs of Rohilkhand and so he marched to the bridgehead opposite Sakartal and encamping there cut off the food supply of the besieged. This caused great distress among the Rohillas at Sakartal and hence the Chiefs of Rohilkhand tried to persuade Najib Khan to come to a settlement with the Marathas ². But Najib Khan refused to do so and held on with a grim tenacity.

1. Nuruddin f. 23b-24b : Alamgir-i-sani f. 210a.
Sarkar - Fall etc. II pp. 207-8.

2. Nuruddin f. 25b-26a : Gulistan f. 78b.

Faiz Bakhsh f. 46b-47a.

till ^{the} 11th day when the Oudh vanguard of 10,000 men under Umrao-Gir and Anup-Gir Gosain (3rd Nov.) surprised Govind Ballal and his party, part of which survived to cross over to the other side.¹ A few days after this Shuja himself arrived on the opposite bank in full strength. This sudden appearance of Shuja at Sakartal was evidently due to his reliance on the information conveyed to him by Najib Khan regarding the future plans of the Marathas.

On the arrival of Shuja-ud-daula, there was consternation in the Maratha camp and Dattaji appealed to Surajmal Jat and Ahmad Khan Bangash for help. The Jat Raja and the Bangash Nawab replied promptly. On the 8th November, 5,000 Jat troops joined Dattaji and Ahmad Khan Bangash arrived there at the same time.² But along with this fresh hope for Dattaji, came the confirmation of the news of Ahmad Shah Abdali's march by the arrival of the fugitive Governor of the Panjab in his camp.³ Dattaji was completely bewildered, for if he raised the siege without even realising an indemnity, he dared not show his face in Puna. He accordingly took advantage of the offer made by Shuja at this time, to act as a peace-maker, and demanded twenty five lakhs as indemnity from Najib Khan.

1. Sarkar- Fall of the etc. II pp. 209-210.
Nuruddin f. 26a-26b.

2. Sarkar- Fall of the etc. II pp. 212.

3. Idem. p. 211.

At the same time he summoned Mulhar Holkar from Rajputana and the Wazir from Delhi.¹

While the two sides were deciding on the sum to be paid as an indemnity, Imad-ul-Mulk, at the confirmation of the news of Abdali's march had had both the Emperor Alangir II and Intizam-ud-daula the Ex-Wazir murdered, before his march to join the Marathas at Sakartal.² This hastened the advance of the Afghan King and when on the 23rd November, 5,000 troopers, the sole remnant of 6,000 Marathas posted at Multan, straggled into Dattaji's camp with the news of Abdali's near approach, Dattaji was obliged to raise the siege on the 8th December and march northwards to meet the invader.³ He was joined by the Wazir near Muzaffarnagar.

Najib Khan abstained from attacking the retiring army and when the news of Ahmad Shah's arrival at Buria and Mustafabad reached him, he marched forward to meet Abdali, sending him urgent messages to cross over the Jumna before ~~making~~ giving a meeting to the Marathas on the other side of the Jumna.⁴

Ahmad Shah Abdali's vanguard had to give battle to the Marathas' vanguard near Taraori (south-east of Thaneshwar) in which the Afghans had the better of the enemy. (24th December).⁵

1. Sarkar- Fall of the etc. II. p. 212.

2. Alamgir-i-sani f. 214a-215a.

3. Sarkar- Fall of the etc. II. p. 216.

4. Nuruddin f. 27b-28a.

5. Sarkar- Fall of the etc. II. p. 218.

But during the following night the entire Abdali army according to Najib's instructions, ~~forwards~~ forded the Jumna near Buria (18 miles n.w. of Saharanpur) and joined Najib Khan near Mirat.¹ The combined army now marched down the east bank of the Jumna towards Delhi, Najib Khan acting as ~~x~~ the vanguard. Being reinforced only by the Chiefs of Rohilkhand on their way, because Shuja had gone back home from Sakartal, the Afghan army encamped at Luni (6 miles northeast of Delhi in the Doab.)²

Dattaji quickly fell back towards Delhi, and halting at Sonapat for five days (29th December → 2nd January, 1760), to watch the movements of the enemy, finally encamped at Barari (10 miles north of Delhi). Here, early in the morning of the 9th January, 1760, the 7,000 Marathas under Sabaji, who were guarding the Barari Chat, were attacked by the combined army, Najib leading the van. Dattaji came up and joined in the action but was killed. The final attempt was made by Jankoji who had been posted 16 miles behind ~~the~~ Dattaji, but he was also wounded, whereupon the Marathas fled away in panic.³

After this victory, Ahmad Shah Abdali, marched forward towards Delhi, Najib Khan acting as his medium in his dealings with the Chiefs of Hindustan.⁴ Without ~~entering~~ entering Delhi,

1. Nuruddin f. 29a : Sarkar II, p. 219.

2. Nuruddin f. 29b : Gulistan f 79b.
Faiz Bakhsh f. 47b-48a.

3. Nuruddin f. 29b-30b.

4. Idem f. 31a.

~~Xixhsnk~~

the combined army passed on and encamped at Khizirabad (14th January), and demanded tribute from Surajmal Jat and the Rajput Chiefs. When Surajmal delayed to comply with the demand, Najib Khan prevailed on the Abdali to attack him (27th January). Accordingly the Jat fortress of Dig was laid siege to (6th February).¹

Meanwhile, the Maratha fugitives from B Barari who had taken refuge in the Jaipur Kingdom, being joined by Mulhar Holker from Rajputana (15th January) had marched forward in light order to harass the enemy's flanks and make lightning raids on their grain depots and revenue collection offices.² But near ~~xhs~~ Dig they were surprised at night by a detachment of Afghan troops (11th February) and hence they suddenly turned towards the Doab, to plunder Najib Khan's possessions there. The Abdali left Dig ~~and~~ in pursuit of them but when he was at Dankot (20 miles southwest of Delhi) the Marathas had crossed the Jumna. He marched forward and from Wazirabad sent Najib Khan and Jahan Khan across the Jumna against the enemy. Najib and Jahan surprised the Marathas at Sikandrabad (4th March), obliging them to cross back and take refuge with the Jat Raja. The Abdali soon followed and the entire army laid siege to the Jat fort of Ramgarah (near Aligarh) on the 26th March, which surrendered after 15 days.³

1. Sarkar II p. 227

2. Idem pp. 224-225.

3. Idem pp. 227-229. 272-273.

Surajmal became alarmed and sent an agent to the Abdali, to sue for terms (26 April). The Shah demanded 45 lakhs. But the Jat king encouraged by the news of the advance of a large army under the Peshwa's ^{Cousin} Sadasiv Rao Bhanu from the Deccan, began to waste time in useless negotiations¹. The news of this Maratha advance finally reached the Abdali camp. Najib Khan begged the Shah to stay and crush the Marathas. He paid Ahmad Shah ten lakhs in cash to meet his war expenses, and promised to undertake the responsibility of supplying the provisions for his army during his stay in the Doab.² At the same time Hafiz Rahmat Khan, the representative of the Rohilkand State advised Ahmad Shah Abdali to come to terms with the Marathas. Ahmad Shah Abdali preferred ~~to~~ the latter course and sent Hafiz Rahmat Khan to Mathura (16 May) to open negotiations with Surajmal Jat and the Marathas.³ But, as a precaution, he sent Najib Khan and Jahan Khan to Shuja-ud-daula to win him over to the Afghan cause.

The efforts of Hafiz Rahmat Khan at Bharatpur, where he had been conducted by Surajmal Jat and Gangadher Yaswant (Holkar's diwan) from Mathura, produced no result, as the Maratha

1. Sarkar II, p.273.

2. Sarkar II, pp.273-74. : Nuruddin, f.32a, He does not give the exact page.

3. Sarkar, ^{II} / pp.229-274.

demands were exorbitant. In fact, the Marathas were determined upon a revenge and had accordingly sent letters through special ambassadors to Shuja-ud-daula to join their cause¹.

Shuja-ud-daula, however, remembering that the Marathas had been the constant friend of Imad-ul-Mulk, the mortal enemy of the house of Oudh; and that during their last campaign, they had openly demanded the surrender of his most lucrative cities of Allahabad and Benares, decided to throw in his lot with the Abdalli invader, whom he knew would return to Afghanistan after the victory, leaving the Delhi Government in the hands of his Indo-Muslim supporters. Then when Najib Khan reached Kanauj, Shuja came up to the opposite bank at Mehdiganj. Najib Khan waited on him with the Abdali's letter. Shuja after a long discussion agreed that if Najib could bring for him a signed safe conduct and the robe of investiture as imperial wazir, from Ahmad Shah Abdali, he would join the Afghan cause. Najib Khan returned to Koil (beginning of June) and the Shah complied with Shuja's request. Shuja ^{ud-daula} ~~Abdulla~~, after an attempt to go towards Behar and join Shah Alam who had been defeated by the troops of the East India Company, finally marched out at the head of seven thousand horsemen and a devoted Gosain corps, early in July and reaching Anupshahar, was presented to the Shah

1. Sarkar, II, pp.246-47, 275.

on the 18th July¹. The Shah had also been joined by this time by Ahmad Khan Bangash, through the mediation of Hafiz Rahmat Khan who had reached the Abdali camp from Bharatpur about the 20th June.²

But towards the end of July there was a scarcity of food in the Abdali Camp, because they had consumed by that time all they had been able to procure from the Doab. It should be remembered that this tract had constantly been ravaged since 1756. Provisions had to be transported at heavy cost from distant places and hence the few lakhs that had been paid by Najib were nearly exhausted. The chiefs of Rohilkhand and Ahmad Khan Bangash, pleading poverty when asked for a contribution, were allowed to send their army home until October, when campaigning would once more be possible.³ The Shah then turned for contribution to Shuja-ud-daula and the request being a veiled threat of extortion, there was a rupture between Shuja and Najib, because the latter was responsible for bringing him within Abdali's clutches.⁴

1. Sarkar II, pp.276-78.

2. Idem, II, p.274, gives the date of the return of Hafiz. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.82a, says Hafiz introduced both Ahmad Khan Bangash and Shuja to Ahmad Shah Abdali, but only part of it seems to be true for we suddenly find Ahmad Khan Bangash with Abdali after this.

Nuruddin, f.32b. only says - that Najib called Shuja from Lucknow and introduced him to Ahmad Shah.

3. Sarkar, II, pp.279-80.

4. Sarkar, II, pp.280-81.

Shuja accordingly persuaded Ahmad Shah Abdali to come to a settlement with the Marathas and offered his services as a peacemaker. The Shah agreeing to it, Shuja sent a letter to Bhau, through an agent, Raja Devidat. The proposals were that Shah Alam should be recognised as Emperor, his eldest son Jawan Bakht, installed in the Government of Delhi as heir apparent, Shuja appointed as Wazir, Nahib Khan confirmed in his possessions in the Doab and that Abdali should return to his own country and the Marathas to the Deccan.¹

The policy of Bhau had, from the nature of the Peshwa's instructions, from the very beginning, been one of alliance or neutrality with Shuja. Arriving on the 8th June on the north bank of the Chambal (20 miles south of Agra) inspite of the news he received that Shuja had decided to join the Afghans, (4 July) he planned to send across the Jamna an army to enforce Shuja's neutrality, but the flooding of the river prevented him from doing so. This had forced him to fall in with the plans of Surajamal and Imad-ul-mulk, and with them he had taken possession of Delhi. (2 August).² It was here that Shuja's proposals reached him. He had no idea of coming to any terms with the Abdali, but he wanted to try and win over Shuja and hence encouraged the negotiations. But Surajmal and Imad, whose plans were

1. Sarkar, II, p.255.

2. Idem, pp.247-49, 252-55.

Nuruddin, f.33a.

quite contrary to the interests of Shuja, angered by Bhau's conduct, left the Maratha camp in disgust without even taking leave of Bhau. (3 Aug.).¹

But the trouble in the Abdali camp began to grow worse daily. In addition to the famine prices raging in his camp, the usually unhealthy monsoons in the Doab, began to carry away large numbers of the Abdali's horses, mules and camels. The fall of Delhi, discouraged the chiefs of Rohilkhand and Ahmad Khan Bangash, who began to intrigue secretly with Bhau. The followers of the Shah, apprehensive of the loyalty of their allies, were frightened of the Marathas and began constantly pressing him to go back home. But, inspite of all this, Najib's resourcefulness and the Shah's iron will and influence over his troops triumphed and kept the entire army in order.²

The reports of these troubles in the Abdali Camp and the secret overtures of Shah's Indo-Muslim allies, except Najib Khan, who was afraid of meeting the Afghans in the open field, led Bhau to believe that he could starve the Shah and thus oblige him to leave Hindustan.³ Accordingly, to block the crossing of Bararighat, he encamped near Badli (12 Aug.)⁴. But Bhau had

1. Sarkar, II, p.255.

2. Sarkar, II, pp.280-81, 259-61.

Extracts from letters of Govind Ballol, the Maratha collector at Etawa are given in it.

3. Idem, p.258.

4. Idem, p.267.

not reckoned ~~not reckoned~~ with his own financial position and the difficulties of food supply when he took this step and by the 16th September, there was starvation in his own camp.¹ His position was so precarious by the 10th October that he decided upon marching northwards to capture Kanjpura, then in the hands of ^{Najibat} ~~Najib~~ Khan Rohilla, a protege of Najib, for the town, which commanded the ferry over the Jumna, and formed a convenient half-way house for the provisions of the Afghans from ~~xxx~~ Sirhind if it fell into his hands, would not only cut off the enemy food supply but also give him ~~the~~ provisions that were in store/^{there.}

He carried Kanjpura by assault on the 16th October and captured large supplies of provisions and cash.²

But the fall of Kanjpura forced the hands of the Abdali. He at once broke up his camp and marched northwards (20 Oct.) and arriving within eight miles of Baghpat, halted to find a suitable ford. After three days search they were successful and another three days/^{was} spent for the crossing of the whole army. The combined army now marched along the west bank of the river (27th) and reached Sambhalka (12 miles south of Panipat) on the 31st October³. Bhau meanwhile, hearing that Abdali had crossed over

1. Sarkar II, pp.261-62.

2. Sarkar II, pp.267-70. : Nuruddin, f.34a-35b.

3. Nuruddin, f.35b-38a. : Sarkar II, pp.282-84.

and was marching towards him, had moved down to meet the enemy, and reaching Panipat (29 Oct.) had halted there to learn of the enemy's movements. On the 1st November, the Abdali advanced and encamped at a distance of seven miles from the enemy.¹

The Shah allowed the Maratha foragers to carry away his stray cattle for the first few days, without making any attempt to stop it. Taking this as a sign of the timidity of the enemy, Bhau decided upon entrenching himself at Panipat (5th Nov.). Up to the 6th Dec, the Marathas controlled the open country and had even made two minor attacks on the Afghans though without any success (19th November and 22nd November). But Bhau was not in a hurry; he was waiting for Govind Ballal, whom he had ordered to advance up the Doab, to cut off the enemy food supply and to plunder Najib's possessions.²

The news of Govind Ballal's advance at the head of the ten thousand men from Etawa, caused consternation among the Najib Rohillas for the safety of their defenceless homes. The result was a sudden outburst of daring by them in the evening of the 7th Dec. They penetrated right into the Maratha trenches, killing Balwant Rao, Mehendele, the most capable officer of Bhau, but they were finally driven off.³ The battle nevertheless

1. Nuruddin, f.38a-38b. : Sarkar II, pp. 227-72, p284.
 2. Sarkar, II, pp.298-300, pp.301-3.
 3. Idem, pp. 304-5: Nuruddin, f.42b-43a.

proved to be the turning point in the Panipat campaign. The absence of any capable commander, in the Maratha camp, immediately led to the establishment of the Afghan supremacy in the open, for the Shah getting encouraged, now took the initiative and appointed three Cavalry patrols of at least 5,000 each, under experienced leaders like Jahan Khan, Shah Pasand Khan and Bahadur Khan to keep a constant watch on the Maratha entrenchment and stop all food supplies from getting in there.¹ Then/in a few days a fresh reinforcements of 5,000 horse reached Shah's camp from Qandahar, under Atai Khan and Karimdad Khan. This body was at once sent with a Captain of Najib Khan towards Govind Ballal, who was then in the middle Doab. The Afghan detachment, reaching the Maratha camp between Shahdara and Balalabad by forced marches, surprised Govind Ballal on the morning of the 17th December and killed him.²

On receiving the news of this disaster (21 Dec.) Bhau appealed to Shuja-ud-daula to arrange a peace at any price between him and the Shah. Shuja-ud-daula and Hafiz Rahmat Khan succeeded in winning over the Shah's Wazir, Shah Wali Khan, to accept a large ransom from Bhau. But in the Shah's Council chamber, Najib Khan by taking advantage of the fanaticism of the Afghans, had

1. Sarkar II, pp.305-7.

Gulistan, f.87a. It says the patrols consisted of 6,000 men each.

2. Sarkar, II, pp.311-12. : Nuruddin, f.45b-46a.
Gulistan, f.86a-86b.

the Wazir's pacific advice rejected.¹

Finally on the 14th January 1761, because of the state of his starving army, Bhau was forced to come out of his trenches and give battle. The battle began early in the morning and by three o'clock in the afternoon the Marathas had been completely defeated. Bhau was killed, Madhaji Sindhia wounded and Mulhar Holkar fled away without taking any active part in the battle. The Maratha fugitives from the battlefield took refuge in the Jat Kingdom.²

The victorious army now marched towards Delhi and entered it on the 29th January 1761. The Shah had only been a month and a half in the Capital, when his soldiers began to clamour for their arrears of pay. Najib Khan advised Ahmad Shah Abdali, to solve his problems by realising a tribute from the Jat Raja. After fruitless negotiations, the Abdali, detached a large army under Shah ^{wali} Khan and Prince Jawan Bakht to march against and put pressure on Surajmal (8 March). But the soldiers, remembering the plague which had broken out there four years before, refused to proceed to the Mathura region.³

1. Sarkar, II, p.313, pp 316-17.

Nuruddin, f.43b-45b. Najib represented that the present war was a Jihad or holy war, which was incumbent on all true Muslims.

2. Sarkar II, pp.318-54. : Nuruddin, f.46b-52b.

3. Sarkar II, pp.374-76.

Nuruddin, f.52b-54b.

Ahmad Shah Abdali, after this, decided upon returning to Afghanistan and recalled the army. But the Abdali wanted to put the affairs of the Empire of Delhi on such a footing as would ensure for him a regular tribute. Two things were necessary for this, namely, the maintenance of Najib Khan at Delhi and secondly, peace between Najib Khan and the opposite party consisting of Imad-ul-Mulk, Surajmal and the Marathas. Accordingly his final instructions before his departure (20 March) were that Imad-ul-Mulk was to be the Wazir and Najib Khan the Mir Bakhshi, that these two were to bury their old rivalry and co-operate with each other and that the representatives of all the powers of Hindustan were to meet at a place and settle terms with the Marathas. And of the Maratha possessions in the Doab, Etawa ~~xxx~~ was given to Enayat Khan, the son of Hafiz Rahmat Khan, Shahjahanabad to Dundi Khan, Mirat to Najib Khan, and Kora and Karra, to Shuja-ud-daula.¹

But no sooner was the Abdali's back turned than Najib Khan, by taking advantage of the dread of Imad among the royal family

1. Qissai Ahwal-i-Rohilla, f.54a, also gives the grant of the middle Doab to Najib.

Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.96a, mentions the grant to Dundi Khan and Enayat Khan only.

Nuruddin, f.53b, 54a and 56a only say that Imad-ul-Mulk was sent the Wazir's robe by Ahmad Shah. He also says the Maratha possessions in the middle Doab, i.e. Mirat, came into Najib's possession after the Abdali's return.

Faiz-Bakhsh, f.58b, mentions besides the grant to Enayat and Dundi, that to Shuja.

Sarkar II, pp.378-80.

obtained from Prince Jawan Bakht a rescript giving him the charge of the Capital (7 April).¹

Thus when the Abdali's agent, reaching Mathura (19 April) gave Imad the robe of Wazir and summoning the representatives of Rohilkhand Oudh and Farrukhabad, started discussions about the peace, with the Marathas' agents present there, Suraj Mal and Imad-ul-mulk, were bent upon securing the control of Delhi, to the total exclusion of Najib. This gave the representatives of Oudh and Rohilkhand a good chance to break up the peace congress after two months of futile talk because their States would have had to surrender part of their possessions to the Marathas before any peace could have been concluded.²

Henceforth, the titular Wazir's hope of ousting Najib from Delhi entirely disappeared for the Jat who had already taken possession of the fort of Agra, without any opposition from Najib, refused to fight for Imad single-handed. Thus Najib henceforth remained not only Mir Makhshi, but also Governor of the Metropolitan district and Regent (Mukhtar) of the Imperial administration.³

1. Nuruddin, f.54b-55b.

Sarkar II, p.377.

2. Sarkar II, pp.380-81. It seems likely that the Marathas were unwilling to come to terms unless their possessions in the Doab were restored to them. The Nawab of Oudh had Kora and Karra. The chiefs of Rohilkhand had Etawa and Shakohabad.

3. Sarkar II, pp.378 and 382.
Nuruddin, f.55b.

In November 1761 Najib Khan engaged himself in subduing his refractory zamindars in the Hansi-Hisar country, from where on Abdali's summons, he went to the Sarhind Patiala country to help him in punishing the Sikhs (Feb. 1762). After two months with the Abdali, he came back to Delhi¹. But early next October he was again called by the Abdali to Lahore to settle the affairs of the Empire. The agents of Shah Alam, the Marathas, the Chiefs of Rohilkhand and Ahmad Khan Bangash, were also present there. It was decided that Shah Alam should be installed at Delhi, that Shuja should be his Wazir and that forty lakhs a year should be paid to the Afghan King as tribute for which Najib was held responsible. Najib Khan then returned to Delhi (18 Jan. 1763).²

Shuja, on receiving the instructions of the Abdali, marched with the Emperor to instal him at Delhi. The chiefs of Rohilkhand on the Emperor's summons, joined his standard but Ahmad Khan Bangash, did not put in his appearance. Hence when the party was at Sikandrabad, Shuja advised the Emperor to annex the territories of the Nawab of Farruhkabad for his rebellious conduct, but the Rohilla chiefs were against any such step

1. Sarkar II, p. 378.

Nuruddin, f. 56a and 57b.

2. Sarkar II, pp. 387-88.

Nuruddin, f. 56b-57b. He says Ahmad Shah gave the robe for the kingship to Shah Alam and Wizarat to Shuja-ud-daula, but Shah Alam was already Emperor and hence it probably means, particularly because of the Emperor's march for Delhi, after receiving it, his installation at Delhi.

and hence Shuja sent pressing invitations to Najib to come to Sikandrabad. Najib quickly arrived in the Imperial Camp and successfully persuaded the Nawab of Oudh to abandon his hostile design against the Bangash Chief. After this Najib fell ill in this Camp and had not recovered properly when ^athe dispute broke out between Shuja's Shia~~n~~ troops and his Sunni Afghans. Hence Najib left the Emperor hurriedly (16 May) and marched back home, where he had a long stay to recover his health. The Rohilla chiefs returned to their homes also. The Emperor finding himself thus left without the united support of all his vassal chiefs, gave up the idea of a return to Delhi, and turned back to Allahabad.¹

Najib Khan had just recovered his health, when he was suddenly called to Delhi (December) by Surajmal's attack on the Baluch zamindars. The campaign ended in Najib Khan making a successful night attack on the Jats, in which Surajmal was killed (25 December 1763).² But in November 1764, Surajmal's son Jawahar Singh, with his own army and hired Sikh, Maratha and Gosain troops, attacked Najib. The Rohilla, sending his wakils both to the chiefs of Rohilkhand and to Abdali in Qandahar for

1. Sarkar II, pp.385-89. : Nuruddin, f.57b-60a. He does not mention Najib's illness, or the outbreak of hostilities between Shia~~n~~s and Sunnis.

Imad-u-Saadat, p.88-91.: Ain-i-Alam Shahi, f.217a.-225b.

2. Nuruddin, f.66a-70b. : Idem, f.236a-242b.

help entrenched himself in Delhi. The chiefs of Rohilkhand marched out to Najib's help, but hearing of the size of the enemy army, halted at Daranagar to wait for future developments. Najib Khan on the other hand in spite of the repeated attacks of the enemy, held out, till the 4th February, when the news of the Abdali advance to his help and Mulhar Holkar's intervention brought about a peace between him and Jawahar Singh.¹

Abdali, in response to Najib's appeal had reached Mustafabad Buria (25 miles south-east of Ambala) in February 1765, when Najib had already made peace with the enemy. Najib marched up to meet him but Abdali did not wait and hurried back to his own country.²

Relieved of the danger from the Jats, Najib now engaged himself in subduing the turbulent zamindars in the north of Delhi. He perpetrated such a massacre at the village of Suana (April 1765) that the whole of Harina quickly submitted and paid their revenue.³

1. Nuruddin, f.74b-92b.

Ain-i-Alam Shahi, f.274a-251a.

Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.69a. It mentions the march of the chiefs of Rohilkhand to Daranagar.

Tarikh-i-Afaghani - f.69b, says The Rohillas, thinking it inadvisable to go forward, stopped at Daranagar.

2. Nuruddin, f.92b. : Ain-i-Alam Shahi, f.252a.

3. Idem, f.93a-97b.

After this Najib Khan went to Najibgur via Delhi, on the news of the illness of his wife, who died, leaving two sons, named Kallu and Malhu.

In October 1765 Najib returned to Delhi and immediately turned to the subjugation of the peasantry west of the capital. After ~~xxx~~ covering the Hisar districts he had turned to Rohtak, when the news of a Sikh raid in the Saharanpur district, obliged him to march thither.¹

The Sikhs had already visited the Doab in 1764, but fear of the Jats had forced Najib to buy them off by paying 11 lakhs of rupees. But the Sikh invasion this time (nov.1765) was rather a formidable one, and it took Najib six months of constant campaigning to drive them out (April 1766).²

In the beginning of 1767 Ahmad Shah abdali entered the Panjab and summoned Najib to pay seven years/^{arrears} of tribute of Hindustan. Najib interviewed him on the 9th March at Ismailabad (20 miles south of Ambala), when the envoys of Rohilkhand and the Jat Raja also waited on the Abdali.³

Najib Khan marched with the Abdali on his campaign against the Sikhs (17 March) in the Jalandar Doab. A part of the Sikh

1. Sarkar II, pp.394-401. He mentions the payment of 11 lakhs on Marathi authority.

Nuruddin - f.100b-109b.

3. Nuruddin, f.110a-112b.

Sarkar II, pp.494-501, gives the details of Ahmad Shah's campaign against the Sikhs.

21. Nuruddin, f.98b-100a.

army managed to reach Najib's possessions in the Doab, but they were crushed at Mirat by a combined Durrani (8,000, Jahan Khan) and Rohilla (5,000 under Zabeta Khan), contingents. (15 May).¹ But the campaign against the Sikhs were Abdali out and he finally decided to keep only Peshawa and the country west of Attock and leave the rest of the Panjab to the Sikhs. Najib promised to pay 25 lakhs to the Abdali and then returned to Delhi.²

Najib Khan spent the following winter at Aonla, where he celebrated his son Kallu Khan's marriage with the daughter of Sadulla Khan.

Then returning to Delhi, he had to face a Sikh invasion of Karnal and the suburbs of Delhi.³ He had not been well throughout this year and his health was completely broken, so he shrank from another campaign against the Sikhs and handed over the charge of his army and territory to Zabeta Khan (march 1768), and came to Najibgur to lead a retired life. Zabeta came to terms with the Sikhs by money payment.⁴ After this things were quiet in Hindustan till the Marathas, early in 1770, invaded it.

1. Nuruddin, f.111a-112b.

2. Sarkar, II, pp.500-1, 402.

Nuruddin, f.113a.

3. Nuruddin, f.113a-113b.

4. Idem, f.114a-115a.

CHAPTER VII.

Rohilla policy during the Maratha invasion of Hindustan,
1770-1773.

Towards the end of 1769 A.D. the Peshwa, Madhu Rao, decided to restore the Maratha authority in Hindustan which had been eclipsed for nearly a decade as a result of the defeat at Panipat and to recover the Maratha jagirs in the Doab. Accordingly a large army under Ramchandar Ganesh, Visaji Krishna Biniwala, Tukoji Holkar and Madhaji Sindhia was ordered to advance towards Hindustan. Ramchandar¹ who had been given the ensign of authority by the Peshwa, before advancing north of the river Chambal, despatched letters calling upon all the chiefs of Hindustan to present themselves ^{to} and pay tribute ^{and} to release the Maratha jagirs they had usurped since 1761². At the same time to facilitate a quick march to Delhi he wrote to the Jat Regent, Nawab Singh, offering him their friendship for a tribute of five lakhs of rupees only.³

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1. Select Committee Proceedings, 1st March 1771. Letter - Sir Robt. Barker, Benares, 13 Feb. 1771. Tukoji, Madhaji and Visaji (Peshwa's Diwan) had their own contingents, but the army of the Peshwa, which numbered more than half of the entire Maratha army, was under the command of Ramchandar Ganesh, the Peshwa's deputy.
 2. Sarkar - Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol II, p. 406: Nuruddin, 11151
 3. Select Committee Proceedings, 28 April 1770. Paper of Intelligence despatched by Primrose Gailliez from Allahabad.

The first news of the Maratha advance was received by Najib Khan through a private letter from Tukoji Holkar, in which he had asked the Rohilla to continue the friendship that had previously subsisted between him and the Holkar^{family}. Najib wrote back to Tukoji saying "I have for a long time past renounced the world on account of age and made Zabeta Khan my heir and supreme agent. He will not deviate from your Council."¹ But he was alarmed just the same, for he knew, that the Marathas were coming up, after a preparation of ten years, to avenge Panipat, for which he had been mainly responsible. He accordingly busied himself in negotiations with the other powers who had fought the Marathas in 1761, in order to present a united front to the enemy.

But the situation in 1770 A.D. was entirely different from that of 1761 A.D. The chiefs of Rohilkhand, the Bangash Nawab of Farrukhabad and the Nawab of Oudh, had been prompted to join the anti-Maratha coalition in 1761 because of the presence in Hindustan of a strong Afghan army under Ahmad Shah Abdali. But in 1770 Abdali was on his deathbed in Afghanistan. Further Shuja-ud-Daula, the Nawab of Oudh, whose interests were closely connected with the English government at Calcutta, was in no such danger of Maratha aggression in 1770 as he had been in 1761. In fact,

1. Sarkar - Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol.II, p.406.
Nuruddin, f.115b-116a.

Shuja-ud-daula, having no apprehensions regarding his own safety in 1770¹, was determined to profit by the situation. Thus, instead of joining hands with Najib Khan, Shuja encouraged the chief of Rohilkhand and the Nawab of Farrukhabad to form a plan contrary to that ^{of} ~~Najib Khan~~.²
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Thus Qasim/Khan, the ex-Nawab of Bengal and Imad-ul-Mulk, the ex-Wazir, being encouraged by the chiefs of Rohilkhand and the Nawab of Farrukhabad, came out of their retirement and began to enlist troops in the territory of the Raja of Gohad.³ Their plan was to raise a good army, hire the Sikhs, then in the Jat territory, on the invitation of a faction under Ranjat Singh, the brother of the Jat Regent, Nawal Singh, and then invite the Marathas to join them in an expedition against the English, to release the Emperor, Shah Alam, and perhaps to establish Qasim Ali Khan in Bengal for large concessions. But shortage of ready money led to the sudden collapse of their affairs⁴ and the Sikhs

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1. Sel.Com.Pro. 1st March 1771 - Letter - Barker - Benares, 16 Feb. "He (Shuja) knew it was probable they (marathas) would attack his dominions or the Kings, after the reduction of the Rohillas, but then says he (Shuja) I had the English to assist me and it was time enough to fight when assured they had actual designs against our territories."
 2. Sel.Com.Pro. 28 March 1770. Qasim Ali's letter to Shuja, sent by Gabriel Harper from Faizabad.
 3. Sel.Com.Pro. 16th Feb. 1770. Letters of Harper from Faizabad, dated 20th and 22nd January.
 4. Sel.Com.Pro. 13th March 1770. Report of the Committee to the Court of Directors.

marched on towards Khumbher to the help of Ranjit Singh. Nawal Singh intercepted the Sikh army near Howle (24 Feb.1770) and by defeating them, obliged them to retire.¹

At this time the Marathas who were at Jeynagar, had settled their affairs with the Raja and were preparing to march forward when they received an offer of 14 Lakhs of rupees besides other advantages from Ranjat Singh at Kumbher, if they placed him in power in the place of his brother².

Nawal Singh had not yet replied to the Maratha offer of friendship but preferred to wait and learn the attitude of the other powers of Hindustan towards the Marathas. Yet Ram Chandar was in favour of coming to terms with Nawal Singh and thinking the Jat Regent would yield on his near approach, marched forward.

Najib Khan, being informed of the situation of affairs by Tukoji Holkar and considering Zabeta Khan too young to handle them, decided to go himself to the Marathas "incline them by face to face meeting and parley to maintain peace with him and by offering his co-operation in their present undertakings, keep them firmly on his side."³ The message reached Ram Chandar

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 28th March - Letter of P.Wendel from Agra dated 3rd March.
2. Sel.Com.Pro. 28th March 1770, Letters Harper - Faizabad, 9th, 12th, 30th March.
3. Sarkar - Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol.II, p.407.
Faiz Bukhsh, f.73b.
Nuruddin, f.116b-117a.

Ganesh through Tukoji, when the Marathas were at a distance of only ten miles from the Jat frontier. As Nawal Singh had not yet changed his attitude, Ram Gandar "welcomed Najib's offer of co-operation as a God-send", remarking "We have come to this country after ten years and if we do not first make friends with Najib, then all the Rohillas (trans Ganges) and Shuja" will "join him against us, and he is also very powerful in himself. With such a combination of enemies against us, we shall have to fight a hard fight, the result of which none can foresee. Therefore we ought to reassure this man, make him our ally, first attack the Jat Raja and easily exact a large contribution from him. Whatever was done by Najib against us is now a thing of the past."¹ But Madhaji Sindhia was opposed to it and said "The foremost of our enemies is Najib-ud-daula especially the blood of three and a half persons of my family is on his head. Never mind, I shall write to the Peshwa and take his orders."²

The Peshwa preferred the demands of political expediency to those of blood feud and accordingly "a written pledge of alliance and friendly assurances was sent to Najib Khan, through Tukoji Holkar, directing Najib to march towards the Jamna conquering the Jat possessions in the middle Doab on his way, at

1. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire. II, p. 408.
Nuruddin, f. 117b-118b.

2. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire. p. 409. The three killed ~~by~~ were Dattaji, Jankoji and Sabaji. Madhaji himself had been ~~in~~amed for life.
Nuruddin, f. 118a-118b.

the same time that they invaded the Jat kingdom west of the Jamna¹. But henceforth, the Maratha proceedings in Hindustan, was going to be continually hindered by the intrigues of Madhaji ~~xxviii~~ Sindhia, whose sole interest was the destruction of Najib Khan and his State.

The Marathas began their march and reached Kumbher without any resistance from Nawal Singh, who preferred to remain entrenched at the fort of Dig (beginning of March). At this time Ram Chandar encamped outside Kumbhar, receiving his provisions from Ranjit Singh.²

Najib Khan, meanwhile, writing to the chiefs of Rohilkhand to come up and join forces with him, had started from Najibgur, and by the end of March, while Najib was near Sikandrabad, the chiefs of Rohilkhand had assembled on the bank of the Ganges near Sahsawan, ready to cross over and join Najib.³

At this news Nawal Singh decided upon attacking the Marathas before they were reinforced, from across the Jamna. Marching out ✓

1. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, II, p. 409.
Nuruddin, f. 119a.

2. Sel. Com. Pro. 28th March 1770. Letters Harper 19th March and
30th March.

3. Sel. Com. Pro. 28th April 1770. Letter. Gailliez - Allahbad,
9th April.
Tarikh-i-Faiz Bukhsh, f. 74a.

of Dig, Nawal Singh proceeded towards Kumbher. On his approach the Marathas marched forward and at a distance of two miles from their encampment a severe engagement followed (beginning of April)¹. Finally the Jats were defeated and fled towards Dig. The Marathas obtained from following up their victory and marching up to the banks of the Jamna near Mathura, encamped there to await Najib Khan and to form their future plans.

Najib Khan, conquering the Jat possessions on his way, reached the east bank of the Jamna opposite Mathura and encamped there, while the chiefs of Rohilkhand remained encamped near Sahsawan, waiting to join the Marathas, after an agreement had been reached between them and Najib Khan. Tukoji Holkar crossed over with his army and paid a visit to Najib in his tent on the 17th April. Two days after this ~~the~~ Najib paid a return visit to Tukoji's tent, when he was introduced by Tukoji to Ram Chandar Ganesh and Madhaji Sindhia.²

After several conferences with Najib, the Marathas finally came to an agreement with him. It was decided that the Marathas should take back their possessions in the Doab, which were then in the hands of Hafiz Rahmat Khan, Dundi Khan and Ahmud Khan Bangash (excepting the part then under Najib Khan); the Jats

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 28th April 1770. Letter Gailliez. 13th April.

2. Sarkar - Fall of the Mughal Empire, II, pp.410-11.

were to get back their entire possessions for a large ransom, provided they made proper allowances for Ranjit Singh and that the combined army of the Marathas, the Jats and the Rohillas would then march up to release the Emperor from his allies.¹

But the result of this agreement was a division in the camp of the chiefs of Rohilkhand. Dundi Khan was prepared to submit to it but Hafiz Rahmat Khan was against it. While things were in this state at Sahsawan, Ahmad Khan Bangash arrived there, with the news that Shuja-ud-daula, was willing to march up with the English to join them against the Marathas. At this the chiefs of Rohilkhand, inspite of the defection of Dundi Khan, decided to give up the idea of a compromise with the Marathas and ~~xxx~~ sending them the following message "Najib has usurped Mirat and other ~~xxxxx~~ ^{us} Mahals, and you have not recovered them. Why are you asking/to restore our annexations? We shall not give you chauth or land unless Najib does the same", they marched away and encamped at Fatehgarh, to be near Ahmad Khan Bangash and Shuja-ud-daula².

This conduct of the chiefs of Rohilkhand annoyed Najib Khan and he ~~was~~ now prepared to join hands with the Marathas against

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 26th ~~March~~ May 1770. Letter Harper 2nd May.
Sel.Com.Pro. 29th Dec.1770. Letter - Harper 20 Nov.

2. Faiz Bukhsh, f.74a-74b.
Sarkar - Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol.II,p.413. He is wrong about the date.
Sel.Com.Pro. 26th May. Letter - Harper 2nd May.

them. The Marathas accordingly threatened them with no less than the conquest of their whole country and while their detachments carried their plundering raids as far as Etawa, the entire Maratha army crossed over on the 25th April and encamped near Najib¹. But Sindhai wanted to take advantage of the situation and secretly proposed to the opposite party to put forth a plan contrary to Najib's plan which had been accepted by Ram Chandar Ganesh.

Accordingly Imad-ul-Mulk started from Farrukhabad with a paper signed by Shuja-ud-daula, Dundi Khan, Hafiz Rahmat Khan and Ahmad Khan Bangash, proposing to set up a new King and to march against the present King who was in the hands of the infidels.² The arrival of Imad, in the Maratha camp, led to disputes among their chiefs. Maghaji was this time supported by Visaji and hence Tukoji's opposition to the new plan did not persuade Ram Chandar to reject it. Ram Chandar for some time unable to decide which plan to follow, finally gave in to Sindhaa and Visaji and planned treachery against Najib. But Najib who had received timely information of it through Tukoji, quickly broke up his camp and marched away with Tukoji towards Koil. The Marathas fell on his baggage but could capture nothing. (10 May).³

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 26th May. Letters- Harper 2nd May and 9th May.
Sarkar - Fall of the Mughal Empire, II, p.411.

2. Sel.Com.Pro. 26th May. Letter - Harper 2nd May.

Sel.Com.Pro. ~~xxxxxxx~~ 9th June. Letters - Harper 14 May & 19th

3. Sel.Com.Pro. 21st June 1770. Letter - Harper Lucknow, May.
3rd June.

Sarkar - Fall of the Mughal Empire, II, p.411.

At this, Ram Chandar, who used to get his supply of provisions from Najib's territories, quickly turned back to Najib and came to terms with him through Tukoji. The conduct of negotiations with the jats was again entrusted to Najib Khan.¹

But the late treacherous conduct of the Marathas had made Najib Khan change his attitude towards them. He began to correspond with the chiefs of Rohilkhand with the object of building up a strong anti-Maratha coalition under the banner of the Emperor. His plan was to march with the Marathas towards Farrukhabad when the Emperor was to proceed with the Wazir ostensibly with the purpose of joining the Marathas, but really to attack them, and after defeating them to conduct the Emperor to the capital.²

The chiefs of Rohilkhand at once began vigorous preparations for war and at the same time applied to the Emperor to join them with the Wazir. Shah Alam was quite prepared to fall in with the plan, and asked his Wazir to join him. But Shuja, agreeing to the request, made large demands from the chiefs of Rohilkhand ^{as} ~~an~~ a condition for the Emperor's march.³

Najib Khan all this time continued his negotiations with the Jats and the Jats, secretly encouraged by the Rohillas, while

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 19th July 1770. Letter - Harper - Cawnpore, 16th June.

2. Sarkar - Fall of the Mughal Empire, II, p.413.

Sel.Com.Pro. 21st June 1770. Letter - Dundi Khan.

Sel.Com.Pro. 9th Aug.1770. Letter - Gaillioz - 8th July.

Sel.Com.Pro. 11 Aug.1770. Deliberations of the Committee.

3. Sel. Com. Pro. 25th Sept.1770. Letters- Hafiz Rahmat Khan and Dundi Khan.

Sel.Com.Pro.5th Oct.1770. Letter - Harper 13 Sept.

keeping up the appearance of submission, began to delay the settlement of affairs. But towards the end of June, one of Najib's letters to the chiefs of Rohilkhand was intercepted by Sindhia, as a result of which the Maratha chiefs taxed Najib with failure to keep his promise, ^{and} accused him of treacherous collusion with ^{his} ~~the~~ brother Afghans, and demanded from him all the money he had collected in the Jat territory. Najib Khan answered them haughtily and handing over the Jat territories to them by having his collectors recalled, marched away towards Delhi.¹

But when Najib had proceeded only two stages, the fear of being distressed for want of provisions again compelled Ram Chandar to come to an agreement with him. Thus while Najib encamped at Koil with Tukoji Holkar, the rest of the Marathas cantonned at Jalesar (near Sayyidabad) which is 36 miles from ~~X~~ Koil). Ram Chandar now began direct negotiations with the Jats.²

But the chiefs of Rohilkhand, encouraged by a letter from Shuja-ud-Daula, promising them aid against the Marathas, with 10,000 troops (15th July) wrote to the Jats not to come to any settlement with the Marathas, saying they were coming up with

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1. Sel.Com.Pro. 11th Aug.1770. Letters - Harper 4 July and 15 July. Sarkar - Fall of the Mughal Empire, pp.410-414; Nuruddin, f.122b.
 2. Sel.Com.Pro. 25th Sept.1770. Letters - Harper 30th July, 7th Aug. & 15 Aug.

the Emperor to their assistance. Then to make sure that the Jats did not accede to the Marathas demands, they marched 32 miles towards ~~towards~~ the Maratha encampment from Fatehgarh (beginning of August). At the same time they sent their Wakil to the Emperor to urge upon him the necessity for a westward march and wrote letters to the English, asking for help against the Marathas.¹

But, at the same time as he had promised support to the chiefs of Rohilkhand, Shuja had sent Umrao Gir to the Marathas' camp with the proposal to pay them eighty lakhs of rupees in return for the possession of Rohilkhand and Farrukhabad.² Thus the arrival of Umrao Gir in the Maratha Camp (middle of August) again led to disputes among the Maratha chiefs, for Sindhia and Visaji, because of the late conduct of the chiefs of Rohilkhand, were able to urge strongly for the acceptance of Shuja's offer.

The chiefs of Rohilkhand, at the first news of Shuja's proposals, quickly marched back to the bank of the Ganges, ready to cross over and join forces with Ahmad Khan Bangash.³

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 25th Sept, 1770.
Letter - Gailliez 16th Aug.

2. Sel.Com.Pro. 11th Aug. 1770. Letter - Harper 15 July.
Sel.Com.Pro. 19th Oct. 1770. Letter - Gailliez 24 Sept.
Sel.Com.Pro. 15 March 1772. Letter - Barker 28 Jan.

Shuja openly confessed his inclination and wish at one time to reduce the Rohillas.

3. Sel.Com.Pro. 25 Sept. 1770. Letter - Harper 15 Aug.

After this Najib Khan and Tukoji Holkar continued the arguments with Ram Chandar who was busy settling the Jat affairs, to reject Shuja's offer but Ram Chandar preferred not to decide on anything till after a settlement with the Jats.¹ The Jats, however, being secretly encouraged by Najib Khan, began to delay the settlement and after days of negotiations (end of July to end of September) Ram Chandar finally gave in to the demands of Najib and Tukoji and asked Najib to bring the Jat affair to a conclusion.²

Najib Khan, who was very ill at this time, directing Hafiz Rahmat Khan and Ahmad Khan to submit to the Maratha demands about the cession of the Doab³, held a private discussion with the Jat envoys in his own tent (27 Sept.) and then calling the two sides before him on the 8th Oct., fixed by his arbitration the tribute to be paid by the Jat Raja and thus concluded a peace between him and the Marathas. Then, knowing that his end was near, he arranged with Ram Chandar Ganesh, that Zabeta Khan, with a part of his troops should attend them, while he, with the rest of the army, should immediately return to Najibgar.⁴

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 19 Oct.1770. Letter - Gailliez 24 Sept.

2. Sel.Com.Pro. 7 Nov.1770. Letters - Harper 11th and 12th Oct.

3. Sel.Com.Pro. 19 Oct.1770. Letter - Harper 22nd Sept.

4. Sarkar - Fall of the Mughal Empire II, p.414.

Sel.Com.Pro. 7 Nov.1770. Letters - Harper 12 Oct. and 17th Oct.

The Chiefs of Rohilkhand and the Nawab of Farrukhabad, according to the advice of Najib Khan, had started negotiations with the Marathas for a compromise. But the Marathas wanted the cession of Doab, as well as a sum of money in lieu of what had been collected from those parts during the last ten years¹. Ahmad Khan Bangash was prepared to submit to this. But Hafiz Rahmat Khan preferred to submit to the terms that had previously been proposed by the Wazir and accordingly wrote to the Emperor (28th Sept.)². At this Shuja communicated to Hafiz his willingness to enter into a treaty of alliance with him and his resolution to send immediately an army under his third son to the frontier (24 Oct.)³.

But before Shuja's message reached Rohilkhand, Hafiz Rahmat Khan and Ahmad Khan Bangash had received the offer from the Marathas, who had marched up with Zabata Khan towards Etawah, to take from them a small sum of money for their friendship, besides the cession of the Doab. Hence Hafiz did not respond to Shuja's offer of alliance and preferring to come to terms with the Marathas, opened up negotiations with them.⁴

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 19 Oct.1770. Letter - Gailliez 30 Sept.

2. Sel.Com.Pro. 7 Nov.1770. Letter - Hafiz 28 Sept. transmitted in letter Harper 12 Oct.

3. Sel.Com.Pro. 7 Nov.1770. Letter - Harper 24 Oct.

4. Sel.Com.Pro. 5 Dec.1770. Letter - Harper 12 Nov.
Sel.Com.Pro. 29 Dec.1770. - Letter Harper 20 Nov.

But while the Marathas were still on their way to Etawah, the news of the death of Najib Khan (31st Oct.) made Imad-ul-Mulk again start for the Maratha[†] camp to win them over to his previous proposals and on his arrival, the Maratha proceedings were again delayed for some time owing to disputes among their Chiefs. But Ram Chandar, finally refusing Imad's proposal to set up a new King invested Etawah.¹ Shaikh Kabir who was in charge of the place, held on for a few days and then surrendered the fort on the 12th Dec.² The Marathas after this marched forward and by the beginning of January 1771, were encamped on the banks of the Kalinadi, at a distance of eight miles from Farrukhabad.³

But the Emperor, meanwhile, on the news of the death of Najib, had made up a plan of his own. Shah Alam was ambitious and was desirous of ruling over a larger tract of land than the City of Delhi. The power and prestige enjoyed by Najib Khan had obliged him all this time to fall in with the plans of his Mir Bakhshi, for his immediate concern was a return to Delhi. But, as soon as Najib was dead, he determined upon throwing himself into the hands of the Marathas, provided the Imperial lands in the

1. Sel.ComPro. 23 Nov.1770. Letter - Harper 6 Nov.

2. Sel. Com. Pro. 29 Dec.1770. Letter - Harper 16 Dec.
Faiz-Bakhsh, f.74b.

3. Sel.Com.Pro. 7 Feb.1771. Letter - Harper 9 Jan.

Doab then in the hands of Zabeta Khan and the Jats were restored to him. Accordingly on the pretence of sending the robe of Mir Bakhshi to Zabeta Khan, he sent Saif-ud-din, Muhammad Khan, with his proposals to the Marathas then on their way to Farrukhabad.¹

Saif-ud-din joined the Marathas in their camp near Farrukhabad and presented to Ram Chandar Ganesh, the Emperor's proposals to join them provided Delhi were handed over to Saif-ud-din and they promised to secure for him the possessions of the Doab, from Zabeta Khan and the Jats. The result was a serious dispute among the Maratha chiefs, Visaji and Sindhia vehemently supporting the Emperor's proposals, but Ram Chandar was definitely against breaking the former arrangements with Najib Khan and the Jats. Hence Visaji and Madhaji Sindhai, broke up their encampment and marched away with the intention of going back to the Deccan. But they had not gone far when the bulk of the troops under Ram Chandar, deserted their chief and joined them. So they at once decided upon capturing the capital and marched towards Delhi (end of Delhi 1771). Ram Chandar followed them to Delhi, while Tukoji, after conducting Zabeta Khan to Sakartai, went to Delhi to join Ram Chandar.²

At Delhi a conference of all the Maratha chiefs was held

1. Sel. Com. Pro. Dec.5, 1770. Letter - Harper 12 Nov.

2. Sel. Com. Pro. 1st March 1771 - Letter Barker 12 Feb.
Letter - Harper 30 Jan.

and finally ended in an agreement by which Ram Chandar consented to deliver the ensign of authority to Visaji, on condition that he respected his former arrangements with the Jats and Najib Khan.¹ Visaji after this came to an agreement with the Emperor's agents and to a memorandum containing the terms, the Heir affixed his seal on behalf of the Emperor (15 Feb.).²

The terms were:- The Marathas were to be paid 40 lakhs of rupees and assigned Mirat and seven other Mahals. The Emperor was to cede the districts of Karra (Jahanabad) and Kora to the Marathas or in default give them equivalent territory near Delhi. The Marathas undertook to escort the Emperor to Delhi in two months. The Emperor was to pay ten lakhs (out of the forty) in twenty days, on receiving which they would restore the Delhi fort to his agent. After proceeding to Delhi, Shah Alam was to grant them 15 lakhs worth of Mahals, thus leaving a balance of 15 lakhs which was to be cleared in seven months.

Shah Alam started from Allahabad on the 13th April and halting at Sarai Alamchand (20 miles to the west) for 19 days to plan ^{his} march on Delhi, with the Wazir³. Shuja, anxious to

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 1 March 1771. Letter - Barker 12 Feb.

2. Sarkar - Fall of the Mughal Power II, p.552-553.

3. Sel. Com. Pro. 17 May 1771. Letter - Barker 20 April.

~~anxious to~~ please the Emperor, so that he should not appoint another Wazir, agreed to send an escort of 10,000 troops under his son with the Emperor (4 May)¹. The Emperor, after this moved on towards Kera, escorted by the Wazir and Sir Robert Barker, the Commander-in-Chief of the English army. While the Emperor was in Kera, Shuja, unwilling to tie his hands by letting his son fall into the hands of the Marathas, prevailed on the Emperor to relieve him by paying 12 lakhs of rupees². Leaving Kera the Emperor marched via Kanauj towards Farrukhabad (30th June), and crossing the Kalinuddi (9 Aug.) he realised a ^{Nazarana} peshkash of seven lakhs of rupees at Farrukhabad from Muzaffar Jang, whose father Ahmad Khan Bangash, had died on the 17th April. After this Shah Alam marched on and ~~realising a Nazar of seven lakhs of rupees from Muzaffar Jang, the son and successor of Ahmad Khan Bangash,~~ encamped at Nabiganj (19 miles south-west of Farrukhabad) to pass the rainy season (Sept.)³

Zabeta Khan, on the other hand, who had by this time secured the promise of support from the chiefs of Rohilkhand against the Marathas for a payment of 10 lakhs of rupees⁴, at the news of the

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 4 June 1771. Letters - Barker 4 May and 11 May.

2. Sel.Com.Pro. 23 June 1771. Letter Barker 25 May.

3. Sel.Com.Pro. 12 Sept. 1771. Letter - Barker 29 August.
Sel.Com.Pro. 10 Nov. 1771. Letter - Harper 3rd Oct.

4. Sel.Com.Pro. 30 March 1771. Letters- Harper 17 and 19 March.

Emperor's near approach, set himself to bring under control a faction in his own State led by his brothers, Kallu and Malhar. In spite of the repeated attempts of Hafiz Rahmat Khan to bring about a peaceful settlement, the two brothers, encouraged by Madhoji Sindhia persisted in their demand of an equal division X of the State with Zabeta Khan. Finally on the 26th June, a battle was fought in which the rebels were defeated and Kallu and Malhar were taken prisoners. After this Zabeta Khan busied himself in the fortification of Sakartal.¹

Nor was there perfect peace in the Maratha camp at Delhi. In spite of Madhaji Bindhai's willingness to deliver the fort of X Delhi to the Emperor's agent as part payment. Visaji was not prepared to do so unless the ten lakhs agreed upon were paid. Then Ram Chandar promised ^{support} to Madhaji in this respect and hence Madhaji went over to his side and his action was soon followed ² by the rallying of the troops of Mudo Rao, again under Ram Chandar. Finally, on the 25th June, Visaji submitted the ensign of authority to Ram Chandar, on condition that the fort should not be delivered unless five lakhs and 50,000 rupees were paid and a good security for the balance was given by Yaqub Ali Khan then on his way from the Emperor³. Soon after this, Madha Rao's order from the Deccan arrived confirming Visaji in the command and

1. Sel. Com. Pro. 18 July 1771. Letter - Harper 2 July.

2. Sel. Com. Pro. 18 July 1771. Letter - Harper 25 June.

3. Sel. Com. Pro. 18 July 1771. Letter - Harper 2 July.

directing Ram Chandar to return. But Sindhia and Holkar, inspite of this order, refused to submit to Visaji (beginning of July). At this time Yaqub Ali arrived in the Maratha camp and gave the requisite security, but since the Emperor had not sent the robe of Bakhshi, to Zabeta Khan, Ram Chandar supported Tukoji when he objected to the delivery of the fort¹. At once Sindhia again joined the camp of Visaji and the consequent desertion of troops from the camp of Ram Chandar followed². By the 2nd Aug. Visaji felt strong enough to carry his point and delivered the fort to the King's agent to keep Sindia in hand.³ But Ram Chandar and Tukoji still persisted about their demands for Zabeta and even opened up negotiations with him⁴. But Ram Chandar's followers began to desert him gradually till he was forced to go back home. Visaji now sent Madhaji Sindhia to escort the Emperor from Nabiganj while he himself remained encamped near Delhi to keep Tukoji out of mischief, (end of Sept.)⁵

Madhaji Sindia reaching Nabiganj, was presented to the Emperor on the 18th Nov. 1771. Then sending a letter to the Wazir

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1. Sel.Com.Pro. 27 Aug. 1771. Letter - Harper 14 July.
 2. Sel.Com.Pro. 27 Aug. 1771. Letter - Harper 9 August.
 3. Sel.Com.Pro. 12 Sept. 1771. Letter - Barker 29 Aug. Sarkar - Fall of the Mughal Empire, p. 553. Calendar of Persian Correspondence III, p. 717.
 4. Sel.Com.Pro. 10 Nov. 1771. Letter - Barker 12 Sept.
 5. Sel.Com.Pro. 10 Nov. 1771. Letter - Harper 3 Oct.

through his son-in-law, evidently with certain important proposals Sindhia marched away with the Emperor towards Delhi (25 Nov.)¹ Shah Alam entered the palace fort of Delhi on the 6th Jan. 1772.

While the royal party was still on its way, Visaji had received the news from home of the war between the Peshwa and Haider Ali, the Nawab of Mysore and hence had decided to make a compromise with the Rohillas and with their assistance to bring the Maratha affairs in Hindustan to a speedy conclusion, so that he should "be at liberty to co-operate in measures with the (Maratha) chiefs in the Deccan."² Thus immediately on the arrival of the Emperor at Delhi, Visaji, having letters sent by the Emperor to Hafiz Rahmat Khan and Zabeta Khan, summoning them to Daranagar to settle their tribute (peshkash) marched out with the Emperor from Delhi (middle of January). Visaji's idea, by such a course, was to realise the money due from the Emperor and to get the Rohillas to join their armies with him for an expedition to secure the position of Kera and Karra (Jahanabad) that had already been granted to the Peshwa by the Emperor.³

But this news combined with the message brought by the son-in-law of Sindhia⁴, alarmed Shuja-ud-daula. He at once

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 10 Jan 1772. Letter - Harper 30 Nov. 1771.
Paper of Intelligence from the King's Camp dated 18 Nov. 1771.
2. Sel.Com.Pro. 15 March 1772. Letter - Barker 28 Jan.
3. Sel.Com.Pro. 24 June 1772. Letter - Hafiz Rahmat Khan to Barker.
4. Sel.Com.Pro. 10 Jan. 1772. Letter - Harper 16 Dec. 1771.
This letter and the future conduct of Shuja shows that the proposal from Sindhia was for help against the Rohillas, whom he wanted to destroy in return for the cession of Rohilkhand.

despatched letters to Hafiz Rahmat Khan, then on his way to Daranagar, telling him not to present himself before the Emperor and informing him that he was immediately setting out with the English to his assistance and perhaps threatening to attack his possessions, should he act to the contrary.. A letter was also sent by him to Zabeta Khan, asking him not to compromise matters with the Marathas, but to stand his ground, till reinforced by the armies of Hafiz Rahmat Khan and himself.¹ At the same time he asked for the permission of the English government for the presence of the Commander-in-Chief with him, on his undertaking to bring about a compromise between the Rohillas and the Marathas.²

Shuja-ud-Daula's message reached Hafiz Rahmat Khan at Tilhar and, being apprehensive of the safety of his own dominions, he halted there undecided what plan to adopt. But soon after, he received further messages from Shuja-ud-daula and Sir Robert Barker, then on their way, assuring him of support against

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 24 June 1772. Letter of Hafiz to Barker.
 Sel.Com.Pro. 15 March 1772. Letter - Barker 28th Jan.
 Letter - Barker 25th Feb. "Hafiz with the combined armies of the Rohillas from the assurance that I have given them that the Wazir will take no improper advantage of their being absent from those parts of the Rohilla country, which lay contiguous to his Excellency's Dominions, whilst I am with him, will march to the defence of Zabeta Khan and the fords of the Ganges."

2. Sel. Com. Pro. 3 Feb. 1772. Letter Barker 21 Jan.

the Marathas. Hence Hafiz detaching a body of 4,000 men under Faizulla Khan to reinforce Zabeta Khan at Sakartal, asked Shuja to march up and post himself opposite to Sakartal, as in this situation he would be in readiness to defend such of the fords as were passable at that season of the year. But Shuja did not agree to it and kept Hafiz detained at Tilhar by carrying on useless negotiations till the 25th Feb. when the Marathas had reached Sakartal¹.

Zabeta Khan meanwhile on the receipt of Shuja's message had at once determined upon a resistance to the Marathas and had remained entrenched at Sakartal. The Marathas arriving with the Emperor within 32 miles of Sakartal, decided to cross over and attack Najibgar, where the family and treasures of Zabeta Khan were lodged². At this Zabeta sent detachments of troops under Afzal Khan and Sadat Khan to guard the ghats of Lice Gulla and Chandi. On the 23rd February the Maratha army, thirty thousand strong, led by Madhaji Sindhia, marched from the Maratha encampment ^{towards} ~~from~~ Chandi Ghat.³ About this time Faizulla Khan arrived on the banks of the Ganges opposite Sakartal and hence

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 15 March 1772. Letter - Barker 25 Feb.

2. Sel.Com.Pro. 15 March 1772. Letter - Barker 25 Feb.

3. Sel.Com.Pro. 24 June 1772. Letter from Zabeta Khan to Barker. It also gives the following details.
Sel.Com.Pro. 15 March 1772.
Paper of Intelligence from Sakartal dated 24 Feb. 1772,

Zabeta Khan was able to send another detachment under Karim Khan to reinforce Sadat Khan at Chandi Ghat. But when Karim Khan had only just taken his post, the Marathas started crossing the river under cover of artillery fire. Karim Khan and Sadat Khan were killed in their attempt to oppose them. The Marathas after ^{attacked} crossing over/Afzal Khan at Lice Gulla. Afzal was defeated and fled with a few followers to Najibgar, hotly pursued by the Marathas.

Receiving news of this disaster, Zabeta Khan decided to remain entrenched at Sakartal, till the arrival of further reinforcements and accordingly directed Faizulla Khan to cross over with his army and join the four thousand men left at Sakartal. But the troops of Faizulla were in a state of panic and absolutely out of control. Zabeta crossed over to try and keep them together but by the time he reached there, they were already in the process of dissolution. Hence, directing the army at Sakartal, to garrison Puttergur, Zabeta followed Faizulla to Rampur, to march up to the defence of the garrison at Najibgar, with the armies of the chief of Rohilkhand and Shuja-ud-daula. While still on his way, Zabeta heard the news that the Rohillas had decided to make a compromise with the Marathas and hence he turned back towards Najibgar. But before he could reach there, the Marathas had besieged the fort and hence he had to take refuge in the neighbouring mountains.¹

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 24 June 1772. Letter from Zabeta Khan to Barker.
Sel.Com.Pro. 15 April 1772. II. Paper of Intelligence from
from Bareilly dated 5 March.

The chiefs of Rohilkhand, meanwhile, at the first news of Zabeta Khan's defeat, had quickly turned back and sending a letter to the Emperor offering to pay the peshkash had gone with their families and treasures to Pilibhit, to await the Emperor's reply.¹

The Emperor and the rest of the Maratha army crossed over by a bridge of boats, while the siege of Najibgur was still going on-(first week of March) and both the forts of Najibgur and Buttergur surrendered immediately after this.² Visaji, who was anxious to settle his affairs quickly and had grown disgusted with the Rohillas for their late conduct, now ~~enlisted~~ ^{listened to} on the advice of Mahhaji and sent his wakils, Biharji and Malhar Rao to Shuja, then encamped on his frontiers at Bangarmow, with the offer to cede to him the tract of Rohilkhand, provided the provinces of Kora and Karra (Tajanabad) were secured for the Marathas.³ The chiefs of Rohilkhand, getting no reply from the Emperor, took refuge in the jungle of Gangapur (20 or 30 miles from Pilibhit) where they were also joined by Zabeta Khan.⁴ Madhaji Sindhia had his revenge for Panipat, by having Najib Khan's grave dug up and his corpse burnt.⁵

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 15 April 1772. 1st and 2nd paper of Intelligence.

2. Sel.Com.Pro. 15 April 1772. Letter - Barker 6 March, 9th and 10th March.

3. Sel.Com.Pro. 24 June 1772. Letters - Barker, 5th April, 4 and 20 May.

4. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.140a-b. Tirikh-i-Faiz Bukhsh, f.78b.

5. Sel.Com.Pro. 15 April 1772. Letter - Barker 28 March.

Shuja-ud-daula on the other hand, who had already been trying to convince Sir Robert Barker of the propriety of the cession of Kora and Karra to the Marathas, in return for the cession of Rohilkhand to him¹, on the arrival of the Maratha wakils in his camp, found himself in a predicament. His greatest ambition ^{was} the conquest of Rohilkhand but he had by this time been informed that he could not accede to the Maratha request for the cession of Kora and Karra without displeasing the English in Calcutta². Yet the ambitious Wazir was not prepared to let the chance slip, without getting some advantage. His plan was to act as a mediator between the Rohillas and the Marathas provided he was paid for it by the Rohillas. Thus Elich Khan, his minister, was sent to the Marathas with the offer that if they agreed to cede ~~xxxx~~ to him the possessions of Kora and Karra, he would secure for the Emperor a peshkash for Rohilkhand from the Rohilla chiefs. And to make sure that the Rohillas did submit to his arbitration, he prevailed on Sir Robert Barker to send Captain Harper to them, with the proposal to compromise their affairs with the Marathas for the sum of a crore of rupees, which included the payment to be made to the Emperor³.

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 15 March 1772. Deliberations on the letters from Sir Robert Barker.

Sel.Com.Pro. 24 June, 1772. Letter - Barker 4 May.

2. Sel.Com.Pro. 15 March 1772. Barker instructed "to go to war with the Marathas rather than let the Wazir come to a disgraceful compromise with them."

3. Sel.Com.Pro. 24 June 1772. Letter - Barker 20 May. Harper was sent because the Rohillas had no faith in Shuja and would not come to any agreement with him without the mediation of the English.

The Rohilla chiefs at Gangapur, suffering from the hardships of exiled life and the ravages of sickness due to the unhealthy climate of the place, at once jumped at Shuja's proposals ^{through} ~~to~~ Harper, particularly because ^{of} their faith in the English. Thus Harper returned to Suja's camp at Shahabad with the promise of ~~the~~ the Rohillas to pay 50 lakhs of rupees and a letter from Hafiz which left "the management of the negotiations with the Marathas to the Wazir under the inspection of the English (22nd April) ¹."

About a week after this Elich Khan reached the Maratha camp at Puttergar and presented to them the Wazir's proposals. This made ~~the~~ Visaji again turn to the advice of Tukoji and refusing "to permit His Excellency to have any concern in the treaty between them and the Rohillas" marched towards Bareilly and started negotiations with the Rohillas, by offering to evacuate Rohilkhand and to secure for Zhabeta Khan his possessions in the upper Doab, provided they paid an adequate tribute to the Emperor. ²

The chiefs of Rohilkhand, on receiving the Maratha offer, decided to take advantage of the situation. Thus keeping their offer of fifty lakhs of rupees open to the wazir, they continued their negotiations with the Marathas ³. Their idea evidently was

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1. Sel.Com.Pro. 24 June 1772. Letter - Barker 22 April.
 2. Sel.Com.Pro. 24 June 1772. Letter - Barker 10 May.
 3. Sel.Com.Pro. 24 June 1772. Letter - Barker 18 May.

to pay a reasonable sum of money to the Emperor and not the large sum that had been demanded mainly for the sake of Zabeta Khan, who having lost all his treasures at Najibgar, was now absolutely penniless.

But the sudden change of the Maratha policy, displeased the Emperor for he would have to return Zabeta's possessions in the Doab, which had been ceded to him only two months before. He therefore began to plot the ruin of the Marathas. Informing Shuja-ud-daula that he would grant him the provinces of Kera and Allahabad as a price for driving out the Marathas from Hindustan and thus securing for him their possessions in the Doab, he also wrote a letter to Sir Robert Barker, expressing his willingness to throw himself upon the support of his previous allies.¹

Shuja, encouraged by the Emperor's proposals, again sent Capt. Harper to the Chiefs of Rohilkhand, offering to march up and thus secure for them not only their possessions in Rohilkhand but also Zabeta Khan's possessions in the upper Doab, provided they settled with him the amount of tribute to be paid to the Emperor, informing them, however, that he had been asked by the Emperor to do so². On Harper's arrival in the Rohilla camp, Zabeta Khan who knew that the Rohilla chiefs would not part with such a large sum of money that had been demanded by the Marathas for his sake, welcomed Shuja's proposals and, starting for Shahabad

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 24 June 1772. Letter - Barker 10 May.

2. Sel.Com.Pro. 24 June 1772. Letter - Barker 20 May.

reached there on the 16th May. But the other Rohilla chiefs began to delay their decision on various excuses¹.

But the Marathas, on the news of Shuja's offer of alliance to the Rohillas against them and of Zabeta Khan's start for the Wazir's camp, became alarmed and quickly changed their plan. Promising the Emperor to secure for him the Jat possessions in the Doab for that of Saharanpur ~~etc.~~, which he was still required to surrender to Zabeta Khan, Visaji sent Madhaji Sindia with the Emperor's letter to the Wazir granting him the provinces of Kora and Allahabad if he would settle by his mediation the amount of tribute to be paid by the Rohillas to the Emperor.² Shuja was, however, not prepared to change his plan for he would secure by it the same advantages as were now offered by the Marathas, besides the honour of being the saviour of the Empire and the Rohillas. But to facilitate the consummation of this plan, he accepted the Maratha offer. The direct result of this was the willingness of the Rohilla chiefs to send their representative, Hafiz Rahmat Khan to Shuja-ud-daula, for the Marathas informed them that the amount of the tribute to be paid by them was to be fixed by Shuja's arbitration.³

1.Sel.Com.Pro. 24 June 1772. Letter -,Barker 18 May.

2.Sel.Com.Pro. 24 June 1772) Letter - Barker 20 May.

Sarker - Indian Historical Quarterly . Dec.1935.p.643. The fact that the Marathas made a second demand for the grant of Kora and Allahabad from the Emperor proves that it was at this time granted to Shuja-ud-daula.

3.Tarikh-i-Afighana, f.71b. : Qissai Ahwal-i-Rohilla.f.57a.

After Hafiz Rahmat Khan had entered Shuja's camp (25th May), the Marathas, leaving behind the prisoners taken at Najibgur crossed back into the Doab to canton there during the rains and to secure for the Emperor the Jat possessions in the Doab, while the Emperor returned to Delhi.¹

Hafiz who had come to Shuja's camp to settle the amount of tribute to be paid to the Emperor and thus make peace with the Marathas, refused to agree to Shuja's plan on being informed of it. But after days of persuasion by Shuja, Zabeta Khan and Sir Robert Barker, he finally yielded and a treaty was concluded between Shuja-ud-daula and the Rohillas (including Zabeta Khan), which was also attested by General Sir Robert Barker (17 June).²

By this treaty, Shuja undertook "to establish the Rohilla Sardars (Hafiz Rahmat Khan, Zabeta Khan and all other Rohilla Sardars great and small) in their different possessions, obliging the Marathas to retire either by peace or war" and also guaranteed that should the Marathas "after the expiration of the rainy season again enter the country of the Rohillas, their expulsion is the business of the Wazir". The Rohilla Sardars on the other hand, in consequence of the above, agreed to pay forty lakhs of rupees to the Wazir in the following manner:—"As the Marathas

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1. Sel.Com.Pro. 24 June 1772. Letter - Barker 8 June.
Faiz Bukhsh, f.79a-86a : Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.149b.
Tarikh-i-Afighana, f.71b. : Qissai Ahwal-i-Rohilla, f.57a.
 2. Sel.Com.Pro. 20 July 1772. Letter - Barker June 17.
True translation of the Treaty, : Tarikh-i-Faiz Bukhsh, f.78

are now in the country of the Rohilla Sardars, the Wizar of the Empire shall march from Shahabad as far as may be necessary to enable the families of the Rohillas to leave the jungles and return to their habitations, ten lakhs of rupees in specie in part of the above sum shall then be paid and the remaining thirty lakhs in three years from the beginning of the year 1186 A.H." (4 April 1772).

After this Shuja-ud-daula, dismissing Zabeta Khan and Hafiz Rahmat Khan "with the greatest profession of cordiality" and the promise to return immediately after the rains to start operations against the Marathas, marched back to Faizabad.¹

The Marathas on the other hand "who had patiently awaited the result of the negotiations between the Rohillas and the Wazir finding themselves entirely excluded and a treaty of defence entered into against them" at once decided on a revenge on Shuja-ud-daula and his allies, and set themselves wholeheartedly to the subjugation of the Jat possessions in the Doab, which they were then engaged in with the Imperial General, Najat Khan, to be free as soon as possible. Capturing Chorgarh, after a long siege (end of August) they marched on and besieged the fort of Ramgarh, but failing to carry it by the middle of September, they finally accepted the offer of a compromise with the Jats, and marched towards the bank of the Ganges to cross over and

1. Letter - President & Select Committee at Fort William in Bengal, dated 10 Nov. 1772, to the Court of Directors in London.

attack the Rohillas.¹

The Rohillas meanwhile had been writing constantly to Shuja-ud-daula informing him of the intentions of the Marathas and asking him to come up and join forces with them. But, inspite of their "earnest solicitations", the Wazir took no step till after the report of the Maratha march towards Rohilkhand.²

Hence when the Marathas, reaching the bank of the Ganges, (end of Sept.) demanded from the Rohillas the payment of the tribute of forty lakhs of rupees, to the Emperor and a satisfaction for their bad intentions towards them, the chiefs of Rohilkhand apprehensive of their own safety, at once despatched five lakhs of rupees and the Holy Quran as a token of friendship to the Marathas, agreeing at the same time to pay the tribute of forty lakhs of rupees to the Emperor provided the bond which they had signed for it, was secured for them.³

The Marathas were only too glad to welcome the Rohilla offer for their main interest in Hindustan now was a revenge on Shuja-ud-daula, besides the realisation of the money due from the Emperor

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 29 Oct.1772. Letters- Harper 29 Aug., 6 Sept. & 19 Sept.

2. Sel.Com.Pro. 29 Oct.1772. Letters - Harper 19 Sept. & 6 Oct.

3. Forrest, G.W. Selections of Letters, Despatches etc. I, pp. 60-61. Letter of Hafiz to Governor.

The Wazir's narrative of the behaviour of the Rohillas.

Hastings papers. British Museum Mss. 29, 1339.

Letter - Barker to Hastings (private) 10 May 1773.

The paper signed on their part for the Treaty with Shuja on 17 June 1772 (is always referred to as a bond by the Rohillas, which consisted of two papers, the other being signed by Shuja)

and the occupation of the provinces of Kora and Karra. Hence to make sure of the Rohilla support, they again extended their previous offer to the Rohillas with the addition that Zabeta Khan will also be given back his previous possessions in the middle Doab. The result was that Zabeta Khan at once started for the Maratha camp (beginning of October).¹

Visaji, on the arrival of Zabeta Khan in his camp, sent Dearam Pandit to the Emperor at Delhi (end of October) to demand from him the grant of Kora and Karra to the Marathas and Saharanpur ~~etc.~~ to Zabeta Khan; the appointment of Zabeta Khan as Bakhshi, the relinquishment of the Jat territories that had been conquered; that the Marathas should be allowed to settle the affairs of the tribute with the chiefs of Rohilkhand.²

But the Emperor, encouraged by Shuja-ud-daula, sent back the Maratha Waki with a "direct and absolute denial to all their demands" (2nd week of November).³ At this Visaji marched towards Delhi with Zabeta Khan to enforce his demands. The Emperor on the other hand, prepared to oppose them. The result was that on the arrival of the Marathas within eight miles of the capital, a fierce engagement followed, in which the Imperialist General, Najaf Khan, was defeated and had to take refuge

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1. Sel.Com.Pro. 29 Oct.1772. Letter - Harper 6 Oct. Sarkar - The Indian Historical Quarterly (Dec.1935) p.643.
 2. Sel.Com.Pro. 12 Dec.1772. Letter -Harper 12 Nov. Sel.Com.Pro. 7 Jan.1773. Papers of Intelligence.
 3. Sel.Com.Pro. Dec.1772. Letter - Harper 17 Nov.

inside the Delhi fort (17th Dec.). The Emperor now finding the tables turned against him, agreed after two days to comply with all the Maratha demands.¹ After this Visaji was delayed at Delhi for some time due to Madhaji's refusal to follow him. Finally, Madhaji submitted on the arrival of orders from the Deccan and Visaji sending to Shuja a formal demand of the withdrawal of all the troops from Kera and Karra, and the return of the bond ~~xxx~~ given by the Rohillas, marched up to the banks of the Ganges at Ramghat,² and sent Derram Pandit to Hafiz Rhamat Khan with the offer that if the chiefs of Rohilkhand would let the Marathas pass through their territories, on being assured that no depredation or ravages would be committed on the ryots by them during their march, they would remit a large sum, from the stipulated tribute due to the Emperor for which they now had the authority, besides giving them satisfaction in other respects. (beginning of Feb.)³.

The motive of the chiefs of Rohilkhand in giving money to the Marathas and making professions of friendship to them

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1. Sel.Com.Pro. 12 Dec.1772. Letter - Harper 24 Nov.
Sel.Com.Pro. 7 Jan.1773, Papers of Intelligence.
Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.86b-87a.
Qissai Ahwal -i-Rohilla, f.57b.
 2. Letter - President and Select Committee to London, dated 31 March 1773.
Sel.Com.Pro. 30 March 1773. Deliberations.
 3. Forrest - Letters etc. p.60.
Letter of Hafiz to Governor.
Tarikh-Faiz Bakhsh, p.87a.
Tarikh-i-Afighana, f.72b, gives the date.

only a few months ago was to save themselves from an immediate attack by the Marathas, but in February, Shuja-ud-daula was already on his way towards the frontiers of Rohilkhand, and hence they decided to take advantage of the situation. Without giving any definite ~~answer~~ answer to the Marathas they informed Shuja-ud-daula of the Maratha proposals and their determination not to agree to it, provided their bond for forty lakhs of rupees which had not been paid to the Emperor was returned to them. Shuja, desirous of defeating the Marathas and of driving them out of Hindustan, at once yielded to the Rohilla demands and sent special messengers to the chiefs of Rohilkhand, informing them of his willingness to hand over the bond to them in return for their assistance against the Marathas.¹ Hafiz Rhamat Khan accordingly continued the policy of keeping the Marathas employed in negotiations. By the end of February 1773, hearing that the English were on their way to join Shuja-ud-daula, the Marathas sent Zabeta Khan to prevail on the chiefs of Rohilkhand to join them against Shuja². But Zabeta's persuasions had no effect on the Rohillas and when they received the message from Baker, informing them that he was marching up to their assistance (2nd week of March) with the Wazir, they marched up

1. Forrest - Letters etc. p.60. Letter - Hafiz to the Governor.

2. Sel.Com.Pro. 30 March 1773. Letter - Barker 6 March.

from Aonla to Bisauli and waiting there to be joined by contingents from various parts of their territories, they detached Ahmad Khan Bakhshi with a large army to march up and post himself at the fort of Asadpur (20 miles from Ramghat) to prevent the crossing of the Marathas at Ramghat, where they had built a bridge of boats.¹

On the approach of Ahmad Khan Bakhshi, the Marathas who were endeavouring to cross over at Ramghat, found their attempt frustrated. But Tukoji Holkar, crossing over, by a ford some distance away from Ramghat, marched up and besieged Ahmad Khan at Asadpur (19 March). Ahmad held on till the evening when, finding his ammunitions exhausted, he was obliged to surrender. Tukoji's next plan was to attack the Rohillas at Bisanli but by the next morning, he heard that the armies of the Wazir and the English had reached Sahsawan (20 miles from Ramghat) and hence, sending across the prisoners by the bridge at Ramghat and then breaking the bridge, Tukoji marched towards the ford of Karakpur to be joined there by a large party of the Marathas who were crossing over to his assistance (20th March). At the same time the English, who had been informed of their Maratha movements, were also racing for the ford and reached there in time to drive away a small party that had already crossed over. Tukoji at this,

1. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.168a.
 Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.87b.
 Tarikh-i-Afaghani, f.72b.

marched away towards the west of Ramghat. The English then turned back and joining the Wazir's army near Asadpur, encamped there¹. Next day the chiefs of Rohilkhand arrived in the Camp of Shuja-ud-daula from Bisauli.²

After a consultation with Hafiz Rahmat Khan, Shuja-ud-daula, and Sir Robert Barker, it was finally decided that on the 22nd of March, while the armies of the Wazir and the Rohillas would march to attack Tukoji, then encamped about thirty miles west of Ramghat, the English troops under Barker would cross the Ganges at Karakpur and attack the main army of the Marathas, encamped on the opposite bank of Ramghat. Accordingly Barker, crossed over, in the morning of the appointed day and marched towards Visaji's encampment, but the enemy quickly decamped and hence he was obliged to turn back without any battle, after a halt of two days on the enemy's ground (24 March). The Wazir on the other hand, did not carry out his part of the Contract and excused himself on the ground of his "suspicion of the treachery of the Rohilla (Hafiz)."³

On the other side while Visaji was marching towards Koil Tukoji, plundering Samhal and the neighbouring villages, was

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1. Sel.Com.Pro. 15 April 1773. Letter + Barker 20 March. Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.87b.
 2. Sel.Com.Pro. 15 April 1773. Letter - Barker 21 March.
 3. Sel. Com. Pro. 15 April 1772. Letters - Barker 23 & 24 March.

was marching towards Bisauli, to capture the families of the Rohilla chiefs lodged there. Hence the Rohillas at once proceeded to the defence of their families (24th March) and Barker followed them the next day.¹ The Rohillas reaching Bisauli, marched a few miles further to oppose the Marathas. But by the time Tukoji arrived near the Rohilla camp, the English army was on its way to Bisauli (25 March). Hence the Marathas, without making an attempt on Bisauli, retreated immediately towards Muradabad to plunder the town, and the adjacent villages. The Rohillas joined by the English followed the enemy but when the combined army had reached Kadjauri, they heard that Tukoji had crossed over by a bridge of boats at Puth (26 March). At the same time news was brought that Visaji had turned back and was marching towards Ramghat, where Shuja had left a guard of 4,000 men while he remained encamped at Karakpur. Accordingly, Barker hurried to Ramghat, while the Rohillas proceeded towards Puth, to guard that ford. Barker arrived at Ramghat just in time (27 March) to prevent the Marathas from carrying the detachment posted there and the enemy retired towards ^{the} Kalinadgi².

About this time Visaji received an order from Babu Sakhiram, the new minister of the Peshwa, Narai Rao, to return with his forces to Poona³. Visaji, writing back home that "the disputes

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 15 April, 1772. Letter - Barker 24 March.

2. Sel.Com.Pro. 27 April 1772. Letters - Barker 26 and 28 March.

3. Sel.Com.Pro. 26 May, 1772. Information received by the President.

he was engaged in prevented his complying immediately with the order", communicated to Sir Robert Barker through Najaf Khan, his desire to come to some reconciliation, and at the same time sent a detachment towards Karinbas, a ford about fourteen miles^a above Ramghat, giving out that he would himself follow them on the 14th April and crossing over would ravage Rohilkhand.¹ But Barker wrote to Najaf Khan under the Wazir's direction that if the Maratha Sardars are inclined to a peace, they give up every pretention to Kora and Karra, leave the whole of the country between the rivers at the disposal of the King and Wazir and themselves return to the Deccan without delay." He then marched up from Ramghat and encamped at Karinbas (12 April).^a At this Visaji, ordering his detachment to move towards the ford of Ahar (18 miles from Karinbas), marched up and encamped at Dibbi.² (16 miles from Karinbas). But, while Visaji was still at Dibbi, he received "a second and peremptory order" from home for his "immediate return, whatever might be the situation of affairs". Hence he sent his Wakil "to prevail on the Wazir and Hafiz Rahmat Khan to bring about a peace and save their credit"³ (middle of April).

Shuja-ud-daula agreed to send a wakil to the Peshwa to

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1. Sel. Com. Pro. 26 May 1772. Letters - Barker 11 and 15 April.
 2. Sel. Com. Pro. 26 May 1772. Letter - Barker 20 April.
 3. Sel. Com. Pro. 26 May 1772. Information received by the President - Letters - Barker 20 and 27 April.

to settle the Maratha affairs in Hindustan and the prisoners taken by Tukoji at Asadpūr were released for a payment of one lakh and thirty thousand rupees. The Marathas after this, leaving a small garrison at Etawa to control their possessions in the Doab, hurriedly marched back home.¹

After this the Wazir and the English marched back towards Oudh, while the Rohillas returned back to their homes (middle of May).²

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1. Sel.Com.Pro. 26 May 1772.
Letter Barker 6 May.
Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.88b.
Tarikh-i-Afaghani. f.72b.

2. Sel.Com.Pro. 9th June 1772. Letter - Barker 20 May.
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CHAPTER VIII.

Relations between the Rohillas and the East India Company.

The Government of the East India Company at Fort William (Calcutta) taking advantage of the attack of Siraj-ud-daula, the Nawab of Bengal and Behar on their possessions in 1756 had secured the control of the Government of Murshidabad, first by defeating Siraj-ud-daula and putting Jafar Ali Khan on the Masnad (1756) and then by deposing Jafar Ali and putting Qasim Ali in ^{his} ~~the~~ place (1757). But Qasim Ali Khan, unlike his predecessor, was a capable man and hence after a thorough preparation, resorted to war with the English to rid himself of their domination (June 1763). But he was defeated and had to take refuge in Oudh.

Qasim Ali Khan, succeeded in winning over Shuja-ud-daula the Nawab of Oudh and the Wazir of the Empire, to take up his cause, by promising to pay twenty seven lakhs of rupees, to defray the expenses of the campaign against the English¹. Then, while Shuja-ud-daula started concentrating his forces at Benares, the Emperor at Allahabad summoned the chiefs of Rohilkhand to his assistance (Feb. 1764).

The Rohillas at once replied to the Emperor's call and sent

1. Ain-i-Ali Shahi, I, f.226a-233a.

Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.67b.

Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, vol.II, p.545.

an army of six thousand men under Enayat Khan,¹ The son of Hafiz Rahmat Khan. The Emperor, on the arrival of the Rohilla army, marched out from Allhabad and joined Shuja-ud-daula at Benares (Feb. 1764).

The English on the other hand, at the first news of the Wazir's intentions sent a large army towards the enemy on the frontiers of Oudh. But the English Commander, because of mutiny and desertions in his own ranks, was prevented from crossing the frontiers of Behar and attacking the enemy (Feb to March)². Finally, on hearing that Shuja was throwing a bridge across the Ganges at Benares, (to cross over) the English army under Major Carnac, marched up to prevent the construction of the bridge (end of March)³. But, hearing that the Wazir had detached a large body to cut off the English line of retreat towards Patna, Major Carnac quickly fell back towards the frontiers of Behar (beginning of April)⁴. Then, while the English army was engaged in minor skirmishes with the Wazir's detachment, Shuja-ud-daula marched up with the main body from Benares (middle of April)⁵. At this Major Carnac retreated to Patna and entrenched himself there (end of April)⁶. The Wazir's army then marched towards

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1. Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.68a. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.114b.
 2. Sel.Com.Pro. 23 March and 19th March 1764.
 3. Sel.Com.Pro. 3 April 1764.
 4. Sel.Com.Pro. 16 April 1764.
 5. Sel.Com.Pro. 7 May 1764.
 6. Sel.Com.Pro. 10 May 1764.

Patna and on the 3rd May, delivered a general assault on the English trenches at Patna.¹ After an attack lasting a few hours the enemy attack was repulsed with such a heavy loss by the English that the Wazir, although he remained encamped within eight miles of the City, for the next month, he did not venture another attack², and finally towards the middle of June, because of the coming rains, Shuja marched back towards Oudh and cantoned at Baksar, to start operations again after the rains.³ The Rohilla army under Enayat Khan returned to Rohilkhand until the rainy season ended.⁴

While the Emperor and the Wazir were ~~there~~ encamped at Baksar, Major Hector Munro, who had superseded Carnao, after restoring discipline in the army, marched up in the beginning of October to attack the enemy at Baksar. A contested battle was fought on the 22nd October 1764, in which the English were completely victorious and Shuja-ud-daula fled away to Lucknow.⁵ The Emperor who had been secretly won over by the English, remained on the battlefield with his small retinue and was received with due honour by the English.⁶

Mr. Vansittart, the governor and President of the Government of Calcutta, decided to give Shuja-ud-daula's possessions to the Emperor and hence Major Fletcher, who succeeded Munro in the

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 14 May 1764.

2. Sel.Com.Pro. 1st June 1764.

3. Sel.Com.Pro. 25 June, 9 July 1764.

4. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.117a.

5. Sel.Com.Pro. 6 Nov. 1764. Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f.68b-69a. Tawarikh-i-Afighana, f.69b-70a. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.120b-121a.

6. Calendar of Persian Correspondence, II, No.1044. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.120b.

command, over ran the whole of Oudh and Allahabad (8 Feb. 1765)¹.

Shuja-ud-daula fled with his family from Lucknow and, leaving them at Bareilly, met the Rohilla chiefs on their way back from Daranagar where they had gone on Najib Khan's summons for help against the Jat Raja, Jawahar Singh. A meeting of all the Rohilla chiefs was held on their return at Bareilly to decide whether to take up Shuja-ud-daula's cause or not, but none of the Rohilla chiefs, except Hafiz Rahmat Khan, was willing to go to war with the English². Hence Shuja went to Farrukhabad with the hope that if Ahmad Khan Bangash agreed to take up his cause, the chiefs of Rohilkhand might be tempted to join him.³ But the Bangash Nawab also disappointed him. Finally, Shuja hired the Maratha troops under Malhar Holkar, then on their way back to the Deccan from Delhi, and crossed the Ganges to join the Marathas at Kora (end of April).⁴ At this news the English at once marched up from Allahabad and a battle

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 19 Feb. 1765.

2. Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f. 69a-69b. : Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f. 121b.

3. Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, f. 69b. : Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f. 121b. Hafiz accompanied Shuja to Farrukhabad to help him win over Ahmad Khan Bangash.

4. Faiz-Bakhsh, f. 70a, says Hafiz accompanied Shuja, but is not supported by other sources.
Tawarikh-Afghani- f. 70a. : Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f. 121b.

Sel.Com.Pro. 29 April 1765, says Shuja has bought over Rohillas to his interest, but Sel.Com.Pro 1st June, acquaints us that Shuja and Ghoziuddin (Imad-ul-Mulk) was on his way to join Malhar in Kora, without mentioning anything about the Rohillas. The first information was perhaps due to the presence of Hafiz at Farrukhabad.

followed at Kera on the 3rd May 1765, in which the Marathas, failing to stand the English artillery fire, took to flight and Shuja had to take refuge at Farrukhabad.¹

Shuja-ud-daula now decided to throw himself on the generosity of the English and desired an interview at Jagemau with the Commander of their forces.² And luckily for Shuja, Lord Clive who had just then taken the place of Vansittart in the Government of Calcutta, considered his predecessor's policy of giving the whole of Shuja's possessions to the Emperor a "foolish" one, on the ground that Shah Alam would not be able to maintain himself there without English help.³ His idea was to establish a friendly state as a barrier on the borders of the English possessions, so that the Company would not have to maintain a war 600 miles beyond the boundaries of their own territories. Accordingly, Clive welcomed Shuja's offer and asked Carnac to open negotiations with him. Ultimately, Shuja-ud-daula presented himself in the English camp and the final arrangements were delayed pending the arrival of Clive from Calcutta⁴. Clive interviewed Shuja-ud-daula at Benares (2nd Aug. 1765) and the Emperor at Allahabad (9 Aug.)⁵. The result was the conclusion of formal treaties.⁶ The Emperor was

1. Sel. Com. Pro. 1 June 1765.

2. Sel. Com. Pro. 11 June 1765.

3. Cambridge History of India, vol. V, p. 175.

4. Sel. Com. Pro. 10 Aug. 1765. Letter - Carnac 3 July.

5. Sel. Com. Pro. 7 Sept. 1765. Letters- Clive & Carnac 3 and 20 Aug.

6. Sel. Com. Pro. 7 Sept. 1765. Copies of the Treaty of Allahabad and the Farman of the King

given the provinces of Kera and Allahabad "as a royal demense for the support of his dignity and expenses" and was promised a tribute of twenty six lakhs of rupees for Bengal, Behr^a and Orissa, in return for which the Dewani or the right of collection of revenue of these provinces was granted to the Company by a farman of the Emperor (12 Aug.). Then on the 16th August the Treaty of Allahabad was concluded between the Company and Shuja-ud-daula. By this Shuja was given all his dominions, with the exceptions of Kera and Allahabad, in return for which he agreed to pay fifty lakhs of rupees to the English to cover the expenses of the recent war. At the same time the two parties bound themselves in an alliance of mutual armed support.

But the tranquility so happily established in Hindustan was again disturbed early in 1766. The Sikhs were carrying on their depredations in the suburbs of Delhi and the Mir Bakhshi, X Najib Khan, found it very difficult to put a check to their activities. Hence he wrote to the Emperor expressing the "necessity of an alliance with the Marathas, as without some additional strength, he shall not be able to defend the honour of the King's house at Delhi."¹ The Emperor alarmed at the danger to which his family was exposed to, at once wrote to the Marathas proposing that they conduct him to Delhi. The Marathas, who had lost

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 28 Feb. 1766. Letters - Col. Smith 10 Feb.

supremacy and their possessions in Hindustan since 1761, being naturally desirous of getting it back, promptly sent up their agents to the Emperor to open up negotiations with him.¹

This alarmed both the Chiefs of Rohilkhand and the Jat Raja, the former because the Emperor might agree to return to the Marathas their possessions of Etawa and Shakohabad, the latter because the Maratha advance would "render desolate his flourishing provinces"².

The Government of Calcutta when informed of the situation knowing that they could not enter into an alliance with the powers beyond the boundaries of Oudh and Allahabad, because by the orders of the Court of Directors, their "line of ^{defence} ~~descent~~" was limited to these parts", decided that it was "absolutely necessary" to form a league between Suja-ud-daula, the Rohilla * chiefs and the Jats" to oppose the Marathas in every attempt to gain a footing on this side of the Jumna", on the ground that the return of the Marathas to Hindustan, "must necessarily produce disturbances that may probably extend to Shuja-ud-daula's dominions and even to these provinces" (Bengal & Behar)³.

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1. Sel.Com.Pro. 28 Feb.1766. "King on the point of concluding an alliance with the Murathas."
 2. Sel.Com.Pro. 28 Feb.1766. Letter - Col.Smith 10 Feb.
 3. Sel.Com.Pro. 28 Feb.1766. Letter - Committee to Col.Smith.

Accordingly Clive met Shuja-ud-daula and the representative of the Emperor at Chapra (in North Bahar) to discuss the plan with them (July). But Shuja-ud-daula convinced Clive¹ that "distant alliances could be of no advantage since it is certain that neither the Jats nor the distant Rohillas (Najib Khan) would ever be prevailed upon to march to our assistance in the case of an invasion." Further, since the assembling at Chapra of the "chiefs or agents of those whose alliance may be useful" (chiefs of Rohilkhand) would have detained Clive for many months, he entrusted to Shuja-ud-daula the management of such Treaties as he thought convenient for his own and the Company's welfare. Shuja-ud-daula was, however, not to enter into any absolute engagements without previously acquainting the President with every proposal and obtaining his approbation to it. After this Clive, securing for Shuja-ud-daula the office of the Wazir from the Emperor, which since the battle of Baksar, had been given to the Emperor's son, returned to Calcutta.²

Since the Maratha danger disappeared because of the expulsion of the Sikhs from the suburbs of Delhi by Najib Khan, the government of Calcutta did not put any pressure

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 12 Aug. 1766. Letter - Clive & Carnac 15 July

2. Calendar of Persian Correspondence, II, No.1044.

on Shuja-ud-daula for the conclusion of an alliance with the chiefs of Rohilkhand and hence nothing was done in this respect by Shuja.

Early in 1770, the Marathas, after a thorough preparation, marched towards Hindustan. Najib Khan and the chiefs of Rohilkhand who held the Maratha possessions in the Doab since 1761, endeavoured to build up an anti-Maratha coalition and accordingly asked Shuja-ud-daula to join them. But Shuja excused himself on the grounds of his inability to face the Marathas, without the support of the English army. Hence Dundi Khan on behalf of the Rohillas, including Najib Khan, wrote to Mr. Cartier, the Governor and President of Fort William, asking for his advice on the situation.¹ They evidently expected that the English Government would send their army to join them against the Marathas.

The Government of Calcutta, though rather anxious to see the Marathas driven away from Hindustan because of the limit put on their "line of defence", could do nothing, besides informing the Rohillas of this fact and urging on them the necessity of giving a united front to the Marathas. The Rohillas took this as a mere excuse on the part of the English Government for their

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 21 June 1770. Trans. of letter - Dundi Khan.

unwillingness to join them against the Marathas.

The result was that the Rohillas decided upon a compromise with the Marathas and to support them in their designs against the English. Najib Khan joined them at Mathura and the chiefs of Rohilkhand were assembled at Sahsawan to follow his example (April 1770). But the Marathas decided to accept the support of the Rohillas, on terms which were very favourable to Najib Khan. This allowed Shuja-ud-daula to create a division among the Rohillas, by promising the chiefs of Rohilkhand to come to their assistance against the Marathas. Hence, while Najib Khan continued in the Maratha camp, the chiefs of Rohilkhand, marched back to Fatehgarh, ready to join forces with Ahmad Khan Bangash and Shuja-ud-daula.¹ This was followed by Shuja's intrigues with the Marathas in alliance with the Rohillas and the Bangash Nawab, which ended in a treacherous attack of the Marathas on Najib Khan, although the latter was saved by timely information from one of the Maratha chiefs. After this, inspite of a reconciliation between the Marathas and Najib Khan, the latter began to correspond secretly with the chiefs of Rohilkhand to build up a strong anti-Maratha coalition. The Rohillas accordingly started a vigorous preparation for war and asked the Emperor to join them, promising to conduct him to Delhi. Shah Alam was prepared to do so, but Shuja who did not want to lose his present

1. Vide, p. 169

exacted position by his hold on the Emperor, evaded compliance^X with the request of the Rohillas by making large demands as a condition for the Emperor's march.¹

At this, the Rohillas again wrote to the English Government at Calcutta informing them that "for some time past there had been a misunderstanding between the Rohilla chiefs and Shuja-ud-daula" and asking "what steps" they thought "most prudent to take in the present situation of affairs".² They expected that the English would put pressure on Shuja to co-operate with them. Nor was their expectation quite wrong, for the Government of Calcutta thought that Shuja was "too much overcome by his ancient animosity against the Rohillas to have time for calm reflection" and wrote to the Wazir about the necessity of vigorous operation against the Marathas and of the strictest ^{union} lenience with the Rohillas.³ (21 June 1770).

The result of the letter of the Government of Calcutta to Shuja, however, was quite the contrary to what the chiefs of Rohilkhand had expected. Shuja decided to wreak vengeance on^X them and writing to them promising help with 10,000 troops, he sent Umrqa Gir to the Marathas offering to give eighty lakhs

1. Vide, p. 171

2. Sel.Com.Pro. 21 June 1770. Letter - Dundi Khan.

3. Sel.Com.Pro. 21 June 1770. They wrote to Shuja "that the Rohillas have been peaceful neighbours to him and that he would ill-exchange them for the turbulent and restless ones, the Marathas who are never satisfied with conquest."

of rupees in return for the cession of Rohilkhand and Farrukhabad to him (15 July). Shuja's plan, however, failed because of the influence of Najib Khan on the Marathas and the only result of it was a delay in the Maratha proceedings in Hindustan and the resolution of the chiefs of Rohilkhand to come to terms with the Marathas.

This was followed by the march of the Marathas towards Farrukhabad, the death of Najib Khan (31 October), the proposal of the Emperor to the Marathas when they were near Farrukhabad, the march of the Marathas to Delhi and the conclusion of a treaty between the Marathas and the Emperor, signed by the Heir apparent at Delhi, on the Emperor's behalf (15 Feb. 1771).

Shuja at once formed a plan by which he was prepared to lead an expedition in alliance with the Rohillas and the Bangash Nawab to drive out the Marathas from Delhi and place the Emperor in possession of it.¹ But Shah Alam, after delaying for some time, openly refused to agree to it and hence it failed.² Shuja had, however, started for ^{Mehdighat} ~~Mahindghat~~ on the frontiers, to have an interview with Hafiz Rahmat Khan, thinking that even if his plan failed, a treaty of alliance with the Rohillas would be the only security against the future attempt of the Marathas (24 Feb.)³. But Hafiz Rahmat Khan because of a

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| 1. Sel.Com.Pro. | 1 March 1771. Letter - Barker 15 Feb. |
| 2. ditto. | 30 March 1771. Letter - Harper 10 March. |
| 3. ditto. | 20 March 1771. Letter - Harper 5 March. |

letter from the Emperor, directing him not to see Shuja, and the offer of Zabeta Khan to pay the chiefs of Rohilkhand 10 lakhs of rupees for joining forces with him at Sakartal when attacked by the Marathas, preferred not to have an interview with Shuja. Hence the wazir had to turn back from ^{Mehdighat} ~~Mehindighat~~ with "a shock to his pride" (26 March)¹.

After this Shah Alam started for Delhi on the 13th April 1771 and reached there on the 6th January 1772. On the arrival of the Emperor at Delhi, Shuja being informed that the Marathas in consequence of bad news from home, were going to compromise matters with the Rohillas, requested the government of Calcutta, to let their Commander-in-chief attend him in bringing about a settlement between the Rohillas and the Marathas, so that "the Rohillas by giving up a part of their country for his Majesty's support, shall remain in possession of such parts as will be a barrier to his own dominions."²

But Shuja, although correct about the attitude of the English government towards the Rohillas, was not aware that they did not want the establishment of the Marathas in Hindustan if possible. Thus Sir Robert Barker, on receiving the permission

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 20 April 1771. Letters - Harper 17, 19 and 26 March. Sel.Com.Pro. 17 May 1771. Letter - Harper 13 April.

2. Sel.Com.Pro. 3 Feb. 1772. Letter - Barker 21 Jan. Shuja even said that Zabeta Khan had sent a signed Qaul Nama (treaty) with blanks to fill in.

of his government to march up with Shuja, unconsciously helped the Wazir in his plan to secure the possession of Rohilkhand, by encouraging the Rohillas to put up a resistance to the Marathas.¹ The result was the defeat of Zabeta Khan, the devastation of the north-western part of Rohilkhand by the Marathas and the flight of the Rohillas into the jungles of Gangapur (end of February). But now, when Shuja-ud-daula wanted to come to a settlement with the Marathas on the pretence that the Maratha army was too strong for him, Barker did not allow him to do so, and thinking Shuja's fear was genuine, ordered the first Brigade under Col. Champion to march up (28 Feb.)² But the government of Calcutta, who could see through Shuja's plan, countermanding the march of the Brigade, advised Barker to "go to war with the Marathas rather than let the Wazir come to a disgraceful compromise with them (15 March)³.

On the arrival of this instruction to Barker, Shuja, who had been constantly trying to convince the Commander of the propriety of his point of view, quickly decided to secure Kora and Allahabad for himself, by acting as a mediator between the Rohillas and the Marathas. But the Marathas refused this and

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 15 March 1772. Letter - Barker 25 Feb. "The grand point at present appears to be the prevention of a compromise between the Rohillas and the Marathas, which I am endeavouring at by stirring up the Rohillas."

2. Sel.Com.Pro. 15 March 1772. Letter - Barker 28 Feb.

3. Sel.Com.Pro. 15 March 1772. Deliberations and letter to Barker.

hence Shuja, who at the same time, secretly received the offer of the grant of Kora and Allahabad from the Emperor for the expulsion of the Marathas from Hindustan, at once jumped at the offer, for the late attitude of the English government had convinced him that they would help him against the Marathas. Then he managed to get the Rohillas to sign a Treaty with him which was also attested by Sir Robert Barker (17 June 1772). By this Treaty he agreed to establish the Rohilla chiefs, including Zabeta Khan in their different possessions (excluding the previous Maratha possessions) and the Rohillas agreed to pay forty lakhs of rupees to him in three years.

Then making a formal requisition of the assistance of the government of Calcutta, "to protect him from the consequences of his Treaty with the Rohillas", he returned to Faizabad to march up again and start operations immediately after the rains.¹ (beginning of July).

But the Government of Calcutta had since the 13th April 1772 come under the control of a President, whose attitude towards the Rohillas was quite different from that of his predecessors. Warren Hastings, who succeeded Mr. Cartier ~~as~~ as the Governor of Fort William, had formed definite views about the position of affairs in Hindustan and on the relations between the English, the Wazir, the Emperor, the Marathas and the Rohillas, before

1. Letter - President and Select Committee to the Court of Directors - 5th Sept. 1772.

he took up office. Then writing on the 26th March 1772, to Sir George Colebrooke¹, he says that the King, whether he continued in the hands of the Marathas or threw himself upon the protection of the Company, not a single ^{rupee} should be paid to him as tribute, and that the Wazir, Shuja-ud-daula, "our useful ally" should be left the uncontrolled master of his own dominions, ~~himself~~ Furthermore, he should be assisted in making himself strong enough to stand his own ground against any invader so as not to be a burden to the Company by seeking their assistance on every possible occasion. The Marathas were to be allowed to establish themselves on the other side of the Ganges provided Rohilkhand was handed over to Oudh, thus rendering it a geographically compact State. In fact, in one of his subsequent letters to Du Pre², he actually regrets that the Maratha offer to Shuja, regarding the cession of Rohilkhand to him on condition of their establishment in the Doab, has been rejected by the Government of Calcutta, and says that in the acceptance of it, he saw "less danger" than in "running headlong into war with the Marathas."

And it was the above views which Hastings consistently followed throughout the tenure of his office. Thus he wrote

1. Hastings Papers. British Museum. MSS.29127.

2. ditto.

MSS.29126.

in answer to the Wazir's request for Zabeta Khan that, although his Government "mean to hold their Treaties with him inviolate and though they disapprove of offensive measures, they mean to grant him offensive support within the limits of his own dominions". The Wazir on the receipt of this answer" re-iterated in stronger terms his solicitations for Zabeta Khan" but the Government of Calcutta did not change their policy.¹

But while Shuja-ud-daula was then engaged in communications with the English Government, the Marathas who were engaged in the subjugation of the Jat territories in the Doab, suddenly made peace with the Jats and marched up to the banks of the Ganges with the intention of attacking Rohilkhand. Shuja, ordering his troops to march for Bangarmau, at once made a formal requisition of a Brigade for the protection of his own dominions from the English (middle of September).² The Brigade was accordingly granted and marched up towards Oudh (29th Oct.). But before Shuja could make a move towards the frontiers, the Rohillas had already come to terms with the Marathas and Zabeta Khan had gone over to the Maratha Camp (beginning of Oct.).

The Marathas, after this, asked the Emperor to confer on Zabeta Khan the office of Bakhshi and to grant them Kora and

1. Letter - President & Secy. to the Court of Directors. 10 Nov. 1772. Hastings even thinks that Shuja had "most pompously espoused" Zabeta Khan's cause.

2. Secy. Pro. 29 Oct., 1772.

Allahabad. The Emperor, being encouraged by Shuja-ud-daula, refused to comply with their demands. Hence they marched towards Delhi to force the Emperor to do so.

Shuja-ud-daula, who was extremely alarmed at this unexpected move of the Marathas, wrote to the President of the Government of Calcutta, requesting ~~xx~~ in urgent terms to send their Commander-in-Chief to concert measures for the defence of the Emperor at Delhi, saying that "if the Marathas became victorious and they bring his Majesty to another condition, you must then reflect in what situation are you and I, my friend".¹ But the English Government took no notice of this.

The result was that the Marathas after defeating the Imperial army outside Delhi (17 Dec.) forced the Emperor to comply with all their demands. Then after a month's delay, near Delhi, due to the rebellious attitude of one of their chiefs, Madhaji Sindhia, they marched towards the bank of the Ganges opposite Ramghat, to take possession of Kora and Allahabad by crossing through Rohilkhand.

The Government of Calcutta when they heard of the ^aMaratha march from Delhi and realised their intentions, finally agreed to send Sir Robert Barker to assume the command of the English troops (18 Feb.)². Barker was instructed to discuss personally

1. Fifth Report of the Committee of Secrecy 1781. Appendix No.18. Letters from Shuja-ud-daula.

2. Sel.Com.Pro. 18 Feb.1773.

with the Wazir the best plan of operations for the defence and security of his possessions and of Kora and Allahabad. Rohilkhan was to be included in "the line of defence" and he was "authorised to enter into a treaty with Hafiz Rahmat Khan for the defence and protection of his dominions on such condition as shall fully indemnify the Company for the additional charge and hazard which may be incurred by such an engagement". He was at the same time instructed "studiously to avoid engaging the Company in an offensive war with the Marathas" and on no account to cross the river Ganges, except for the protection of Kora.

Shuja-ud-daula, on the news of Barker's setting out to join him, was again encouraged to revive his previous plan of delivering the Emperor from the hands of the Marathas and ^{thus} ~~then~~ secure the possession of Kora and Allahabad, and wrote to the President of the Government of Calcutta expressing his anxiety that "some decisive blow be struck to weaken the overgrown power of the Marathas." He further pointed out that it was "the most favourable season for undertaking it" and that if the English troops were permitted to accompany him to Delhi, it would be a source of great advantage to the Company since he would take upon himself the payment of the whole Brigade and get them excused from the payment of the ~~tax~~ Bengal tribute to the Emperor (24th February)¹. At the same time he sent a

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 30 March 1772. Deliberations of the Committee.

special messengers to the chiefs of Rohilkhand who were then negotiating with the Marathas and had informed him of the Maratha proposals to them, namely, the return of the bond they had signed for forty lakhs offering to return the bond himself in exchange for their co-operation against the Marathas.¹

Barker reached Shuja-ud-daula's camp at Gohani on the 5th March 1773 and after hearing the Wazir's contention, that the chiefs of Rohilkhand "could not flatter themselves with security ~~whilst~~ while we remain within the prescribed line", decided to cross over into Rohilkhand and to march towards Ramghat. Then while the Wazir and Barker marched up towards Rohilkhand, the Rohillas hurried towards Ramghat to prevent the Marathas from crossing over.²

The present action of Sir Robert Barker, inspite of the order of his Government to the contrary, was due both to his firm conviction in the policy of Hastings' predecessor, and the privileged position the Commander-in-Chief of the English army at this time enjoyed by being a member of the Council. And this fact becomes still more apparent by Barker's subsequent conduct of crossing over the Ganges to attack the Marathas (22nd March).

But the conduct of the Commander-in-Chief made the President of the Government of Calcutta, who bitterly resented the powers

1. Forrest - Selection of Letters, Despatches etc. I, p. 80.
Letter - Hafiz to the Governor.

2. Sel. Com. Pro. 30 March 1773. Letter - Barker 6 March.
Vide, p. 196-97

exercised by him at this time,¹ and who was determined upon having his own policy put into practice, resort to secret communication with the Wazir.

Thus on the 16th March, while the Wazir was still on his march towards Ramghat to join the Rohillas, a private letter from Barker was sent to Hastings², communicating to him the message that the Wazir enraged at the perfidy of the Rohillas who were marching up to join the Marathas, had reverted to the opinion that they ought to be expelled from Rohilkhand and the country annexed to his own dominions; and that if the English would enable him to execute this project, he would pay to the Company fifty lakhs of rupees and, by securing the Maratha possessions in the Doab for the Emperor, induce him to resign his claim to the tribute paid from the revenues of Bengal, Behar and Orissa, and acknowledge those provinces to be the property of the Company, that if the districts of Kora and Allahabad are transferred to him, he would give to the English in exchange all his own territories lying to the South of the Ganges, excepting Benares, and that since "the proposals in some measure occasion a revolution, to have the ratification performed in your presence at Benares, which may be done in the rains when the operations of the campaign are over." A letter to the same purport^{was} sent to the

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1. Hastings Papers. Br.Mus.29127. Letter to Sir George Colebrooke 26th March 1772. "He (Shuja) is at the absolute disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, whose only duty appears to be to attend and direct him."
 2. Hastings Papers, Br.Mus. Mss.29133.

President by the Wazir on the same day.¹

This sudden and well arranged proposal from the Wazir, which conformed exactly to the views of the President, could not but have been due to some hint to the effect from him. That the Wazir, who only a year before, had been prevented from securing the possession of Rohilkhand by the Government of Calcutta, should now suddenly think that the same Government would allow him to do so, unless informed of their change of policy, seems inconceivable. And the ^{future} further conduct of the President and the Wazir confirms ~~to~~ the belief.

Shuja-ud-daula's main concern henceforth was to create a pretext, by which a war could be declared against the Rohilkhand State in future. And his plan was to secure from Hafiz Rahmat Khan, whom we had already promised to release from his treaty obligations, ^{by} the return of the bond for forty lakhs, a promise in the presence of Sir Robert Barker that he would be solely responsible for the clearance of the bond, although Zabeta Khan was jointly responsible for it, by giving him to understand that without such a promise, the English would not take part in the defence of Rohilkhand against the Marathas and that he would not actually have to fulfil it, for after the conclusion of the campaign, he would return the bond to him.

Thus soon after his arrival at Ramghat, taking advantage

1. Fifth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, 1781. App. 21.

of the presence of a part of the Maratha army under Tukoji, Holkar in Rohilkhand, which was threatening to attack Bisauli, where the families of the chiefs of Rohilkhand had been lodged, Shuja-ud-daula succeeded in getting Hafiz Rahmat Khan to fall in his snare. Taking Hafiz Rahmat Khan to Sir Robert Barker's camp (23 March)¹, Shuja arranged with the Commander-in-Chief that, provided the Rohillas immediately paid the forty lakhs, protection would be afforded "to their families and country from the ravages of the Marathas", that twenty lakhs out of the forty he would pay to the Company for the part they would take in this protection and that in default, after fulfilling of this agreement by the Rohillas, he would pay to the Company the sum of five lakhs of rupees for their aid in putting the chiefs of Rohilkhand, except Zabeta Khan, in possession of their territories.

The idea of Shuja-ud-daula in thus voluntarily promising twenty lakhs of rupees to the English Government was to give them the impression that an agreement had been reached between him and Hafiz Rahmat Khan and the inclusion of the clause regarding the non-fulfilment of the promise was calculated to give Hafiz-Rahmat Khan an impression that the Wazir meant to return them the bond for forty lakhs.

Nor was Shuja-ud-daula's calculation quite wrong for the Government of Calcutta understood the whole proceeding in exactly

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 15 April 1773. Letter - Barker 24 March.

the same way Shuja wanted them to and the President wrote to Sir Robert Barker (15 April) saying "We approve of the plan formed for the protection of the Rohilla country and of the stipulation you have made on behalf of the Company for the moiety of the sum of forty lakhs to be paid by the Rohilla (Hafiz) for ^{this} ~~their~~ aid", and at the same time adding that "we cannot agree to the alternative proposal" and "you will not engage in any measures for reducing the country of the Rohillas in case of default in their engagements with the Wazir".¹

But the Government of Calcutta at the same time as they communicated the above direction to Barker, they also decided that "the Wazir's request for an interview with the President be complied with, for it would at this season be productive of great benefit to the Company's affairs."² This certainly suggests the idea that Hastings who had the complete control of the transaction of foreign affairs³, was a party to Shuja's plans for the above decision assumes that the Rohillas would refuse to pay the forty lakhs when demanded of them.

Shuja-ud-daula on the other hand, inspite of the expulsion of the Marathas from Rohilkhand (end of March) prevailed on

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 15 April 1773. Letter to Barker.

2. Sel.Com.Pro. 15 April 1773.

3. Hastings Papers. Br.Mus. Mes.29137. Letter to Sullivan dated 11 November 1772. The ~~affairs~~ ^{for} of the English Government ~~by~~ were transacted by a Select Committee consisting of the Governor and two members of the Council, but the Governor by Hastings' letter, seems to have the complete control of it.

Sir Robert Barker not to open the question of the clearance of the treaty of 1772, with the Rohillas, at this time, because it might cause a junction between the Rohillas and the Marathas, who were still on the other side of the river¹. And it was not till after the march of the Marathas towards the Deccan (beginning of May) that the Wazir asked Sir Robert Barker to demand a clearance of the forty lakhs due from Hafiz Rahmat Khan.² ~~The~~

The refusal of Hafiz Rahmat Khan to comply with the request on the ground that "the defence of their country by the English and the Wazir was equally necessary for the security of His Excellency's dominion" and that "no terms of accommodation had been settled with the Marathas by which only a permanent peace and security to their possessions could be ensured to them" came as a surprise to Sir Robert Barker³, who, being unaware of the Wazir's plan, now called the Rohillas "treacherous sect of people". Barker stayed at Karambas and continued to remonstrate with Hafiz Rahmat Khan for the fulfilment of his promise. Hence the Rohillas, afraid of displeasing the English Government, now accepted the liability but began to delay payment on the pretence that they could not do so "until he (Hafiz) could ~~XXXXXX~~ consult the other Rohilla Sardars who were a party to it."⁴

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 28 May 1773. Letter - Barker 6 May.

2. Sel.Com.Pro. 9th June 1773. Letter - Barker 10 May.

4. Sel.Com.Pro. 9th June 1773. Letter - Barker 13 May.

1. Sel. Com. pro. 26th May 1773. Letter Barker 13 April

While things were going on in this way at Karambas, Shuja-ud-daula received a letter from the President, sent on the 22nd April, informing him that his proposals "require much consideration and the previous ratification of a formal agreement" and asking him to apply for a meeting at once for it was uncertain when the President would again have an interval of leisure for such a journey.¹ Accordingly Shuja-ud-daula wrote to the President asking for an interview at Benares and hurried by expeditious marches towards Oudh, while Barker followed him at ease with the Brigade² (middle of May).

After the necessary preparations Hastings left Calcutta for Benares on the 25th June 1773.³ He was accompanied by Vansittart and Lambert, two members of the Council, and Sir Robert Barker stayed at Benares for the conference. But Hastings, who had received from the Council full authority to enter into any arrangements which he thought desirable, conducted the negotiations personally, without the aid of any interpreter and hence everything that is known regarding them is derived from the accounts given by Hastings himself.

The negotiations with the Wazir started on 19 August.⁴ It was ultimately decided that the Wazir should pay two lakhs

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1. Fifth Report of the Committee of Secrecy 1781. App.21.
 2. Sel.Com.Pro. 9 June 1773. Letter - Barker 20 May.
 3. Letter - President and Committee to the Court of Directors.
16 Aug.1773.
 4. Hastings Papers - Benares Diary. Br.Mus.Mss.29,212.

and ten thousand rupees per month for the assistance of a Brigade, instead of the previous charge of one lakh and fifteen thousand, that Kora and Allahabad should be ceded to the Wazir on condition that he paid 45 lakhs of rupees to the Company, in three instalments, and that the Wazir should pay 40 lakhs of rupees to the Company for the conquest of Rohilkhand, by monthly payments of four lakhs of rupees to commence from 10th June 1774, besides the expense of the Brigade while on service. Should any accident oblige the Company's forces to retire from the Rohilla country and prevent the Wazir from obtaining possession of it, the said forty lakhs were not to be demanded.¹

But when everything seemed to have been settled, the Wazir, thinking he was undertaking greater pecuniary responsibility than he could fulfil, desired the conclusion of the Kora and Allahabad business and the postponement of the Rohilla expedition to another year. This displeased Hastings for he says in his ~~writing~~ diary "it was his business, not mine, though it did not appear to me how it would mend the matter, since he would be equally unable to provide the ready money payment (for Kora and Allahabad) with which the Rohilla expedition had no connection."² And in his earnestness to force the Wazir to

1. Forrest - Letters etc. I, pp.150-51.

2. Hastings Papers. Br.Mus. Mss.29,212.

the Rohilla enterprise, he raised the payment for Kora and Allahabad to fifty lakhs of rupees. But the Wazir, who was not backing out of the Rohilla expedition, because of money considerations, but the fear of Maratha help to the Rohillas, accepted Hastings' terms and the result was the conclusion of a treaty on the 7th Sept. 1773, in which the terms regarding the Rohilla expedition were not included.¹

Inspite of the Wazir's present conduct, there was, however, no change of policy on the part of Hastings who gave the Wazir every reason to expect that the postponed expedition against the Rohillas "whenever it could be with prudence resumed and he desired it, it should be undertaken" and then started for Calcutta (10 Sept.)².

Thus, only a month after, when Shuja-ud-daula, in consequence of the news of the death of the Peshwa, wanted the support of the English forces for the conquest of the Maratha possessions in the Doab, the President ^{gave} ~~made~~ no reply to it.³ But when on the 18th Nov., a second letter from Shuja-ud-daula reached Calcutta, regarding English help for an expedition against the Rohillas, on the terms previously agreed upon at Benares, the Select Committee recorded a resolution the very next day, to the effect that "should the Wazir persist in his intentions with respect to

1. Forrest - Selections.I, pp.54-55.

2. Sel.Com.Pro. 26 Nov.1773. Fifth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, 1781. App.23.

3. Sel.Com.Pro. 19 Nov.1773. Letter - Shuja-ud-daula received on 23rd Oct.

the Rohilla country and determine to prosecute the enterprise with steadiness to a conclusion, the Government considering the strict alliance and engagements which subsist between the Company and Shuja-ud-daula, particularly what passed between the Wazir and the President at the conference at Benares, cannot on this occasion refuse him support and assistance," and that "the terms proposed appear highly advantageous to the Company not only on account of the sum which is ultimately stipulated as a consideration for the service but by immediately relieving them from the heavy expenses of a large part of their army."¹ Then on the 22nd November Hastings laid before the Committee a draft of a letter to the Wazir informing him of the above resolution, but the Committee decided that the matter, being of such extreme importance, it should be laid before the Council at large.² The result was a debate lasting three days in the Council (26 to 28 Nov.), at the end of which it was decided that they "wished to avoid the ^{expedition} ~~expenditure~~ proposed without entering into the propriety of such an enterprise on general principles" and that "sensible of the embarrassment the President is under, from what passed between him and the Wazir at Benares", they approve of the letter that has been specially

1. Sel. Com. Pro. 19 Nov. 1773.

2. Sir J. Strachey - Hastings and the Rohilla War, p. 57.

"The Government of Fort William was entrusted to a Governor ~~of the~~ Council consisting of nine members, but their respective powers were undefined."

prepared by the President, which is calculated to make the Wazir abandon his present idea, and at the same time save the honour of the Company.¹

The letter contained the terms that the Wazir was to pay for the help of the Company's troops in the Rohilla expedition forty lakhs of rupees immediately on the dismissal of the Brigade employed and not by instalments and that the sum would be considered due whenever the whole or half of the country of the Rohillas should fall into his possession or an accommodation should have taken place with the Rohillas.²

Shuja-ud-daula, who had by this time brought the Maratha possessions in the Doab under his control and after forming an alliance with the Nawab of Farrukhabad, and Zabeta Khan was endeavouring to get the Emperor to join him in the expedition against the Rohilkhand State, on the receipt of the President's letter, wrote back requesting the English Government to keep their forces ready to march up immediately on his requisition, for the defence of his own dominions, thus implying an indirect refusal of the terms proposed for the Rohilla expedition (end of Dec. 1773).³

But the letter of Shuja-ud-daula seems to have been dictated by ^a private information from Hastings to do so, because

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1. Forrest - Selections. I. p. 81. Fifth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, 1781, app. 23.
 2. Sel. Com. Pro. 3 Feb 1774, Letter - Shuja-ud-daula to the President.
 3. Secret Committee Proceedings, 13 Jan. 1774. Letter - Shuja-ud-daula received 10 Jan.

Shuja was at this time trying to come ^{to} an agreement with the Emperor, with the knowledge and perhaps direction of Warren Hastings,¹ and was determined upon ^{an} expedition against the Rohilkhand State. Thus immediately after the conclusion of a treaty with the Emperor, Shuja-ud-daula wrote a letter to the Government of Calcutta agreeing to the terms proposed by them, and asking them to order the Brigade for the Rohilla expedition to march up at once (middle of Jan. 1774)².

The Government of Calcutta, being thus constrained to comply with the Wazir's requisition, ordered Col. Champion, who had succeeded Sir Robert Barket, as provisional Commander-in-Chief, to assume the command of the troops which were already on their march towards the Wazir's territory (14 Feb. 1774).

This was followed by the defeat of the Rohillas at Kattera V by the combined armies of the Wazir and the English and the flight of the Rohillas into the Jungles at Laldang (end of April). Then, towards the end of May, when the Wazir was at Bisauli, the Rohillas were prepared to pay a large sum of money for a compromise through the mediation of the English, but the Government of Calcutta refused to do anything,³ because they had engaged to assist the Wazir not on account of the pecuniary ^{acquisition} ~~position~~, but to extend the boundaries of his dominions to the river Ganges and thus "cover them by this barrier from the

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 10 Feb. 1774. Letter - Shuja-ud-daula to the President.

Vide - p. 251

2. Sel.Com.Pro. 3 Feb. 1774. Letter - Shuja-ud-daula to the President.

3. Sel.Com.Pro. 15 June 1774. Letter-President to Champion.

attacks and insults to which they were exposed by the enemies ~~in~~ either possessing or having access to the Rohilla country". (15 June). The result was that although Shuja-ud-daula, because of various unfavourable circumstances was obliged to conclude the Treaty of Laldang with one of the Rohilla chiefs, Faizulla Khan, by which he was given a small territory round Rampur as jagir, the rest of Rohilkhand became part of the Wazir's dominions (7 Oct. 1774), and a large number of the Rohillas were forced to cross over and take shelter with Zabeta Khan in the Doab.

CHAPTER IX.Internal Affairs of the Rohilkhand State. (1748-74)

After Ali Muhammad Khan's death (26th September 1748) the affairs of the Rohilkhand State were carried on for a short time as he had arranged by the Council, and the different officials in charge of the separate departments until the Rohillas were called upon to defend their territories in a War which continued with short intervals, for three years (1749-52 A.D.). During this period the Council, because of the attachment of the Army to the family of Ali Muhammad Khan, particularly owing to the advance payment that had been made to them by the late Nawab, could not exercise their complete control over the affairs of the State. Thus the march in 1751 of the Rohilla army under the leadership of the Young Nawab, Sadulla Khan, to the help of Ahmud Khan Bangash, against Safdar Jung, was carried out against the express wishes of the Council.¹ But the defeat of this army and the leading part played by the chief officials of the State, who were also the most important members of the Council in the succeeding struggle with Safdar Jung (1751-52) firmly established the control of the Council

1. Faiz Bakhsh, f.28a-28b.

over the Army and accordingly over the Nawab.¹

After the departure of Safdar Jang from Rohilkhand in 1752, while the Rohilla chiefs were busy restoring order both in their own territories and in those of the Nawab,² the two elder sons of Ali Muhammad Khan, namely Abdulla Khan and Faizulla Khan, were released by the Afghan King³ and reached Rohilkhand. They were received on the northern borders of Rohilkhand by Najib Khan and were then provided with all the necessary things for their journey to Aonla in comfort. On their arrival near the capital, they were received by the chief Rohilla officials and were then conducted to Aonla.⁴

After this the question of the surrender of the Government of Rohilkhand to Abdulla Khan, the eldest son of Ali Muhammad Khan, was taken up by the Council.⁵ But, after a

1. Vide, pp. 103-17

We hear only of Dundi Khan and Hafiz Rahmat Khan during the Campaign and the name of Sadulla Khan is not mentioned, even during the peace negotiations with Safdar Jang, (1752).

2. Gulistan, f. 61a-63a.

3. Faiz Bakhsh, f. 31b-32a. It also says that Ahmad Shah Abdali gave them letters to facilitate their journey and ordering the chiefs of Rohilkhand to give them back their father's State and possessions.

Gulistan, f. 64a.

4. Faiz Bakhsh, f. 32b.

5. Gulistan, f. 64b. It says Hafiz offered to hand over the rein of government to Abdulla Khan, but due to the latter's "peevishness and meanness, all the chiefs were against him."

long discussion, the Council was swayed by the four chief Rohilla officials, namely Hafiz Rahmat Khan, Diwan-i-kul and Naib-i-Mustaqil, Dundi Khan, the Sipahsalar, Mulla Sadar Khan, the Bakhshi, and Fateh Khan, the Khansaman, who were not prepared to surrender their independant position; and it was decided that Abdulla Khan was to be the Nawab in the place of Sadulla Khan, but the control exercised by the Council over the affairs of the State was to continue as before,¹ that is, the Nawab's affairs were to be conducted as usual by the Naib-i-Mustaqil. The personal possessions of Ali Muhammad Khan were to remain intact and not divided up among his sons, who were to receive their necessary allowance from the Tahwil (treasury) under Fateh Khan Khansaman, who kept both the private and the public purse of the Nawab.

The above decision of the Council, however, was entirely to the dissatisfaction of Abdulla Khan, who was desirous of securing the same control in the State which his father had exercised. Hence, thinking that Hafiz Rahmat Khan was chiefly responsible for his exclusion from power, he made repeated

1. Faiz Bakhsh, f.32b.-33a.

Vide pp. gives the details about the officials.

attempts, all of which were unsuccessful, to get rid of him by sending him poisoned food.¹

Some time after the six sons of Ali Muhammad Khan who were now settled in their ancestral house at Aonla, began to disagree among themselves. Hamilton, even goes so far as to assert that it was deliberately fomented by the chief officials, because they realised that "amity and good understanding among the brothers" was detrimental to their power.² There seems to be some truth in the above assertion for, although the Council after a long deliberation, came to the conclusion that since the interests of the State would suffer by the division of the personal possessions of the Nawab, the existing arrangement was to continue, the daily quarrels among the brothers gradually became more frequent and the four chief officials were finally able to carry the Council for a division of the possessions of Nawab Abdulla Khan among the six sons of Ali Muhammad Khan.³

The entire territories which yielded an annual income of thirty nine lakhs of rupees was divided into three equal parts,

1. Gulistan, f.64b-65a - gives the details and says it was done through Qutub Shah of Mahdi Khel tribe.

2. Hamilton - Rohilla Afghans, pp.117-18.

3. Faiz Bakhsh, f.33a.

each yielding thirteen lakhs. They consisted of:-

1. Aonla, Manauna, Budaon, Usaheth, Kot, etc.
2. Bareilly (southern part of it) ~~about~~, etc.
3. Muradabad, (southern part of it) etc.

The above three parts were allotted to the charge of the three elder sons, with each of whom was associated one of three younger ones for "training and Company". Thus Abdulla Khan with Murtaza Khan, received the first part, Faizulla Khan, with Muhammad Yar Khan, received the second part, and Sadulla Khan, with Allah Yar Khan, received the third part. Accordingly, while Sadulla Khan went to Muradabad to take over the charge of his jagir, Abdulla Khan and Faizulla Khan, taking over the charge of their own jagirs, stayed at the Palace at Aonla.¹

But this arrangement had not worked for long when trouble arose at Aonla between Abdulla Khan and Faizulla Khan. The authors of the Gulistan-i-Rahmat and the Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh, assert that Abdulla Khan attempted to murder Faizulla Khan.²

1. Faiz Bukhsh, f.33a-33b.

2. Gulistan, f.65a-65b. It further says Abdulla attempted to kill Hafiz Rahmat Khan after his failure to assassinate Faizulla. Faiz Bakhsh, f.33b - It says "Abdulla had enmity and jealousy of Faizulla ingrained in his heart and one day in one of his weak moments, did an act which nobody does to a brother or a relative."

Hamilton, however, informs us that the matter was actually a riot between the domestics of the two brothers over a trifling affair but warmly espoused by their masters.¹ Nevertheless, this incident provided a good pretext for the four chief officials who at once called the Council and succeeded in persuading it to expel Abdulla Khan from Rohilkhand, on the ground that he was a menace to the welfare of the State and the ruling family.² Accordingly, Abdulla Khan was obliged to go away from Aonla on the same day and he was followed into exile by both the two younger brothers at Aonla, Muhammad Yar Khan and Allah Yar Khan, presumably because they bitterly resented the injustice done to Abdulla Khan.

After the expulsion of Abdulla Khan the Council had Sadulla Khan brought back from Muradabad and put at the head of the State as before.³ At the same time the personal possessions of Ali Muhammad Khan were again put under the charge of the Naib-i-Mustaqil, except the parganas of Rampur, Shahabad, Chachet, etc. an area yielding five lakhs of rupees annually,

1. Hamilton, Rohilla Afghans, pp. 118-19.

2. Faiz Bakhsh, f.34a. It gives the details but says that Abdulla went away from Rohilkhand because the chiefs would not eat or drink unless he did so.

3. Faiz Bakhsh, f.34a.

which was left to Faizulla Khan.¹

Abdulla Khan with his two younger brothers stayed for some time near Farrukhabad and was all the time supported with funds by Fateh Khan Khansaman.² Finally, he wrote a letter of apology to the Council and was even helped by Ahmud Khan Bangash who interceded on his behalf for a pardon. The Council, therefore, agreed to recall him and he was given a jagir comprising Sahsawan, Ojhani, Shahadagnagar etc. an area yielding five lakhs of rupees annually.³ Henceforth, Abdulla Khan dissociated himself completely from worldly affairs and lived the life of a hermit at Ojhani, until his death, which was occasioned by the bite of a snake.⁴

Some time after this the four chief officials on the ground of the dissipation of Sadulla Khan, which threw the whole burdon of the administration in his own possessions on Hafiz Rahmat Khan, carried out with the sanction of the Council, a partition of Sadulla's possessions among themselves, allowing

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1. Faiz Bakhsh, f.34a-35a. It further says that Faizulla stayed for some time at Bareilly, but being hurt at the actions of the sons of Hafiz, came back to his own possessions and settled down at Rampur.
 2. Faiz Bakhsh, f.34a. Khansaman supported Abdulla because the two younger sons of Ali Muhammad Khan, who were with him, were left by the late Nawab under his ward.
 3. Faiz Bakhsh, f.34b.
Gulistan, f.65a-66b.
 4. Faiz Bakhsh, f.34b, 73a-73b.

the Nawab a pension of eight lakhs of rupees annually.¹ Thus Hafiz Rahmat Khan received Bareilly, Dundi Khan Muradabad, Mulla Sadar Khan, ^{the territories of and the neighbourhood} ~~Barabanki~~ Kot, and Fateh Khan, Aonla, Budaon and Usahat. At the same time, to please the Resaladars in the Nawab's possessions, these four officials gave them as jaidad the respective divisions they had under their charge, thus bringing them to the same status as their previous Resaladars.² The pension of eight lakhs of rupees to Sadulla Khan was provided as follows:- three lakhs each were to be contributed by Hafiz Rahmat Khan and Dundi Khan and the remaining two lakhs by Fateh Khan and Mulla Sardar Khan.³

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1. Faiz Bakhsh, f.35a. It also asserts that Hafiz Rahmat Khan, Fateh Khan, Dundi Khan and Bakhshi Sadar Khan got Sadulla engaged in luxuries and games to carry out this partition. Gulistan, f.63b. - gives the details, but says that Hafiz, who was ruler of the Rohilkhands, distributed these parts to other Jagirdars. It further gives Sadulla's pension as seven lakhs of rupees annually.
 2. Gulistan, f.63b.
Vide - pp.278-81, details about Resaladars and Jagirdars.
 3. Faiz Bakhsh, f.35a. Bakhshi's name is not included in the list for the payment of the pension to the Nawab, but it seems that two lakhs should be paid to Khansaman was also to be shared by the Bakhshi, these two receiving only a small share of the Nawab's territories, for the same authority in f.90b says Bakhshi Ahmad Khan, the son of Mulla Sadar Khan had not paid the fifty thousand due to the widow of Sadulla Khan.

This change, however, although it dispossessed the Nawab of his personal possessions, did not alter his status. He continued to be the nominal head of the State and the business of the State was carried on as usual by the Naib-i-Mustaqil, under the supervision of the Council. But the Council, which had all along been dominated by the four officials was from now onwards absolutely in the hands of the two chief officials, Hafiz Rahmat Khan and Dundi Khan, who had received the lions' share in the late partition¹, so much so, that on the death of Badulla Khan (1763) they did away with the Nawabship, retaining, however, the post of deputy Nawab.²

During the time of Sadulla Khan, however, all the foreign affairs of the State were conducted in the name of the Nawab, although his deputy, Hafiz Rahmat Khan, carried on the actual transactions. Thus, when Raghunath Rao, stopped at Garh Mukhteswar (1756) to realise the fifty lakhs for the bond given to them by the Rohillas in 1752, we hear the name of Hafiz

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1. Faiz Bakhsh, f.73a. "Sardar Khan and Fateh Khan always followed Hafiz and Dundi, against whose wishes nobody could do a thing."
 2. Tawarikh-i-Afaghana, f.68b. It also says Hafiz and Dundi had all the power in the State.
Faiz Bakhsh, f.90b.
Sadulla's widow was given a small pension.

Rhamat Khan only, although Sadulla Khan was also present there.¹ Similarly, Hafiz Rahmat is mentioned in all the Rohilla affairs in the Camp of Ahmad Shah Abdalli (1760-61) to the exclusion of Sadulla Khan. And, finally, when after Panipat, the Afghan King returned home, of the Maratha possessions given by him to the Rohillas in the lower Doab, Etawa was allotted to Enayat Khan, the eldest son of Hafiz Rahmat Khan and Shakohabad to Dundi Khan, to the complete exclusion of Sadulla Khan.

The affairs in the Rohilkhand State moved on smoothly without any further changes till the invasion of the Marathas in 1770 and the only thing of note that is recorded by the Rohilla historians about the activity of the Government in internal affairs, is the passing of the law in 1768 abolishing the duties on all goods passing through the country, which made living in Rohilkhand exceedingly cheap. ²

The first dissensions in the Rohilla State occurred in 1770 when Dundi Khan and Hafiz Rahmat Khan disagreed on the question of the surrender of the Rohilla possessions in the Doab

1. Faiz Bakhsh, f.35b.

Vide, p.127

2. Gulistan, f.144a.

Wendel - Orme Mss. 216, p.22.

"Living is very cheap in Rohilkhand and one could buy forty to fifty chickens for a rupee."

to the Marathas and Dundi Khan withdrew his forces from that of Hafiz, who was preparing to oppose the Marathas.¹ But, fortunately for the Rohillas, the treacherous attack of the Marathas on Najib Khan, who was then with them, re-united Dundi Khan and Hafiz Rahmat Khan. But the real dissensions among the Rohilla chiefs started after the death of Dundi Khan on the 18th April 1771. Hafiz Rahmat Khan wanted to usurp all the powers in the State and hence with the sanction of the Council had Dundi Khan's territory divided between his three sons, namely, Muhibulla Khan, Fatehulla Khan and Azimulla Khan.² This led to quarrels among the three brothers and hence Azimulla Khan was deprived of his possessions, which were divided between Muhibulla Khan and Fatehulla Khan. But the difference between Muhibulla and Fatehulla Khan continued for the former thought that since he was the eldest son, he had been unjustly deprived of his rights, which gave him the possession of all the territories of his father.

1. Faiz Bakhsh, f.74a. Dundi marched away to Bisauli, his headquarters, refusing to follow Hafiz to Fatehgarh, where he was going to joined by Ahmad Khan Bangash and Shuja-ud-daula to oppose the Marathas, because it was contrary to the interests of his son-in-law, Najib Khan.

2. Faiz Bakhsh, f.76a. Akhbar-i-Hasan, f.54b. - gives the above date of Dundi's death.

Only a year after this Mulla Sardar Khan Bakhshi died (July 1772), leaving six sons.¹ Hafiz again followed his previous policy and had the Bakhshi's possessions given to the eldest son, Ahmad Khan but deprived him of the office of Bakhshi, which was given to the second son, Muhammad Khan. The result was that some time after Muhammad Khan, being encouraged by Enayat Khan, marched out of Aonla with his army to take possession of his brother's territories, and the contingents of the various Chiefs of Rohilkhand had to march up to chastise Muhammad Khan. After a battle in which the rebel was defeated and taken prisoner, Ahmad Khan was again settled in his father's possessions and was also given the office of Bakhshi.²

Following upon this came the rebellion of Enayat Khan, because Hafiz Rahmat Khan had failed to comply with his repeated request for a suitable jagir in lieu of ^{his} jagir in Etawa, which had already been surrendered to the Marathas (middle of November 1772).³ He posted himself at Bareilly and began to enlist troops.

1. Faiz Bakhsh, f.80a.

2. Faiz Bakhsh, f.81a.

3. Faiz Bakhsh, f.82b-85b.

Sel.Com.Pro. 12 December 1772. Letter - Harper 17 Nov.

Sel.Com.Pro. 7 Jan.1773. Letters - Harper 2nd Dec. and 6 Dec.

Hafiz Rahmat Khan who had made Pilibhit his head-quarters, marched up from there to subdue Enayat, but the latter prepared ^{from} to oppose him/within the walls of the fort. Hence, in order to save the citizens of Bareilly from any injury, Hafiz preferred not to take the place by assault and quickly sent to Enayat Khan a grant of the Parganas of Faridpur and Salimpur, with the sole purpose of getting him out of the city. Enayat Khan fell into the snare and marched out of Bareilly to take possession of his jagir with the five thousand men then under his command. Thus, while still on his way, Enayat Khan was overtaken by the armies of the Rohilla chiefs that had assembled near Bareilly in answer to the call of Hafiz. The vanguard was attacked and defeated by Enayat Khan, but on the following day when the main army advanced to attack him, Enayat, after a short resistance, surrendered and was pardoned by Hafiz Rahmat Khan. He then started for Oudh to seek the assistance of Shuja-ud-daula for the purpose of recovering his possessions of Etawa from the Marathas. (beginning of December 1772).

About a year after, as soon as the Maratha menace disappeared because of their return to the Deccan (May 1773) Ahmad Khan Bakhshi, by spending all the savings of his father, enlisted a large army and stopped the remittance of his dues to the Central Government.¹ No action was taken against him

1. Faiz Bakhsh, f.90b.

by Hafiz, because none of the Chiefs was prepared to risk an engagement with the then powerful army of the Bakhshi.

During the same year, Fateh Khan Khansaman died, leaving six sons. Hafiz again acted on his former principle and, inspite of the wishes of some of the chiefs, that Ahmad Khan, the eldest son, should be given the charge of the State, and the second son, Azan Khan, made Khansaman, he divided Fateh Khan's possessions equally among these two sons, giving the office of Khansaman to Ahmad Khan.¹ This led to a rivalry between the two brothers which increased in bitterness as time went on.

Such was the condition of the State of Rohilkhand when Shuja-ud-daula started negotiations with the different chiefs of Rohilkhand to, join him in his war against Hafiz Rahmat Khan. Muhibulla Khan and Fatehulla Khan, the sons of Dundi Khan, actually entered into an agreement with Shuja, promising to remain neutral in the coming struggle. But they were apprehensive of the sincerity of Shuja and, after remaining undecided for some time, joined Hafiz Rahmat Khan on the day of battle at Kattrra (23 April 1774). But the chief officials of the State gave Hafiz a ~~very~~ half-hearted support and actually desired his destruction, because, due to the late action of Hafiz in

1. Faiz Bakhsh, f.92a-92b - gives the details of the quarrels.

having their possessions divided, they believed that he was "engaged in their destruction." 1

1. Faiz Bakhsh, f.94b-95a.

CHAPTER X.**The Rohilla War and the Treaty of Laldang.**

While Hastings was negotiating with Shuja-ud-daula at Benares, the assassination of the Peshwa, Narayan Rao (30 August 1773) divided the Marathas into two hostile camps, one the supporters of Raghunath Rao, who was the uncle of the late Peshwa and implicated in his murder, and the other the Court party, who supported the claims of a supposed posthumous son of Narayan Rao. The news reached Shuja-ud-daula immediately after Hastings' departure for Calcutta and, having been encouraged by the President's display of eagerness for the acquisition of Rohilkhand to him, during the conference at Benares, he at once decided to take possession of the Doab, ^{by} adjoining Kora, driving out the small Maratha garrisons posted in those parts, and accordingly wrote to the President enquiring if the English forces would be allowed to participate with him in his present adventure, should he have occasion for their assistance (middle of October 1773).¹

But Shuja-ud-daula, before he would receive a reply to his letter from Calcutta, heard the news that the Emperor had sent out a large army under Najaf Khan to be joined by the armies of Zabeta Khan, his Mir Bakhshi, for the purpose of bringing

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 19 Nov.1773. Letter - Shuja-ud-daula,
received on 23rd October.

under subjection both the Jat and the Maratha possessions in the Doab; and that Hafiz Rahmat Khan was negotiating with the Emperor offering to co-operate with the Imperial Army against the Jats, provided the Maratha possessions in the Doab which had previously belonged to Enayat Khan and Dundi Khan were ceded to him.¹ This made him at once march up with his army towards the Doab and open up negotiations with the Emperor, to secure the Maratha possessions for himself in return for his co-operation in the subjugation of the Jat possessions for the Emperor. At the same time he wrote to the President at Calcutta desiring to be informed if the offer of the help of the English forces on terms agreed upon at Benares still held good.²

The Emperor agreed to the Wazir's proposals and while Shuja-ud-daula engaged himself in the subjugation of Etawa and Shakohabad from the Marathas, the Imperial army under Najaf Khan marched up to join him (end of October). Hafiz Rahmat Khan protested against the action of the Wazir and perhaps began to negotiate with the Jats.³ The result was that the Jat Regent, Naval Singh, being informed of the intentions of the Emperor and

1. Ain-i-Alam Shahi, II, f.17b-27b.

Sel.Com.Pro. 19 Nov.1773. Letter - Shuja-ud-daula received on the 18th Nov.

Tawarikh-i-Afaghana, f.73a.

2. Sel.Com.Pro. 19 Nov.1773. Letter - Shuja-ud-daula, received on the 18th Nov.

3. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.179b.

the Wazir regarding the Jat possessions in the Doab, marched up and intercepted the Imperial army on its way to join Shuja-ud-daula, when they were in the middle Doab. A fierce engagement followed but the Jats were defeated and were obliged to cross back to the other side of the Jamna (30 October).¹ The Imperialists now invested Agra, and were also joined by a large detachment sent by the Wazir who was by this time in possession of Etawa and Shakohabad.²

While the siege of Agra was still in progress, Shuja-ud-daula sent Elich Khan, his minister, to Delhi with the proposals to give half of the territories that would be conquered if the Emperor joined him in his expedition against the State of Rohilkhand.³ Shuja-ud-daula himself marching towards Farrukhabad, forced the Nawab Muzaffar Jang to conclude a treaty of alliance which made the Bangash Nawab virtually dependant on him.⁴ He then wrote letters to Zabeta Khan offering to spare the latter his part of the possessions in Rohilkhand in return for his co-operation⁵.

1. Secret Committee Pro. 26 Nov. 1773. Paper of Intelligence received by the President.

2. Sel.Com.Pro. 10 Feb. 1774. Letter - Shuja-ud-daula.

3. Sel.Com.Pro. 10 Feb. 1774. Letter - Shuja-ud-daula.
Sel.Com.Pro. 2 June 1774. Letter - Champion 16 May.
Fifth Report - Committee of Secrecy 1781. App. No. 27.

4. Tarikh-i- Faiz Bakhsh, f. 93a.

5. Idem, f. 93a.

About this time Shuja-ud-daula received a letter from the President informing him of the new terms on which the English army could be hired out to him for his expedition. Shuja had no idea of rejecting the terms proposed, for according to his preparations it seems he was determined upon carrying out the Rohilla expedition. Further, his preparations, particularly insofar as the alliance with the Emperor was concerned, seems to have been done with the knowledge and perhaps direction of the President as a private letter received by Shuja-ud-daula at the same time, from him, shows.¹

Hence Shuja-ud-daula's reply at this time to the Government of Calcutta, implying indirect refusal to the new terms proposed by them was evidently done on the direction of the President himself, for immediately on the acceptance of his offer by the Emperor, Shuja-ud-daula, made a formal requisition of the assistance of the English Brigade accepting the terms that had been proposed. At the same time Shuja marched up to Koriaganj and, being joined by Zabeta Khan, awaited for the arrival the Emperor then on his way from Delhi.² But, while he was thus

1. Sel.Com.Pro.10 Feb.1774. Letter - Shuja-ud-daula - It says he has received the letter of the President about obtaining the remission of the Bengal tribute from the Emperor.

Sel.Com.Pro. 2 June 1774. Letter - President to Champion.

"I own it was my original wish that the King or Najaf Khan on his part, should be included in the participation which has actually place of the Rohilla dominion, as it would quicken the issue of the war, obviate one source of competition and still keep the connection of interest between us and the King."

2. Faiz Bakhsh, f.93a. : Sel.Com.Pro.18 April 1774.
Letter - Champion 26 March.
Letter - Middleton 3 April.

encamped he also started secret negotiations with the sons of Dundi Khan, who had been alienated from Hafiz Rahmat Khan due to his late intention of taking possession of their father's jagir of Shakohabad for himself, and finally came to a secret arrangement with them by which he promised to spare them their possessions, in Rohilkhand, for their neutrality in the ~~y~~ coming war with Hafiz Rahmat Khan. Some other smaller Rohilla chiefs were also secretly won over.¹

Then on the news of the arrival of the English army under Col. Champion on the frontiers of Oudh and the return of the Emperor to Delhi due to an indisposition while on the march², Shuja-ud-daula marched up with Zabeta Khan to join the English forces at Sandy, by crossing the Ganges at Mehdyghat.³ (end of March 1774). Joining Col. Champion in the second week of April the Wazir immediately sending a formal demand of forty lakhs of rupees to Hafiz Rahmat Khan marched forward towards Rohilkhand.⁴

Hafiz Rahmat Khan on the other hand, at the first news of the arrival of the English army near the frontiers of Oudh,

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 18 April 1774. Letter - Middleton 3 April.
ditto. 15 July 1774. Letter - Muhibulla Khan and
Batehulla Khan, the sons of Dundi Khan, to
Champion.
2. Sel.Com.Pro. 2 June 1774. Letter - Champion 16 May.
3. Sel.Com.Pro. 18 April 1774. Letter - Champion 26 March.
4. Sel.Com.Pro. 27 April 1774. Letter - Champion 13 April.
Faiz Bakhsh, f.94a.

sending his family to Pilibhit, marched up with ten thousand men and encamped at Jalalabad, waiting to be joined by the contingents of the other chiefs.¹ At the same time he wrote a letter to Col.Champion saying that when the Treaty of Alliance was signed in 1772, General Barker had said that the "performance of this Treaty will be regarded by us both." Hafiz also pointed out that since the conclusion of the Treaty he had remained loyal to his engagements, whereas the Nawab Wazir had been consistently plotting his destruction. The letter concluded with a request to know whether Barker's promise still held good.²

On the 13th April Col.Champion in his reply to Hafiz, pointed out that the only advice he could give him was that in all "desires and demands of the Nawab Wazir you act conformably to his pleasure."³

Then, when the allied army had already entered Rohilkhand, Champion received a second letter from Hafiz Rahmat Khan on the 18th April in which the Rohilla stated that since he had never acted contrary to the Nawab's pleasure but always conformably

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1. Sel.Com.Pro. 18 April 1774. Letter - Champion 31 March.
 2. Secret Com.Pro. 2 Jan 1775. Letter - Hafiz received on 12 April 1774.
 3. Ibid, - reply by Champion to Hafiz 13 April.

to it, he hoped the Colonel would intercede with the Nawab on his behalf.¹ And the reply to this letter was sent by Champion on the 19th April, in which he informed Hafiz Rahmat Khan that "the Nawab's pleasure is this, that for having afforded the Rohilla tribe aid and assistance for three years, the sum of two crores of rupees have been expended. If you think proper, write to be distinctly what your ability is, but it is most advisable that you comply with the Nawab's demand."² Hafiz was at the same time informed that if his answer to the letter was not received on the same day the English army would march forward with the Wazir on the day following. The Wazir, inspite of a reply from Hafiz to Champion on the same day, pleading poverty and informing him that "after a consultation with the other chiefs an explicit answer shall be sent", and inspite of another letter on the 22nd April, with the seals of the three other chiefs affixed to it, saying that a trusty accountant should be sent on the part of the Wazir to ascertain the exact financial condition of the Rohillas³, had continued to advance according to his original plan and on the 22nd April, Champion's reply to Hafiz was that "the Nawab has not given any reply that

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1. Secret Com.Pro. 2 Jan.1775. Letter - Hafiz to Champion.
 2. Ibid - reply, Champion to Hafiz.
 3. Ibid - letters- Hafiz received 19th and 22nd April.

I can write to you" and that "consequent to this should we do so it shall be written to you in a day or two and I hope it will be such as will prove satisfactory to you."¹

Thus it seems fairly obvious that Hafiz Rahmat Khan was now prepared to pay the forty Lakhs which the Wazir had claimed from him and that the Wazir who had used the question of default in the payment of the above sum merely to get the support of the English troops, was determined upon conquering Rohilkhand and had accordingly made an impossible demand from Hafiz Rahmat Khan. The mention in the Gulistan-i-Rahmat, of the refusal of Hafiz Rahmat Khan to accede to the offer of his Diwan Pahar Singh, who was prepared to borrow money for him from some Mahajans (money lenders), refers definitely to the raising of the enormous sum demanded by Shuja-ud-daula and not the forty lakhs laid claim to by him, for the Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh says definitely that Hafiz had to resort to war because he did not have enough money to come to an agreement.²

A battle was finally fought on the 23rd April 1774 at Miranpur Kattrra, where Hafiz Rahmat Khan, after retreating from Jalalabad had posted himself. ~~According to~~ According to

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1. Secret Com.Pro. 2 Jan.1775. Letter - Champion to Hafiz, 22 April.
 2. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.183a.
Faiz Bakhsh, f.96b,
Reply of Hafiz to Faizulla that " I have not got enough money to make peace".

Col. Champion, Hafiz had an army of forty thousand men under him, for, before the battle, he had been joined by all the Chiefs of Rohilkhand, including the sons of Dundi Khan, although the latter had bound themselves ~~xxxx~~ in a treaty with Shuja-ud-daula, to remain neutral.¹ The Rohillas showed great bravery and resolution and, inspite of the superior artillery of their opponents, did not give in till after they had faced a severe cannonade of two hours and twenty minutes and had seen Hafiz Rahmat Khan fall dead in the action. The fighting against the Rohillas was done by the English troops mainly, supported by the Wazir's infantry, his chosen cavalry remaining with him behind the battlefield. The Wazir, however, soon appeared on the scene when the Rohillas had already turned their backs and took an active part in the plunder of the already deserted Rohilla tents. The loss in battle was "over two thousand men" on the Rohilla side and one hundred and eighteen (38 of the Company's men) men on the Wazir's.²

The Rohilla fugitives from the battlefield rushed towards their respective homes and after reaching there, made up their minds about their future course of action, while the Wazir

1. Faiz Bakhsh, f.98b.

Akhbar-i-Hasan, f.45a.

Sel.Com.Pro. 9 May 1774. - Letter - Champion 24 April.

2. Sel.Com.Pro. 9 May 1774. Letters - Champion 24 April & 2 May.

staying for six days on the battlefield, did nothing besides sending out detachments to plunder the neighbouring countryside¹. The sons of Hafiz Rahmat Khan, preferring to throw themselves on Shuja-ud-daula's generosity, stayed with their family at Pilibhit, and finally Muhabbat Khan and Muhammad Zulfiqar Khan^x started for the Wazir's camp to pay their respects to him. The sons of Dundi Khan, namely, Mohibulla Khan and Fatehulla Khan, because of their previous agreement with Shuja-ud-daula, were not apprehensive of any danger to themselves, and hence stayed at Bisauli. Faizulla Khan, however, preferring to seek safety in the jungles, taking all his treasures and family from Aonla, retired northwards with his five thousand followers through the Tarai lands to Laldang, a naturally fortified post in the thick forest at the foot of the Garhwal mountains and beyond the boundaries of Rohilkhand.² The lead taken by Faizulla, in not trusting to Shuja-ud-daula's mercy, was soon followed by many other Rohilla chiefs and their followers. Thus, Ahmad Khan Bakhshi, Ahmad Khan Khansaman, Muhammad Mustaqim Khan and many other smaller jagirdars, rallied to Faizulla's standard at Laldang. This was also followed by the accumulation of a large number of Rohillas from the armies of Hafiz

1. Faiz Bakhsh, f.98b.

Sel.Com.Pro. 1st July 1774. Letter - Champion 12 June. He says plundering was continued for three days after the battle.

2. Faiz Bakhsh, f.98b-99b. : Akhbār-i-Hasan, f.48a.

Tawarikh-i-Afaghana, f.74a: Jissai-Ahwāl-i-Rohilla, f.58b.

Rahmat Khan under Faizulla. Faizulla Khan finding himself at the head of a large army began to prepare for opposition by fortifying his post. At the same time about sixty thousand of the population of Rohilkhand, including both the Rohillas and the Hindu officials in their employment, also sought shelter in the jungles round Laldang.¹

The victorious army marched forward from the battlefield early in the morning of the 29th April, towards Pilibhit and in spite of the voluntary surrender of the two elder sons of Hafiz Rahmat Khan at Deodhi, the palace at Pilibhit where the family of Hafiz Rahmat Khan had been lodged, was besieged. After this the ladies in the Palace were first stripped of their jewels and ornaments and then were packed into forty-five covered hackeries and carried prisoners to the Wazir's camp, where they had little water to drink and were provided with insufficient food, causing so much hardship that they wrote pathetic letters to Col. Champion to deliver them from their present misery, saying "It is better to give up life at once by the dagger than perish by hunger and thirst".²

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1. Sel.Com.Pro. 15 June 1774. Letter - Champion 28 May. He reckons the number of all the Rohillas assembled in the jungles to be over 100,000, but in a subsequent letter says "Faizulla had forty thousand soldiers under him. Hence the rest of the fugitives must be 60,000.
 2. Faiz Bakhsh, f.100a. :
 Sel.Com.Pro. 1 July 1774. Letter - Wife of Hafiz to Champion.
 Secret Com.Pro. 14 Feb. 1775. Reply of Champion to Shuja-ud-daula's written charge and the collection of the reports of the Harkarars, appointed by Champion appended to it.

The Wazir then marched on with his prisoners towards Bareilly and staying there only one day on his arrival (4 May) and making the ladies of Khan Muhammad Khan, one of the Jagirdars, in the palace there, prisoners, he proceeded towards Bisauli, by way of Aonla.¹ The ladies in the palace at Aonla, including the wife of the late Nawab, Sadulla Khan, being included in the train of the Wazir's prisoners, the army marched on and reaching Bisauli, encamped there for the rains (middle of May). The palace at Bisauli was put under guards and Shuja used to go inside the Haweli (ladies' quarter) every day to search for treasures. Finally, on the pretence that the sons of Dundi Khan were trying to remove their belongings from there, the ladies were dragged out in a humiliating way and sent to the Wazir's camp. Then, now that the Wazir had the families of all the principal chiefs of Rohilkhand, except those at Laldang in his camp as prisoners, he sent them all from Bisauli to Allahabad, and himself stayed at Bisauli to start operations immediately after the rains.²

1. Faiz Bakhsh, f.100a.

Sel.Com.Pro. 2 June 1774. Letter - Champion 4 May.

2. Faiz Bakhsh, f.100a - 103a.

Sel.Com.Pro. 1 July 1774. Letter - Champion 12 June.

Sel.Com.Pro. 14 July 1774. Letter - Middleton 17 June.

Shuja-ud-daula soon after his arrival at Bisauli, was joined by Najaf Khan, who had been sent with the Imperial troops by the Emperor to represent him in the Wazir's expedition.¹ Najaf Khan, on his arrival, demanded from the Wazir the surrender of half of the conquered territories to the Emperor, according to the agreement that had been signed. But Shuja evaded Najaf Khan's request on the ground that the agreement signed held good only if the Emperor had joined in person, although no such condition was included in the terms of the Treaty itself.² And finally when Shuja-ud-daula asked Zabeta Khan to withdraw all his troops from his territories in Rohilkhand leaving a small garrison at Najibgur to the other side of the Ganges, on the ground that he could not distinguish between his forces and that of Faizulla's during his future operations, Najaf Khan, inspite of Shuja's promise to Zabeta Khan that his territories would again be put under his control after the subjugation of Faizulla Khan became convinced of Shuja's real intentions regarding Rohilkhand and hence followed Zabeta Khan when he started from Bisauli for his possessions in the Doab, to go back to Delhi (21 May).³

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 2 June 1774 - Letter - Champion 16 May.

2. Sel.Com.Pro. 14 July 1774 - Copies of Treaty between Shuja and the Emperor.

3. Sarkar - Indian Historical Quarterly 1935, p.646.

Sel.Com.Pro. 2 June 1774. Letter - Champion 21 May.

Meanwhile, Col. Champion had received letters both from Faizulla Khan and Ahmad Khan Khansaman, professing willingness to come to terms for their own possessions and the former actually promising to pay twenty lakhs of rupees (15 May).¹ Next day replies to them were sent by Champion according to the wishes of the Wazir to the purport that the Nawab Wazir was the master of the country and the English in accordance with their engagements, had come to his aid, and that the Wazir did not want any of the Rohilla chiefs to ~~come~~ settle in Rohilkhand.² At the same time Shuja-ud-daula wrote a letter to Faizulla Khan signifying his intention of coming to terms with him and asking him to come up and settle the details of it personally.³

But Faizulla guessed Shuja-ud-daula's evil intentions and wrote back to the Wazir saying that he would come up only on condition that his safety was assured by the English Commander-in-Chief. He also wrote a letter to Champion informing him of his reply to the Wazir and begging him to arrange an interview with the Wazir if he could be assured of English protection.

1. Secret Com.Pro. 14 Feb. 1775. Letter - Champion to the Board and the enclosures.

The account given below is also based mainly on the above authority which is supported by true copies of all the letters quoted in it.

2. Ibid, Replies of Champion to Faizulla Khan and Ahmad Khan Bakhshi, 16 May 1774.

3. Ibid, Letter - Faizulla 24 May.

Shuja-ud-daula, finding his plot thus frustrated, now decided upon granting Faizulla Khan territory in the Doab equal to what he actually possessed in Rohilkhand, in return for the twenty lakhs of rupees offered. Accordingly, a reply was sent to Faizulla by Col. Champion proposing the above terms and asking him to come up for an interview, and at the same time assuring him of English protection. (27 May).¹

Faizulla Khan, who because of the late control exercised by Sir Robert Barker over the Nazir, was under the impression that Shuja-ud-daula was a mere dependant of the English, and had thought Champion's previous reply to his letter was only the outcome of his disapproval to his proposal regarding his own possessions, in Rohilkhand, replied to Champion's letter on the same day offering to pay whatever sum was considered necessary for the lease of the whole of Rohilkhand and sent his wakils to the English Commander with definite proposals.² They were:

First - "To pay the Company eighty lakhs of rupees if they put him in possession of all the Rohilla country exclusive of Zabeta Khan's: this sum to be paid in three years and Faizulla Khan's son to be given as hostage till the money is paid, or he will give a subsidy of thirty lakhs per annum."

Second - "If the first proposition is not agreeable

1. Secret Com. Pro. 14 Feb. 1775. Letter - Champion to Faizulla.
2. Sel. Com. Pro. 15 June 1774. Letter - Champion 28 May. Faiz Bakhsh, f. 94a. It says "The Nawab was the dependant of the English".

to the English, let them put the Wazir in their place and engage for his faith: in that case Faizulla will pay the eighty lakhs to the Wazir in three years, and put his son into the hands of the English till the eighty lakhs are paid to the Nawab."

Third - "Or he will pay the Nawab six annas in the rupee or at His Excellency's option, thirty lakhs annually and give the Company twenty five lakhs if they will influence the Nawab to put him in possession of the country and guarantee the treaty: the twenty five lakhs to be paid, ten lakhs in hand, five lakhs in two months after the agreement and the remaining ten in two months more and in either of these cases he will have fifteen thousand men ready to join the English and the Wazirs on all occasions."

These propositions excepting the offer made to the Company independant of the Nawab, were conveyed to the Wazir by Champion and were rejected by him with the "greatest disdain", and accordingly Faizulla's wakils were sent back with a letter from Champion in which the Rohilla chief was informed that the Wazir "will not consent that either you or any other Rohilla shall have one foot of land in this country", that the Wazir "offers you the same quantity of country you have possessed here, in the Doab", and that "if you chose to accept this, it is well, if not, there is no other choice."
(28 May).

After this the Rohillas at Laldang, because of the attitude of the Wazir and the English Commander, began to give a willing air to the proposals of the Emperor, who, being dissatisfied with the Wazir's breach of promise, had invited them to come over and join him.¹ This made Shuja-ud-daula apprehensive of his own security but he was not prepared to allow the Rohillas any settlement in Rohilkhand. Hence, according to his direction, Col. Champion, wrote a letter to Faizulla Khan on the 8th June, telling him that because he had written to the Board at Calcutta recommending his case in a friendly manner and is waiting "impatiently for replies, ...it is necessary and advisable that you do not comply with the King's desires until answers come from Calcutta."² Nor did this letter fail to have the desired effect, for Faizulla was "lulled into inactivity by the hope which he entertained of the interposition of the English Government", and thus lost the chance of crossing over the Ganges at Baisyghat and Chandyghat, while the river was still fordable. And it was not till the 8th July that the Rohilla was informed by Champion

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1. Secret Com. Pro. 14 Feb. 1775. Letter - Champion to the Board. He tells us of the anxiety of the Wazir because of the intrigues of the Emperor with the Marathas, and his determination to humiliate the Wazir.
 2. Ibid, Letter - Champion to the Board.

that the Board of Calcutta "write that the Rohilla country being in the possession of the Nawab Wazir and he the ruler thereof, whatever, he may chose to do in the settlement of it, it would not be proper for them to interfere therein."

The very next day after this message was conveyed to Faizulla Khan at Laldang, the Wazir heard the news that Zabeta Khan was sending supplies of grain to Faizulla Khan and the news was ^{soon} followed by the information that the Emperor was intriguing with the Marathas and was urging on Faizulla Khan to stand his ground till reinforced by him. Hence Shuja-ud-daula decided upon striking a blow at the enemy before the rainy season was over and accordingly marched ^{towards} up Laldang on the 30th July, being delayed for a few days by the hesitation of the English commander to take the field in the distant hilly country during the rains.

But when Shuja-ud-daula was still on his way, hearing the report that the Afghan king, Timur Shah, "had determined to take the field" against him and that the Emperor was "ready to adopt any measure to humiliate" him¹, and being apprehensive lest the Rohillas should retire into the mountains and thus

1. Secret Com.Pro. 14 Feb.1775. Letter - Champion to the Board.

"gain time until his attention should be called off" by his enemies, sent to Faizulla Khan through Champion, a proposal to give him a jagir for 15,000 men in his lately conquered possessions in the Doab ~~thence~~ in return for half of his treasures and effects." (13 Aug.). But Faizulla, dreading the power of the Marathas, declined accepting a settlement in the Doab, and offered half his treasures and effects if the Wazir would grant him a settlement in Rohilkhand (15 Aug.). At this Shuja-ud-daula again communicated to Faizulla through Champion that he was also prepared to enter into a mutual agreement by which he and the Company would engage to protect him in the Doab against any attempt on the part of the Marathas to recover it. Even if Faizulla Khan did not see his way clear to accepting this proposal, the Wazir hoped that he would at least favour him with a personal interview (17 Aug.)¹ Faizulla Khan wrote back requesting Champion to send his secretary to him, to "hear from him" and "relate" to him all particulars, and on Shuja-ud-daula recommending a compliance with it, the secretary, Mr. Murray, accompanied by the field engineer, Lieut. Bruce, started for Laldang (20 Aug.). At the same time Shuja-ud-daula sent his own Wakils to Faizulla to exert their influence on him.

1. Secret Com.Pro. 14 Feb. 1775. Letter - Shuja to Champion, 17 Aug.

On the arrival of Mr. Murray, Champion's secretary, in the Rohilla camp, Faizulla Khan was prepared to accompany him to have an interview with the Wazir, but when the Rohillas recognised Lieut. Bruce^{as} the army surveyor, they became suspicious of the intentions of the Wazir and the English Commander, and hence they forced Faizulla to agree to send his eldest son, Ali Muhammad Khan, instead of going himself. But the offer was rejected by the Wazir and hence Mr. Murray was recalled (24 August).

Then on the 27th August, Shuja-ud-daula marched ^{forward} ~~over~~ from Putturgur (32 miles south of Laldang) where he had been encamped since the 16th August, detaching parties to cut off the enemy food supplies from across the Ganges, and on the 28th was within twenty miles of Laldang. But he was prevented at this time from striking a decisive blow at the Rohillas by the refusal of Col. Champion to march beyond the boundaries of Rohilkhand on the ground that according to the direction of his Government, he ~~xxxxxxxx~~ could not do so until he received a fresh order to the contrary.¹

But, while the Wazir was thus encamped within twenty miles of Laldang (Mohanpur), he heard the news that the Emperor was

Sel.Com.Pro. 6 Oct. 1774. Letter - Champion 28 Aug.

marching up the Doab, to the help of Faizulla Khan. Accordingly a detachment was sent on the 27th August to protect the ford of Chandyghat. And at the same time Shuja-ud-daula opened up negotiations for a settlement with Faizulla Khan through his own Wakils. A part of the Imperial army arrived on the opposite bank at Chandyghat and encamped there to be joined by the main body (28 August).¹ Hence Shuja decided upon marching up further towards Laldang, but heavy rains did not allow him to make a move till the 4th September. And when the army had only advanced ten miles, Shuja found his passage barred by impenetrable jungle and hence, halting there, ordered his men to cut a road through. The Rohillas at this move of the Wazir removed their families further up into the mountains and because the progress of the road then in construction was exceedingly slow, Shuja-ud-daula, apprehensive lest the main Imperial army should arrive to reinforce the Rohillas before they were reduced, wrote a letter to the Emperor desiring an interview on the bank of the Ganges to settle affairs with him.

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1. Secret Com.Proceedings. 14 Feb.1775. Letter - Champion to the Board. But he thought that the Imperialists had come up to the Wazir's help, perhaps because he was told so. Select Com.Pro. 6 October 1774 - Letter - Champion 10 Sept. says the Wazir has "actually addressed the Emperor to settle affairs with him."

On the 11th September, Champion received the permission of the Government of Calcutta to pass the boundary of Rohilkhand for the subjugation of Faizulla Khan and accordingly informed the Wazir. But Shuja-ud-daula, because of the severe rain and the possibility of the enemy retreating further into the hills, was desirous of coming to a settlement with Faizulla Khan and hence asked Champion to postpone the attack on the plea that he was under "a course of physis, which would continue for six days" (13 September). Then on the 14th September two wakils came from Faizulla Khan who informed Champion that the Wazir "had made proposals of accommodation to their master but that he (Faizulla) would trust the English only". The Wazir, being informed of this and convinced by this time that his "endeavour through his own people" would be of no avail, made an offer through Champion to Faizulla Khan of a jagir of ten lakhs annually in Rohilkhand and of the lease of the remainder of the country, if he agreed to keep only two or three thousand Rohillas for his guard, leaving the rest to be employed in the Wazir's service outside Rohilkhand, and to have the Wazir's troops stationed in Rohilkhand. (19 Sept.)

But Faizulla Khan, who had by this time become hopeful of Imperial support, did not send any reply till a reminder was sent to him by Champion on the 25th September, when he replied that "if the Wazir would not grant either of his former requests, fate must determine between them."

At this Shuja-ud-daula decided upon marching up further towards the enemy to force them to come to terms, and beginning the march on the 28th September, he reached within eight miles of Laldang on the 30th. Shuja-ud-daula then sent a letter to Faizulla through Champion, desiring to know at once if he were willing to come up and treat for terms and promising that "in this there is neither prejudice nor danger". A few minor skirmishes also took place between small scouting parties of both armies. Finally, on the 1st October when the Wazir's army was ready to march up, a wakil came from Faizulla to inform Champion that he would come up to treat with the Wazir next day and on the 2nd October when the English army was actually on the march, he presented himself in Col. Champion's camp.

Shuja-ud-daula received Faizulla Khan on the 3rd October. Immediately after that he communicated to Col. Champion ^{that he was willing} to give Faizulla ^a jagir of twelve lakhs of rupees in Rohilkhand, which included his former districts, in return for which the Rohilla would have to surrender half of his effects and limit his forces to five thousand only. Faizulla, when informed of it, requested the Colonel to plead with the Wazir to increase the jagir on the ground that twelve lakhs would be insufficient for the maintenance of all his relations and dependants. But the Wazir, inspite of Champion's recommendation, refused to "do more" for Faizulla (4th October). After

this, Shuja's minister, Elich Khan, arrived in Champion's camp, to make enquiries concerning Faizulla Khan's circumstances and desires. Faizulla solicited Elich Khan to intercede for him with the Wazir to procure for him a jagir of fourteen lakhs and seventy five thousand rupees and stated that he had 117,380 gold mohurs (coins) and 11400 ~~rupees~~ silver coins (rupees), besides his jewels and other effects. On Elich Khan's return with these particulars, Shuja-ud-daula immediately communicated to Faizulla Khan through Champion that a jagir to the amount ~~of~~ he had desired would be given, in return for half his effects. Accordingly, on the 6th October Faizulla again interviewed the Wazir and the terms of the treaty being settled, the two parties again met on the 7th when the treaty of Laldang was signed by them and was also attested by Col. Champion.¹

The terms of the Treaty were that, while Shuja-ud-daula gave to Faizulla Khan a jagir of the country of Rampur and the neighbouring districts, yielding a total revenue of Rs.1,475,000 annually and solemnly engaged to support the honour and character of Faizulla at all times and on all occasions; Faizulla Khan agreed that he would not enter into a connection with any person but Shuja; that he would

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 31 Oct.1774. True copies of the Treaty.

hold no correspondence with any person except the English Chief; that he would consider the enemies of Shuja as his enemies; that he should retain in his service five thousand troops and no more; that with whomsoever Shuja went to war, he would send two or three thousand men according to his ability, to join Shuja's troops; that if Shuja should march in person, he would himself accompany Shuja with his troops; and that he should send the remainder of the Rohillas under him across the Ganges.

The agreement regarding the payment of half of Faizulla's effects was not, however, entered in the Treaty itself, although Col. Champion had reminded Shuja-ud-daula about it before the Treaty was signed, because the Wazir's idea was to extort from Faizulla more money than what he would get by an equal division of his effects. And, from the time the Treaty was signed till the 14th October, there was daily argument over the subject between Faizulla Khan and Shuja's minister, who insisted on receiving money only instead of half of Faizulla's effects. Finally, being importuned by Champion, Faizulla Khan was constrained to agree to pay fifteen lakhs of rupees in ready money.¹

1. Secret Com.Pro. 14 Feb. 1775. Letter - Champion to the Board. He has a letter of Shuja appended to support his assertion, in which the Wazir thanks him for his help in this respect.

After this Faizulla Khan started for Laldang on the 15th October, to bring the fifteen lakhs for the Wazir and to direct the Rohillas assembled there to cross over to Zabeta Khan's territories, after selecting the five thousand he wanted to keep under himself. By the 23rd Oct. Faizulla was back at the Wazir's camp with the fifteen lakhs and while a party of the Rohillas had already crossed over, the remainder were ~~in camp~~ near Baisyghat, making preparations for crossing over. The Rohillas, who thus crossed over to the Doab, were reckoned by Champion to be twenty thousand men although the Tarikh-i-Faiz Bakhsh computes it at fifty thousand.¹ Faizulla Khan then returned to Rampur and took charge of his jagir.

The Rohillas who crossed over and joined the service of Zabeta Khan in the Doab, were besides the followers of various smaller chiefs, the troops of Ahmad Khan Bakhshi, And, Ahmad Khansaman and some other smaller chiefs like Mustafa Khan, Abdul Jabbar Khan, Muhammad Mustaqim Khan and others, were retained in the service of Faizulla Khan.²

After the Treaty with Faizulla Khan, Shuja-ud-daula threw

1. Parliamentary Papers, 1786. Evidence given by Champion on 3rd May.

Faiz Bakhsh, f. 116b.

2. Faiz Bakhsh, f. 119a.

off the mask about his promise to Zabeta Khan regarding the restoration of the latter's possessions in Rohilkhand as soon as the campaign was over.¹ The garrison left behind by Zabeta Khan at Najibgar were now driven away and ~~XXXX~~ Zabeta Khan's possessions were put under the charge of Muhammad Bashir Khan, one of the Wazir's officers. At the same time English forces remained encamped at Ramghat under Col. Gailliez, as a precaution against any attack by Zabeta Khan and the Emperor. For the protection and administration of the rest of Rohilkhand, Shuja-ud-daula left Mirza Sadat Khan, his son, at Bareilly and Mahbub Ali Khan, one of his officers, at Aonla.²

The Rohilla prisoners at Allahabad, which included among others, the families of Hafiz Rahmat Khan and Dundi Khan, after they had suffered great hardships for about a year due to the very meagre provisions made for them by Shuja-ud-daula were finally released on the recommendation of the English Government at Calcutta through the Resident, J. Bristow, by the new Nawab, Asaf-ud-daula, who had succeeded Shuja-ud-daula, on his death (26 January 1775), and were received by

1. Sarkar, Indian Historical Quarterly 1935. p.647.

2. Faiz Bakhsh, f.117a.

Faizulla Khan at Rampur.¹

1. Faiz Bakhsh, f.127a.

Secret Committee Proceedings, 26 April 1775.

Letter - Bristow 11 April 1775 and the decision of the
Committee.

CHAPTER XI.

The Administration and Military Tactics of the Rohillas.

The Constitution of the Rohilla State:-

The Nawab -

During the time of Ali Muhammad Khan who established the Rohilla State in the beginning of 1748 A.D., the Nawab had the complete control of all the external and internal affairs of the State, and although he had direct possession of only about half of Rohilkhand, which comprised the territories around Aonla, the Capital, his jagirdars who had the possession of the rest, were kept under a strict supervision by him through his numerous spies. But, on the death of Ali Muhammad Khan (26 September 1747) his successor, Sadulla Khan, being a minor, a permanent deputy to the Nawab was appointed, but his powers were merely nominal for all real power was now vested in a Council of all the Jagirdars, Resaladars and principal officials of the State. The Nawab, therefore, henceforth becomes the figure-head and his deputy had the power to carry into effect only

1. Faiz Bakhsh, f.33a.

The annual income from the Nawab's possessions was thirty nine lakhs of rupees.

Secret Com.Pro. 19 December 1775.

Answers to the questions of the Committee by Champion and Hannay shows Rohilkhand yielded during the Rohilla Government an annual revenue of over seventy lakhs of rupees.

what the Council gave him the permission to. About 1754 the personal possessions of the Nawab, by the ruling of the Council, were divided among his four Chief Officials and he was given a pension of eight lakhs of rupees annually. Finally, when Sadulla Khan died in 1763, the Nawabship was abolished in the sense that no one succeeded to the pension received by the Nawab, although his permanent deputy continued to act in the same way as before.²

The Naib-i-Mustaqil -

He was the permanent deputy of the Nawab and his duties were to look after the civil administration of the Nawab's personal possessions and to represent him in the conduct of the external affairs of the State, subject, however, to the direction of the Council. But because Hafiz Rahmat Khan who occupied this position was also one of the greater jagirdars and held ~~of~~ the office of the Diwan-i-Kul of the State, he had a great influence in the Council and in concert with the other three greater Jagirdars and Chief Officials, namely, Dundi Khan, Mulla Sardar Khan and Fateh Khan, exercised a controlling influence over it, so much so,

1. Faiz Bakhsh, f.35a.

2. Idem, f.62b and 73a.
Tawarikh-i-Afaghana, f.68b.

At this time all the sons of Ali Muhammad Khan were styled as Nawab.

that about 1754, he was able to have the Nawab's personal possessions divided by which he received a good share¹ and in 1763 succeeded in having the Nawabship abolished.²

The Jagirdars -

They received lands in perpetuity from the Nawab and had the sole control of the Civil Administration in their own jurisdictions.³ They paid a fixed revenue to the Nawab and were required to maintain troops according to the size of their jagirs. There were, however, four great Jagirdars who held extensive tracts of land and were also the chief officials of the State. These were Hafiz Rahmat Khan, Dundi Khan, Muller Sardar Khan and Fateh Khan, the original jagirs of whom were northern part of Bareilly, northern part of Murradabad, south-western part of Shahjahanpur and south-eastern part of Budaon respectively.⁴ The Jagirdars usually nominated their own successors, failing which their eldest son

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1. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, f.63b-64a. It says that Hafiz, who was a Nawab, divided the State among the officials to secure more leisure.
Faiz Bakhsh, f.35a. gives the correct details.
 2. Tawarikh-i-Afaghana, f.68b.
 3. Gulistan, f.12b. Pilibhit was given as jagir to Hafiz Rahmat Khan by Ali Muhammad Khan, who exercised the sole control of these territories and retained it till his death in 1774. Similarly, Dundi Khan retained his jagir of Muradabad right up to his death, and then passed it on to his successors.
 4. Faiz Bakhsh, f.33a and 35a.
Qissai Ahwal-Rohilla, f.17b-18a.

succeeded them.¹ But in both the cases the Nawab had the right to ratify the succession by the presentation of the customary robes.²

After the abolition of the Nawabship, however, this power was exercised by the Naib-i-Mustaqil who went even so far as to misuse the right by dividing a jagir among the different sons of the dead jagirdar.³

The jagirdars, after the death of Ali Muhammad Khan, were given a share in the control of the State, with the Resaladars, although the four great jagirdars were able to carry their point in the Council whenever they united against the smaller jagirdars because the Resaladars being dependant on them, always followed them; the smaller jagirdars were nevertheless able to play a decisive role when there was a division among the greater jagirdars.⁴

1. Faiz Bakhsh, f.79b and 91a. Mulla Sardar Khan, nominated his eldest son, Ahmad Khan, as his successor. Akhbar-i-Hasan, f.33b, 35a, 40b and 41b; on the death of Mulla Mohsin in 1772 his eldest son, Muhammad Hasan Khan succeeded him. Abdul Sattar Khan was also succeeded by his eldest son on his death.
2. Faiz Bakhsh, f.80a. Hafiz sent the robe of the State to Ahmad Khan on the death of Mulla Sadar Khan Bakhshi.
3. Vide, p. 243-47
4. Faiz Bakhsh, f.69a. Hafiz was prepared to assist Shuja-ud daula against the English after the battle of Baksar, but Dundi Khan was against it, and hence Hafiz could not carry his point in the Council.

The Resaladars -

They were in the beginning divided into two groups; those who were Resaladars of the four great Jagirdars and those who were Resaladars of the Nawab. The former received a jaidad from the jagirdars, whose presence in the capital because of the office they occupied in the State, were constantly needed.¹ These Resaladars remitted a fixed revenue to the jagirdars and also maintained an army according to the size of their jaidad. The latter were in charge of certain divisions of the Nawab's possessions, and maintained a fixed number of troops according to the size of the divisions they were put in charge of. But they were paid a fixed salary and were required to submit to the Nawab the whole of the revenue which their jurisdiction yielded.² But, after the division of the Nawab's possessions among the four great jagirdars, all the Resaladars in the Nawab's territories acquired the same status as the Resaladars under the Jagirdars had been enjoying, and received jaidads like the former Resaladars.³ All these Resaladars were represented in the Council but they invariably followed the decision of their own Jagirdars because most of them could be dispossessed of their office by them.⁴ Thus in actual practice there is

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1. Vide, p.246 The jaidads were of two kinds, namely Amli-jaidad (hereditary) and ordinary jaidad (life tenure).
 2. Gulistan, f.63b. : 3. Gulistan, f.63b-64a.
 4. Faiz Bakhsh, f.32b and 34a. : Gulistan, f.69a. The exception is in the case of those who had amli-jaidad.

not a single instance of a Resaladar being dispossessed of his jaidad. On the contrary, the office and possessions, were always confined to the same family, although the jagirdars exercised the formal right of choosing the new successor.¹

The Council -

It consisted of all the jagirdars, Resaladars and the officials of the State, including the Hindus, such as Dewan Man Rai and Raja Kunwar Singh Bakhshi. They decided all questions regarding both foreign and internal affairs involving general administration of the State, such as the division of the Nawab's possessions and the abolition of inland duties on goods passing through the country. The Council was practically controlled by the four great Jagirdars because of the power they derived from the existence of their Resaladars in the Council. But on the death of Dundi Khan, Mulla Sardar Khan and Fateh Khan, Hafiz Rahmat Khan, by virtue of his seniority and the respect in which he was held by the Rohillas in general, was able to usurp all the powers in the Council and this was one of the reasons why he received only lukewarm support from the chief Rohilla

1. Akhbar-i-Hasan, f.41a.

Faiz Bakhsh, f.83b. Shaikh Kabir, a Resaladar of Hafiz, was succeeded by his son, Mustaqin Khan, on the fresh appointment from Hafiz.

2. Vide, p.80.

officials in his war against the combined armies of Shuja-ud-daula and the English.

The Officials -

(1) The Dewan-i-Kul.

This post was occupied by Hafiz Rahmat Khan and he was in charge of all the revenue affairs of the State¹, which were confined to the collection of the revenue from the Jagirdars and Resaladars, because the amount of revenue to be paid by them was fixed by the Nawab, a power which Ali Muhammad Khan bequeathed after his death to the Council. In actual practice, however, there seems to have been no new assessment of revenue, since the time of Ali Muhammad Khan. The conduct of affairs of the Dewan-i-Kul was actually carried on by his Hindu secretary, perhaps due to the lack of knowledge on his part. Raja Man Rai who occupied this position was therefore styled Diwan, when Hafiz Rahmat Khan became Naib-i-Mustaqil.²

(2) The Sipah³ salar.

This post was occupied by Dundi Khan. He had the command of the entire Rohilla forces when on campaign and had the full control of the movements of the army and the

1. Imad-us-Saadat, p.42.
Hadiqat-ul-Aqalim, p.140.

2. Faiz Bakhsh, f.32b.

plan of action. All the Jagirdars including the greater ones, had to obey his orders.¹

(3) The Bakhshi -

This post was occupied by Mulla Sedar Khan. X

His duties seem to have been the payment of the salary of the standing army maintained by the State at the capital and the supply of equipment and provisions for the army during campaigns. But the work was actually done by his Hindu secretary, Raja Kunwar Singh, who was therefore also known as Bakhshi.²

(4) The Khansaman -

During the time of Ali Muhammad Khan, Fateh Khan was given this name, because he was in charge of both the privy and the public purse of the Nawab, beside the State store. But when the personal possessions of the Nawab were taken away from him, Fateh Khan continued to be called by this name but he was henceforth only a Khananchi (treasurer) and his duties were confined to the keeping of the public treasury only.³

1. Irvine, J.A.S.B. 1879, p.104.

He gives a dialogue between Ahmad Khan Bangash and Hafiz Rahmat Khan in which the latter says - "in times of War Dundi Khan takes orders from nobody."

2. Faiz Bakhsh, f.32b.

3. Faiz Bakhsh, f.96a. Khansaman was in reality a Khazanchi of Hafiz.

Civil Administration -

The civil administration in Rohilkhand was left entirely in the hands of the various Jagirdars and Resaladars, who were in charge of a number of Mahals, called jagir and jaidad respectively. Thus the administrative unit was a jagir or a jaidad, and the officials appointed in those jurisdictions, were directly responsible to the jagirdar or the Resaladar, as the case may be.¹ The revenue collection of these units was left by these Jagirdars and Resaladars to the Hindu officials specially appointed for the purpose. The peace and security of the country was maintained by the forces of these Jagirdars and Resaladars, which were really maintained as a police force, although well armed and capable of taking the field when called upon to do so for the defence of the Country.² The administration of justice was also in the hands of the Jagirdars or Resaladars who heard all the complaints and perhaps disposed of them according to equity, good conscience and justice, although an appeal always lay against their decisions^{to} the Nawab and subsequently to the ^{Nail} ~~wakil~~-i-Mustaqil.³

1. Nuruddin, f.5b-6a : Faiz Bakhsh f31a : Gulistan f69a.
2. Gulistan, f.68a-69a. All the Resaladars were with the Rohilla army at Harpar, where they had halted on their march to the assistance of the Emperor.
3. Gulistan, f.144a-144b.

The Army -

Besides the contingents maintained by the Jagirdars and the Resaladars, the State of Rohilkhand maintained a large standing army at the capital, for eight months in a year.¹ During the rainy season which lasted for four months the troops were allowed to proceed on a furlough. The soldiers were paid in cash and comprised both infantry and cavalry, although the former were far more numerous. The payment and equipment of the army was in charge of the Bakhshi, although the recruitment of the army was not done by him directly, but by the jamadars². A jamardar was paid according to the number of men he maintained by the Bakhshi, and he in his turn ~~xxx~~ paid his followers. These units of the jamardars consisted of a single tribe, although the same tribe could have several jamardars.³ Nor was the number of men a jamardar was put in charge of absolutely fixed from the beginning. It varied

1. Wendel - Orme Mss. 216. p.23.
Faiz Bakhsh, f.90a.

2. Gulistan, f.69a.
Nuruddin, f.5a.
Faiz Bakhsh, f.31a.

3. Faiz Bakhsh, f.89a. All the jamardars of the Kamalzai tribe, a branch of the Yusufzai, who were under Faizulla, Hafiz, Dundi and others, went over to Ahmad Khan Bakhshi.

according to the permission and grant given to a Jamardar ✓
by the Bakhshi, which, however, was based essentially on
the bravery and capacity of the Jamardar. Thus a Jamardar
starting with a following of a small number of men, could
rise to the position of a leader of one thousand men, which
seems to be the highest limit.¹ The Sipahsalar took the
command of this army during a campaign, but ^{if} only part of it
was sent out, as was done when six thousand troops went to
the assistance of the Emperor against the English in 1764,
the Council selected the Commander of the contingent from
among the Jagirdars or Rasaladars.²

Nature of the Rohilla State -

Thus the Rohilla State,
was originally based on a system which closely resembled
European feudalism. The Nawab had the direct control of
a large tract of land round the capital and maintained a
large standing army. But the rest of his outlying possession
was in the hands of his Jagirdars who paid him a fixed revenue
and maintained an army of their own according to the size of

1. Nuruddin, f.5a-5b. Najib was a Jamardar of 1000 men after
his bravery at Chilkā (1752). Before this he had 500 men
under him.

2. Faiz Bakhsh, f.68a. : Gulistan, f.114b.

their jagir. These troops had to take the field when summoned by the Nawab. But, during the time of Sadulla Khan, the Nawab became a figure-head and his powers were transferred to the Council of the Jagirdars, Resaladars and the officials. Thus the State became a confederacy of the Jagirdars, Resaladars and the officials, owing nominal allegiance to the Nawab. After the death of Sadulla Khan, the State continued to be a confederacy although there was no Nawab in existence, because the nominal duties of the Nawab exercised by the ^{Nail} ~~Sakil~~-i-Mustaqil, during the time of Sadulla Khan, continued to be exercised by him as before.

The Military Tactics of the Rohillas.-

The Rohillas did not make use of the tactics of the Rajputs, namely, a series of desperate rushes on the enemy. Neither did they adopt the Mughal system which consisted of a charge by the heavy armour-clad cavalry, because against musketry fire which had come into use during their time, the above methods were of little military value except in very rare circumstances. They followed the method of the time and armed their cavalry with "sabre and long lance" and their infantry with muskets¹.

Wendel, Orme Mss. 216, p.23.

But they differed from their contemporaries in this that they placed more reliance on their infantry,¹ than their cavalry. Part of the infantry was always used in a battle to ambush the advancing army with the purpose of killing their leader, thus causing confusion. The Rohillas, being cool and accurate shots, excelled in ambushes. It was in this manner that Qaim Khan Bangash (1749) and Dattaji Sindhia (1760) were slain by the Rohillas. The cavalry, supported by the rest of the infantry, was used first to draw the opposing forces towards the ambush, and then to turn round and make a rush on them as soon as the enemy ranks had become scattered due to the sudden volleys of shots from almost point blank range by the Rohillas in the ambush.² In order to ambush the enemy in the above manner the Rohillas invariably entrenched themselves near a ravine or a ditch. These tactics of the Rohillas saved them from inevitable destruction in 1749 at the hands of the Bangash Nawab of Farrukhabad and in 1760 at the hands of the Marathas, although they failed to achieve their purpose at Kattrra on the 23rd April 1774, against the English army who had their forces divided into two sections called the "1st li:

1. Wendel, Orme Mss. 216. p.23.

"Their infantry was regarded with more terror than their cavalry."

2. Nuruddin, f.29b.-30b. He gives a description of how Dattaji was ambushed by the Rohillas (1760).

Vide, p.90-91

of defence" and the "2nd line of defence" , thus allowing one section to attack the Rohilla party assembled in the ditch in the corner of the battlefield to form an ambush.¹

1. Sel.Com.Pro. 9 May 1774. Letter - Champion 24 April.
He says part of the Rohillas were hidden under cover of the long grass near the ditch, "in order to rush upon us should our right be thrown into confusion" and "never was I more fully convinced of the utility of a second line, than on this occasion."
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